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ABSTRACT  
 
In Lebanon, there is a common understanding and belief among many politicians and 
citizens, in equal measure, that Lebanon is a democratic country. This belief is not only 
restricted to those inside Lebanon, but also to be found in neighbouring Arab countries 
and among their people. In other words, Lebanon is believed to be a country that enjoys 
a relatively democratic political system, rule of law, and a vibrant civil society, 
compared to the rest of the region. However, this is for the most part a 
misunderstanding, and originates from most Lebanese people’s view that a modest level 
of freedom should be considered democracy, and that a relatively unconstrained civil 
society means an effective civil society.  
 
The main purpose of this thesis is to analyse Lebanon’s political system and establish a 
clearer picture about whether the democratic claim is real or just an illusion. In order to 
build this picture, I have concentrated on the internal and external obstacles that have 
impeded the evolution of the Lebanese political system.  The first part of the thesis 
discusses whether or not the Lebanese political system shares any of the features of 
functioning democratic political systems and whether or not it is running in a modus 
which reflects democratic values. In later chapters, the thesis moves on to examine the 
internal and external factors that have hindered the state from becoming a sovereign, 
authoritative state and thus without the necessary foundations for becoming a 
democratic state.  
 
The study will demonstrate that Lebanon suffers from the domination of a militant 
organisation within its borders which violates the country’s sovereignty and disrupts the 
government and its institutions from functioning properly and being authoritative. 
Moreover, it will reveal that most citizens - a key element in any democracy - continue 
to feel subjugated, unable to make their voices heard, and without a say in the decision 
making process. 
 
III 
 
Moreover, it will be demonstrated that Lebanon suffers from several problems. Firstly 
and most importantly, it suffers from the lack of an effective state that imposes the rule 
of law on all of Lebanon’s territory. Secondly and equally important, Lebanon suffers 
from missing a major component that constitutes an essential pillar for the state, and 
that is sovereignty. Thirdly, election results are not taken into consideration as the 
public’s electoral choices are not respected, while instead powerful elite continues to 
rule the country illegally.  These impediments and many others lead the study to 
conclude that the Lebanese political system currently remains far from being considered 
a democracy. 
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1. Chapter One 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Arthur M. Schlesinger noted that “the world got along without democracy until two 
centuries ago, and there is little evidence that constitutional democracy is likely to 
triumph in the century ahead” (Schlesinger 2004). Yet with the beginning of the twenty-
first century, and more specifically following the 11
th
 of September attacks, the whole 
world, and especially the Arab Middle East was shocked by the seemingly rapid spread 
of democratic movements. And it was seemingly time for democracy to become a key 
theme in the United States’; grand strategy which was to be promoted abroad. This type 
of democracy, which many thought should be expanded naturally, or by using 
persuasion and even force if necessary, found itself challenged by fanatical religious 
and political movements and authoritarian regimes in most of the Arab world. In 
Lebanon, however, the scene was somewhat different. The political rift that occurred 
after the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005, and, consequently, after 
the withdrawal of the Syrian troops, resulted in one political camp sticking to the 
historical roots of the Lebanese democratic system, while another, led by Hezbollah, 
apparently represented a stumbling block in its way and challenged it with all kinds of 
violent epithets, with its leaders often describing Lebanon as a country that could not 
survive with a democratic system based on majority controls and minority opposition. 
In this thesis, I will first provide a literature review on democracy and political culture 
as one of the central research themes in contemporary political science. I will then try to 
survey some major studies made about political culture and democracy, trying to find 
out why, after the Second World War, some nations came to support democratic 
systems while other nations turned to authoritarian regimes. 
I will then review the relevant literature on the culture of the Arab world and Islam and 
contend that the literature on the culture of the Arab world, Islam, and the relationship 
between the latter and democracy deserves special attention. The literature review will 
focus on the fact that there is a strong historical connection between religion and 
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politics in the Muslim world, which reflects Islam as a religion consisting of laws that 
organize societies as well as individual principles. After that, I will survey the 
democratization process in the Arab world following the 11
th
 of September attacks. In 
particular I will set out some of the promotion strategies that were implemented in the 
Arab Middle East, explaining how the US dealt with this issue, and the outcomes of 
these strategies.   
The literature review will then move on to discuss the political history of Lebanon, from 
independence, through the war of Lebanon, leading to the post-Taif Accord, and ending 
with the major transitions that took place after the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik 
al-Hariri. 
Finally, a specific literature review of democracy in Lebanon will be included. I will 
study the history of democracy in the country, where it succeeded and where it stalled, 
its current position, and its position in the future. 
The review chapter  will conclude by clarifying the overall structure, methodology, and 
research aims and objectives of the thesis, namely the  investigation of the extent to 
which Lebanon is a democratic country, what are the obstacles it is encountering and 
what is sabotaging it, as well as what are the best means for democracy in Lebanon to 
be maintained.  
 
1.2 Research Aims and Objectives 
 
1.2.1 Research Aims 
 
This research aims to investigate to what extent Lebanon is a democratic country, what 
are the obstacles Lebanese democracy is encountering and what is sabotaging it, as well 
as what are the best means for democracy in Lebanon to be maintained. 
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1.2.2 Research Objectives 
 
In order to fulfil these research aims, this study seeks to define the meaning of 
democracy and its historical evolvement. Also, because Lebanon is an Arab state, this 
study will also briefly analyse to what extent democracy is being implemented in the 
Arab world. Furthermore, this research seeks to measure the perceptions of the political 
leaders and influential figures in the Lebanese political system as regards the extent to 
which democracy is already implemented and what are the current internal and external 
factors sabotaging democracy in Lebanon. 
 
1.3 Methodology 
In order to best fulfil the aims and objectives of this research, I have chosen  to base this 
thesis on qualitative methodology. Qualitative research methodology is defined as a 
method that allows the subjects being studied to give much ‘richer’ answers to questions put 
to them by the researcher. I believe this approach may give valuable insights -which might 
be missed by other methods- on the Lebanese case extending from pre-independence to 
present day.  
1.3.1 Research Resources 
In compiling this thesis, I relied heavily on both primary and secondary sources.  
The primary resources consisted of the following: 
1. Interviews: a number of semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
Lebanese politicians and other members of  country’s political elite.   
The secondary resources consisted of the following: 
1. Scholarly books  
2. Academic journal articles 
3. Other scholarly papers 
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1.3.1.1 Primary Resources 
1.3.1.1.1 Interviews  
1.3.1.1.1.1 Semi-Structured Interviews  
Semi-structured interviews were used as a main method of data collection to reinforce 
the findings of the study. I conducted semi-structured interviews with some influential 
political leaders/figures in Lebanon, representing the country’s various factions. These 
leaders/politicians are: 
1- Saad Hariri, MP, former Prime Minister – Head of the Future Movement. 
2- Walid Jumblatt, MP, Druze leader and the head of the Progressive Socialist 
Party. 
3- Samir Geagea, Christian Leader and the head the Lebanese forces. 
4- Nasib Lahoud, former MP, presidential candidate and the head of the 
Democratic Renewal Movement. 
5- Tariq Metri, former minister, Professor. 
6- Marwan Hamadeh, MP, former minister. 
7- Boutros Harb, MP, Presidential candidate, former minster. 
 Through these interviews, I was able to collect important data on how democracy is 
perceived by the political elite in Lebanon and what the main obstacles standing in the 
way of achieving a healthy democratic system in this country are.  
(a). The Sample 
Overall, the interviews with the politicians conducted by the author can be placed into 
one category. The interviewees were not asked predetermined questions only, but some 
additional questions were added depending on the context of their answers. 
(b). Interview Procedures 
The interviews were conducted between 2008 and 2009. None of the interviewees 
objected to their interviews being recorded, and they happily signed the letter of consent 
that I had prepared.  
(c).Constraints  
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I faced a number of constraints during my field work in Lebanon. Due to the political 
polarization in Lebanon and current security situation, I was not able to conduct 
interviews with representatives of Hezbollah and their allies. However, I attempted to 
work around this limitation by collecting most of the public speeches and interviews 
given by the opposition leaders and members. 
 
1.3.1.2 Secondary Resources 
 
1.3.1.2.1 Books 
Some of the source material supporting the secondary resource approach consists of 
books related directly to points discussed in the research. 
 
1.3.1.2.2 Journals and Papers 
Other material used in support of the secondary resource approach consists of published 
academic journals and papers. I found that accessing such sources allowed my research 
to include up–to-date studies. 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis  
This research attempts to assess, analyse and examine Lebanon’s political system and 
tries to establish a comprehensive and flawless picture about whether the democratic 
claim in the country is real or just a misapprehension. The research, aligning itself in 
this area, aims, additionally, to further our understanding of the political process in 
Lebanon, and find whether the above mentioned claim is valid or not. In an attempt to 
further our understanding, rather than just explanation, the research raises a set of 
research questions. The initial research questions focus on finding out if the Lebanese 
political system shares the structures of properly operative democratic political systems 
in the world.  
6 
 
Succinctly, the fundamental and preliminary questions which this research attempts to 
explore are as follows: what are the main eligible elements that consists a democracy? 
Accordingly, does Lebanon’s political system meet democracy’s standards and thus 
qualify to be considered a democracy? What are the internal and external factors that 
hindered the state from becoming a sovereign, authoritative state, in accordance, lacking 
the necessary foundations for becoming a democratic state hitherto? Therefore, this 
research can be perceived as an original attempt to provide answers to these questions 
through presenting encompassing analyses of the contemporary political system and 
political forces operating in the country.    
To simplify the presentation of this thesis, it has been divided into seven main chapters. 
Each chapter provides overviews and analyses based on these secondary sources, while 
some are based on both secondary sources and primary sources collected during 
research trips to Lebanon between 2008 and 2009.  
The remainder of Chapter one includes the literature review of this thesis, following on 
from this discussion of the research aims, objectives and the methodology.  
Chapter Two provides a profound historical background wherein the main concepts and 
existing definitions of democracy will be discussed. Thereafter, it provides an overview 
of the various approaches regarding the study of democracy and democratization. This 
chapter begins by investigating the notion of democracy and the main phases it has gone 
through since records began. Moreover, the chapter tries to outline the main theoretical 
aspects of democracy along with its practical tools and procedures.   
Chapter three discusses the development of Lebanon as a nation-state since 1943 when 
it first gained its independence from the French mandate. Moreover, it will discuss the 
French mandate of Lebanon, the 1926 constitution and some of its articles that 
respected, recognized and documented democratic principles of governance, and finally 
the gradual transition from the Mandate Era to the independent state. The chapter also 
tries to assess the way the Lebanese political system functioned before and after the 
civil war. Furthermore, it tries to draw a link between the operation of the Lebanese 
institutions and upholding democracy through examining whether the functioning of 
those institutions supported the democratic functioning of the state or failed to do so. 
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This chapter also discusses the institutional synthesis of the Lebanese political system 
and how the translation of the constitutional structure reflected the stability of the 
current model of “democracy”.    
In Chapter Four Ireview some of the internal barriers and hindrances that have impeded 
the development of an effective democratic system in Lebanon. The chapter also 
examines how do these hindrances shake and disturb the path to  democracy in 
Lebanon.    
Chapter five focuses on external hindrances to Lebanon’s democracy. It also examines 
how these external factors manipulate Lebanese internal policies and institutions. 
Moreover, it provides an analysis of how each one of these factors disturbed the 
application of democracy in Lebanon.  
Chapter six provides an thorough account of Hezbollah’s role as an armed organisation 
that functions inside Lebanon. In particular, the chapter investigates the connection 
between Hezbollah and Iran, and sheds light on the organic relationship between them.  
Moreover, this chapter investigates the way this armed organisation managed to reach 
the stage where it became more powerful than the state and its legitimate armed forces. 
The Chapter also discusses the other political parties opposing Hezbollah and how 
Lebanon has become divided into two rival factions, each with its own political agenda. 
An aanalysis of two possible scenarios of state governance in Lebanon is provided 
towards the end of this chapter. 
The conclusion assimilates the various threads of the thesis. The findings of this study 
are summarised and a final evaluation for Lebanon’s “democracy” is supplied.  
 
1.5 Part One: Overview  and Literature Review 
1.5.1 Democracy and Political Culture 
 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, social scientists became concerned with 
studying and elucidating the reasons that made some nations support democratic 
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systems while other nations turned to authoritarian regimes. During and after the war, 
social scientists and anthropologists started to study the cultures and societies which 
developed different types of personalities, and which in turn can explain the support for 
different kinds of political programs and constitutions. In this context, in Germany, an 
earlier piece of research which was carried out by some critical theorists was continued 
by Theodor Adorno and some of his colleagues. In their book, they discussed the 
structure of authority in families, which they believed had led many Germans to support 
authoritarian politics and social prejudice (Adorno 1950). Before that, Ruth Benedict, 
the American anthropologist and Franz Boas’ student, and Margaret Mead, Benedict’s 
student and later one of the most famous American anthropologists of the mid-twentieth 
century, were the proponents of the “culture and personality” approach. This approach 
argued that members of different societies develop different modal personalities, which 
in turn can explain support for different kinds of political programs and institutions.
1
 
Perhaps, after these pieces of work, the most important work on Political Culture and 
now one of the central research themes in contemporary political science was proposed 
by Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba. In their book entitled The Civic Culture: 
Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, they managed to create a theory of 
political culture explaining the political involvement of citizens, or lack thereof, in 
democratic states (Almond & Verba 1963). They “sought to identify the features of 
political culture that foster democratic performance” (Jackman & Miller 1996:634).  
Before looking at the cultural prerequisites of democracy and what the aspects of 
political culture that facilitate democratic politics and governmental performance are, it 
is important to mention that the concept of political culture embodies a variety of 
definitions. Political culture, according to Almond and Verba, is defined as a substantial 
consensus on the legitimacy of political institutions and the direction and content of 
public policy (Almond & Verba1963). Gabriel Almond set out the main ideas and 
summarized them into various definitions: Political Culture has cognitive, effective and 
evaluative components as it is a set of subjective orientations towards politics which 
affects how citizens interact with the political process and thus can influence 
                                                          
1  In the 1920s, due to Sapir's work, the psychological approach to studying culture became prevalent in American 
anthropology. The “Culture and personality approach” was founded by Edward Sapir, Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead. 
Influenced by Gestalt psychology, they believed in “cultural patterning”: Culture should be looked at in forms or patterns, 
rather than as individual elements or “cultural traits”, which were emphasised in historical particularism. 
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governmental structures and performance. It includes knowledge and beliefs about 
political reality as well as feelings with respect to politics and commitments to political 
values (Almond 1993). Lowell Dittmer, a professor at the University of California, 
defines political culture as political symbols that consists of a system, and this system 
nests within a more inclusive system that we might term ‘political communication’ 
(Dittmer
 
 1977). 
The citizens’ interaction with the political process, or what is known as political 
participation, is a very important and fundamental constituent to identifying whether 
any political culture is a democratic one or not . Almond and Verba portray the general 
feature of civic culture as a varied and diverse political culture in which individuals are 
“participants” in and “subjects” of the political system i.e., they are active citizens.2 
Almond and Verba believe that “a successful democracy requires that citizens be 
involved and active in politics, informed about politics, and influential” (Almond &Verba 
1963). Passive citizens, on the other hand, are those who make no demands and have no 
influence. Consequently, the government and officials hardly listen to them and hardly 
satisfy their needs. They are not only those people who fail to vote. Angus Campbell 
pointed out that “the failure to vote, of course, cannot be taken as a direct measure of 
citizen passivity” (Campbell 1962:9). He continues by stating that “there are many 
highly involved people who fail to vote in particular elections because of circumstances 
over which they don’t have control on” (Campbell 1962:9).  According to Almond and 
Verba, the passive citizen is the “non-voter, the poorly informed or apathetic citizen- all 
indicate a weak democracy” (Almond &Verba 1963). 
However, Almond and Verba stress that the cycle of citizen involvement in politics and 
the elite’s response to them, and then the citizens’ withdrawal together, create a cycle 
that may tend to strengthen the ‘balance of opposites’ that is required for democracy” 
(Almond &Verba 1963).
3
 They argue that participatory activity in politics must be 
balanced by a degree of passivity and non-involvement, and that having and creating a 
                                                          
2 The term ‘Active Citizen’ comes from a book entitled How to be an active citizen, written by Paul Douglass and Alice 
McMahon, 1960, Gainesville, Fla. 
3 Almond and Verba found that citizens in ordinary times appear uninterested in governmental decisions and activities. But 
if an issue becomes prominent, the citizens’ demands on officials and government will increase, and if  the government 
responds to these demands, politics will return to normal. This cycle, according Almond and Vebra, is necessary for 
democracy. 
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balance between government power and responsiveness to participation is very much 
needed (Almond &Verba 1963). These cycles of involvement, according to Almond and 
Verba, “are an important way of maintaining the balanced inconsistencies between 
activity and passivity” (Almond &Verba 1963). 
 
1.5.2 The Culture of the Arab World, Islam, and Democracy 
 
In his conclusions about the reasons democratic consolidation has been more successful 
in Latin America than in many other developing areas like the Middle East, Mainwaring 
clearly set out that what has contributed to the “greater survivability of Latin American 
democracies, revolves around changes in political attitudes toward a greater valorisation 
of democracy” (Mainwaring 1999:45). In connection with this, Chu, Shin and Diamond 
presented a very comparable opinion in their study of Korea and Taiwan, stating that the 
consolidation of democratic transitions requires “sustained, internalized belief in and 
commitment to the legitimacy of democracy among the citizenry as large” (Chu & 
Diamond & Shin 2000:2). Similarly, Inglehart, the well-known political scientist at the 
University of Michigan, summed up that “democracy is not attained simply by making 
institutional changes” but its “survival depends on the values and beliefs of ordinary 
citizens (Inglehart 2000:96).  
Lately, the culture of the Arab world, Islam, and the relationship between these and 
democracy, has been widely discussed. This discussion has most often been based on 
the fact that there is a strong historical connection between religion and politics in the 
Muslim world, which reflects Islam as a religion consisting of laws that organize 
societies as well as individual principles. Additionally, this fact has become gradually 
more significant in Arab culture and political life. It started to play a critical role in 
shaping political culture and thus, as Kamrava has described, no Middle Eastern 
Muslim country has really been “able to escape completely from its overarching reach” 
(Kamrava 1998:201).  
It is noted when talking about the Arab world that a democratic political culture is 
necessary for any political system to survive.  Lliya Harek summarized this concept by 
saying that “In the long run, of course, a democratic government needs a democratic 
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political culture, and vice versa” (Harik 1994:56). But, will such a concept ever be 
implemented in the Arab world?  Many scholars and observers state that democracy and 
Islam are unable to coexist; consequently, there is no hope of seeing a democratic 
political culture emerging in the Arab world. By the same token, democracy, cannot be 
taken for granted as there is a big gap between the conceptual understanding of 
democracy on one hand, and the concrete application of democracy on the other hand 
(Al-Dakhil 2011).  That gap as argued by Turki Al-Dakhil, the well-known writer and 
journalist, is caused by the misunderstanding of the notion of democracy in some parts 
of the Arab world .i.e. Arab people’s eagerness for democracy doesn’t necessarily mean 
that it is achievable as they are not culturally qualified to adopt and implement 
democracy as a ruling model (Al-Dakhil 2011). Furthermore, the Arab culture, 
according to Al-Dakhil, subconsciously suffers from different kinds of ethnic, 
intellectual and sectarian discrimination. 
 Seemingly, in order to work, democracy requires certain values, like openness, 
competition, pluralism, and acceptance of diversity; and Islamic and Arab Muslim 
countries are incompatible with these values. These scholars further argue that Islam 
supports intellectual conformity and an uncritical acceptance of authority. Therefore, 
Islam is said to be antidemocratic because it vests sovereignty in God, and, therefore, 
Islam has to be “ultimately embodied in a totalitarian state” (Choueiri 1996: 21-2). Ellie 
Kedourie, for example, seems to agree with these ideas. In his book, Democracy and 
Arab political culture, Kedourie was clear and unreserved: Arabs, Muslims, have 
nothing in their own political traditions that is companionable with the Western concept 
of democracy and so-called constitutional representative government (Kedourie 1992). 
He expressed the opinion that the institutions and values associated with democracy are 
“profoundly alien to the Muslim political tradition” (Kedourie 1992: 5-6). 
 “There is nothing in the political traditions of the Arab world- Which are the 
political traditions of Islam- which might make familiar, or indeed intelligible, the 
organizing ideas of constitutional and representative government. The notion of the 
state as a specific territorial entity, which is endowed with sovereignty, the notion of 
popular sovereignty as the foundation of governmental legitimacy, the idea of 
representation, of elections, of popular suffrage, of political institutions being 
regulated by laws laid down by a parliamentary assembly, of these laws being 
guarded and upheld by an independent judiciary, the ideas of the secularity of the 
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state, of society being composed of a multitude of self-activating, autonomous groups 
and associations - all these  are profoundly alien to the Muslim political tradition” 
(Kedourie 1992: 5-6) . 
                                                                           
Bernard Lewis, the British-American historian and an expert on the Middle East thought 
along the same lines as Kedourie. He accredited the authoritarian nature of the Arab-
Muslim world to the Islamic religion itself. In his book, The Shaping of the Modern 
Middle East, Lewis noted: 
“Islamic History shows no councils or communes, no synods or parliaments, nor 
any other kind of elected or represented assembly. It is interesting that the jurists 
never accepted the principle of majority decision – There was no point, since the 
need for a procedure of co-operate, collective decision never arose” (Lewis 
1994:45-56). 
 
In a later work, - and while many Muslim intellectuals were rejecting the suggestion 
that Islam is an enemy in the struggle for accountable democracy (Muslim 
intellectuals .i.e. in Lebanon) - , Lewis reasserted this same opinion and presented some 
additional hindrances to the development of democracy in the Middle East. These 
hindrances were related to corruption, women’s rights and fundamentalist tendencies. 
He argued that the main challenge in the Middle East remained the relationship between 
those elements carrying the banner of Islam and those carrying the banner of liberal 
democracy. He pointed out that fundamentalists use mosques to spread out their views, 
and that liberal democrats were seen as safeguarding the same standards as the corrupt 
regimes (Lewis 1999). Lewis summarized this as follows: 
    “In the struggle between democracy and fundamentalism for power in Muslim 
lands, the democrats, the democrats suffer from a very serious disadvantage. As 
democrats, they are obliged to allow the fundamentalists equal opportunity to 
conduct propaganda and to contend for power. If they fail, they are violating the 
very essence of their own democratic creed. Paradoxically, it is the western 
concern for democratic freedom, even at the cost of Western values and freedom 
itself that sometimes prevents the Muslim secularists from dealing with this 
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problem in the traditional way. The fundamentalists are under no such disability” 
(Lewis 1999:11). 
 
Analogous opinions have also been expressed by Samuel Huntington’s throughout his 
lengthy career. As early as 1984 Huntington was pointing explicitly to Islam in order to 
explain why “among Islamic countries, particularly those in the Middle East, the 
prospects for democratic development seem low” (Huntington 1984:216) To Huntington, 
it is not Arab culture but rather the Islamic religion which has been the main hindrance 
to economic development and thus democracy. In his opinion, Islam has not been 
hospitable to democracy (Huntington 1984:216). He argues that the “Islamic revival, and 
particularly the Shi’ite fundamentalism would seem even to reduce even further the 
likelihood of democratic development particularly since democracy is often identified 
with the very western influences the revival strongly opposes” (Huntington 1984:216). 
Few years after, in his “The Goals of Development”, Huntington deepened and 
improved these ideas by demonstrating that each region of the world has its own 
separate as well as distinct religio-cultural core that plays an important role in 
determining receptivity to democratic systems (Wiener & Huntington 1994). In his later 
work The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century, Huntington 
categorised Islam and Confucianism as religo-cultural examples under the label of 
“profoundly anti-democratic” (Huntington 1993:300). Accordingly, he presumed that 
they would “impede the spread of democratic norms in society, deny legitimacy to 
democratic institutions, and thus greatly complicate if not prevent the emergence and 
effectiveness of those institutions (Huntington 1993:298).” In light of the above 
mentioned, Huntington’s essay and later book based around the notion of a “Clash of 
Civilisations” furthered the aforesaid ideas by claiming that the early twenty-first 
century will be damaged by a physical and ideological battle between both the anti-
democratic “civilizations” and the West (Huntington 1997). In this well-known book, 
Huntington focused in particular on religious and cultural differences as a major cause 
of international conflict in the post-Cold War era. Furthermore, Huntington asserted that 
Islam in particular encourages Muslim aggressiveness toward non-Muslim peoples 
(Huntington 1997).  He stated that some westerners have argued that “...the West does 
not have any problems with Islam, but only with violent Islamic extremists ... But 
14 
 
evidence to support this is lacking... the underlying problem for the West is not Islamic 
fundamentalism. It is Islam” (Huntington 1997:209-217).4  
 
1.5.3 Democracy and Democratization Process in the Arab World after 9/11  
 
The Cold War affected world politics profoundly. It ended in 1991, with the Soviets 
withdrawing from Afghanistan specifically, and from the Third World in general. This 
left the US as victor, dominating and unchallenged at a regional level (Falk 1993:75). 
As a part of dealing with the new period, the US needed to make some improvements to 
its foreign policy toward the region and satisfy the power vacuum and void the Soviet 
Union had left behind. In particular it had to develop new policies that could integrate 
the Arab World with both the US economy and Western political governance. But, 
while the challenge of adapting to these new conditions and policies was taking place, 
the US was aggressively attacked on 11
th
 of September 2001. As expected, these attacks 
resulted in another turning point in world politics following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union.  
During a lecture at the New York Democracy Forum, Francis Fukuyama alleged that the 
US had been promoting democracy in an organized and serious way for a number of 
decades, and that every American president had made promoting democracy a 
component of US foreign policy (Fukuyama 2005). Fukuyama stated that the foreign 
policy of the US had always contained an authoritative idealist element, and that 
promoting democracy abroad has been one of its goals since the time of President 
Woodrow Wilson (Fukuyama 2005). Fukuyama mentioned that earlier generations 
around the world had benefited from the US’ promotion of democracy. He summarized 
this by saying: 
 
      “We have done a lot of democracy promotion in earlier generations, Japan and 
Germany emerged from World War Two as well functioning democracies in large 
measure because of American intervention. We played a large role in promoting the 
so-called third wave democracies in 1970s, 80s and 90s” (Fukuyama 2005:162). 
                                                          
4
 cited in (Isakhan 2008) 
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Fukuyama supported the idea of the US being at the forefront of aiding the promotion of 
democratic transitions, while he discarded the idea of supporting non-democratic or 
authoritarian allies as “we can be very unhelpful when we support non-democracies or 
we support authoritarian allies that are trying to hold back that tide” (Fukuyama 
2005:162-163) Thomas Carothers supported the idea of the US supporting non-
democracies being unhelpful. He also went further than this, accusing the Bush 
administration in a strenuous critique of its tolerance of, and even support for, autocratic 
regimes around the world (Carothers 2003). In one article, Carothers accused the Bush 
administration, and specifically Bush himself, who, had talked about democracy in the 
Middle East more than any other US president(Brumberg 2005:15), by alleging that the 
administration has turned a blind eye to various anti-democratic practices carried out by 
these newfound allies(Carothers 2003). But Paula J. Dobriansky, an expert on US 
foreign policy, stated that the Carothers’ claim was incorrect. In an article, Dobriansky 
explained the Bush administration’s position, and talked about the September 2002 
national security strategy which “lays out our post-September 11 strategic visions, 
prominently features democracy promotion” (Dobriansky 2003:141). Indeed, 
Dobriansky mentioned in her article that the promotion of democracy was a key foreign 
policy goal of the Bush administration” (Dobriansky 2003:144). Furthermore, she went 
on to say that the strategy portrayed promoting democracy as a central and core part of 
the US and its administration’s national security doctrine, which, as a result, commits 
the US to helping other countries realize their full potential. Evidently, and to support 
her statement, Dobriansky mentioned some smaller parts of the strategy which were set 
out by George W. Bush on the 1
st
 of June 2002 in New York: 
 
     “In pursuit of our goals, our first imperative is to clarify what we stand for: the 
United States must defend liberty and justice because these principles are right and 
true for all people everywhere... America must stand firmly for the non-negotiable 
demands of human dignity: the rule of the law; limits on the absolute power of the 
state; free speech; freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for women; religious 
and ethnic tolerance; and respect for private property” (Dobriansky 2003:141) . 
 
Equally important, Dobriansky wrote that whenever the US and the Bush administration 
in particular, came across any proof of serious human rights breaches or anti-democratic 
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practices in any country around the world, it raised a voice of opposition to such 
violations and sought to address these problems. For the Bush administration, 
Dobriansky continued, “democracy promotion is not just a ‘made in the U.S.’ venture, 
but a goal shared with many other countries” (Dobriansky 2003:142). In short, 
Dobriansky, who served as Under Secretary of State for Democracy and Global Affairs 
from 2001-2009, summed up by saying that despite the massive demands of the war 
against terrorism, the Bush administration found time for and evidenced a keen interest 
in launching several major new democracy-promotion initiatives, and that any 
endeavour to “juxtapose or contrast our efforts to win the war against terrorism and our 
democracy-promotion strategy is conceptually flawed” (Dobriansky 2003:143).  
 
Consequently, with unprecedented forcefulness, and after the 11th of September 
terrorist attacks, the Bush administration focused on promoting democracy in the world, 
especially in the Middle East. The policy consensus in the Bush administration, as 
Katerina Dalacoura argued, “Has been that fostering democracy in the Middle East 
would drain the pool from which terrorist organizations draw recruits in their global 
struggle against the US.” (Dalacoura 2005:963). In her article, Dalacoura argues that the 
promotion of democracy in the Arab Middle East has been pursued on a three different 
levels. The first level “consists of policy initiatives comprising clusters of projects to 
support civil society organizations and reform state institutions with a view to 
encouraging democratic change.” (Dalacoura 2005:963). Moreover, the author referred 
to the USAID programme and its extra emphasis on democracy promotion, which has 
increased since 2001, as a means of reducing poverty and reinforcing US security. The 
second level of US democracy promotion in the Arab Middle East has been dealing 
with traditional and public diplomacy. This level of promotion, according to Dalacoura, 
involved working on promoting reform and highlighting that democratic reform in the 
Middle East has become a central and core objective of US policy in the region. This 
reform promotion was a “key goal in the launching of Radio Sawa (‘Together’) and the 
Al-Hurrah (‘The free’) television station, which target younger audiences in the Arab 
world with a view to initiating them into American culture and wining them over to 
American values” (Dalacoura 2005:964). Reaching the third and final level, the author 
pointed out that, at this level, democracy promotion became an integral part of what she 
calls it “an interventionist US foreign policy in the Arab Middle East, epitomized in the 
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invasion of Iraq”, and that having a democratic Iraq means having a natural US ally and 
this will encourage political reform in the Arab world as a whole (Dalacoura 2005:964).  
 
In addition, in time the response to US democracy promotion policies across the Arab 
Middle East in general became more organized and took the form of regional meetings 
which produced pro-reform statements. Reform appeared to be accepted by all political 
players; debates became more open and took on a freer character, and discussions 
became more frequent and focused. Additionally, arguments started to increasingly 
address many issues beyond the generic criticism of Arab regimes (Carothers & 
Ottaway 2005:8), while an increasing number of Arab analysts began focusing on the 
problems of Arab political systems and acknowledging the need for reform (Ottaway 
2005:173). Moreover, the arguments on democracy have encompassed the Islamist 
movements and encouraged an examination of their attitude towards reform (Ottaway 
2005:185-186). In his article, Gamal Essam El-Din revealed that, in response to the 
debate initiated by US policies, the Muslim Brotherhood decided to unveil their own 
reform initiative in March 2004, which demanded democratic freedoms and suspension 
of emergency laws imposed by the Egyptian government (Essam El-Din 2004). In the 
same context, and in response to the US reform initiative, a considerable amount of 
conferences were launched in the Arab Middle East. For example, an international 
conference took place in Yemen in March 2004, which led to the establishment of the 
Arab Democratic Dialogue Forum
5
. Also in 2004, but this time in Alexandria, a 
conference entitled “Arab Reform” took place. It was attended by Arab writers, 
commentators, intellectuals, and political activists and called upon Arab governments to 
implement reforms that would take into consideration the elimination of states of 
emergency in the some Arab Middle Eastern countries.
6
 In June 2004, a conference 
arranged and coordinated by the United States Institute for Peace took place in Qatar 
and concluded with a call for the adoption of the Doha Declaration for Democracy and 
                                                          
5Sana’a Declaration on Democracy, Human Rights and the Role of the International Criminal Court, 10-12 January2004, 
[Available online] 
http://www.undp.org.ye/reports/Sanaa%20Decleration%20on%20Democracy%20Human%20RIghts%20and%20the%20R
ole%20of%20the%20International%20Criminal%20Court.pdf, January 2010. 
 
6 Alexandria Statement, Final Statement of “Arab Reform Issues: Vision and Implementation”, 12-14 March 2004, [Available 
online] http://www.bibalex.org/arf/en/Files/Document.pdf, January 2010. 
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Reform.
7
  It has been demonstrated that these conferences, in addition to pressure from 
the US, led to an apparent impact on many Arab governments which subsequently “took 
steps that signal a growing acceptance of human rights as a legitimate public policy 
issue” (Hawthorne 2004:13). In May 2004, the Arab League Summit, which was held in 
Tunisia, referred briefly, and for the first time, to political reform, and raised “the 
question of reform, development and modernization in the Arab world”.8 Carothers and 
Ottaway noted that some Arab countries, like Saudi Arabia, Palestine, Bahrain, Qatar, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Algeria and Morocco, have improved some civil rights to varying 
degrees and to various levels and have allowed ‘some’ political participation to be 
conducted through elections’(Ottaway & Carothers 2005:262). In Egypt, former 
President Hosni Mubarak’s government responded by introducing multiparty 
contestation at the presidential elections. It reformed the National Governing party, 
created the Human Rights Council, and gave greater concessions to critics of the 
Egyptian regime (Schemm 2005). 
 
A large and growing body of literature has discussed the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. 
Some of this literature has argued that invading Iraq and ousting Saddam Hussein 
caused the first real tête-à-tête in the Arab Middle East about political reform and 
democracy. Thomas Friedman, for example, argues that invading Iraq resulted in a 
widespread criticism of the US, but that the critics, he continues “miss, though, that the 
US ousting of Saddam Hussein has also triggered the first real "conversation" about 
political reform in the Arab world in a long, long time” (Friedman 2004.) Furthermore, 
in his article, Friedman quoted and summarized opinions of commentators published in 
some Arab newspapers to defend his argument. In another article, also by Friedman, he 
claimed “Yes, there is definitely something stirring out here, but it has miles to go 
before meaningful changes occur. It is something America should be quietly 
encouraging” (Friedman 2004). In a certain sense Dalacoura shares Friedman’s opinion. 
She thinks that some successes were achieved like creating a greater awareness of the 
lack of democracy in the region; “initiating a debate about reform; emboldening 
                                                          
7United States Institute of Peace /Doha Declaration for Democracy and Reform, June 3–4, 2004, [Available online]   
http://www.qatar-conferences.org/arabdemocracy2007/viewlastnews_first.php?id=5, January 2010. 
8 Tunisia Arab League Summit, May 22-23, 2004, [Available online]   http://www.arabsummit.tn/en/summit.htm, January 
2010 
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opposition movements; and making the need for change a given, accepted by both 
publics and governments” (Dalacoura 2001:978). Francis Fukuyama was very 
optimistic when he said that large cracks had been visible in the facade of Arab 
authoritarianism especially after the Iraqi elections which took place in 2005, and that 
the elections and other events meant the whole region had a great deal of pent-up 
demand for democratic change (Fukuyama 2005). 
 
Interestingly, the topic of democracy promotion in the Arab Middle East then led to 
much variation. On one hand, it made some Arab analysts and liberal commentators 
praise democracy and start shedding light on the problems of Arab political systems. 
Furthermore, and rather amazingly, they recognized the need for massive political 
reform, and, as Ottaway describes, they “continued to express hostility toward the 
United States while calling for democratic change” (Ottaway 2005). On the other hand, 
it resulted in some Arab analysts and conservative commentators preferring to deal with 
“democracy as a foreign policy issue, asking why the United States was suddenly 
discussing democracy in the Arab world and what true intentions it was trying to hide 
behind the smoke screen of democracy talk” (Ottaway 2005). Moreover, it caused them 
criticize the Bush administration for using the idea of democracy promotion as a code 
word for regime change. Being more realistic, Fukuyama concluded that the US was 
perhaps the wrong agent for promoting democracy in the Arab Middle East at that point 
in history, and if democracy does come to the Arab Middle East it will have a Muslim 
and an Arab temperament (Fukuyama 2005). 
 
 
 
1.5.4 Lebanon: A Political Overview  
1.5.4.1 From Pre-Independence, to the Pre-Taif Agreement 
In the wake of the First World War, which ended with the break-up of the German, 
Austro-Hungarian, Russian and Ottoman empires, a possibility was witnessed for the 
victorious Allies to redraw the political map of the world. In Europe, the defeated 
Germany and Austria-Hungary re-emerged, with the latter becoming the separated 
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independent countries and republics of Austria and Hungary. Meanwhile, the Bolshevik 
revolution was already beginning to reconstruct the Russian empire, which would later 
become the Soviet Union. The German colonies, which were in Africa and elsewhere, 
were divided between Britain and France as mandates under licence from the newly 
organized League of Nations (Salibi 1993). With the Ottoman Empire having been 
defeated in the War, and Britain and France having been licensed to share the legacy of 
division caused by the outcome of this war, it became necessary to fill the void formed 
after the collapse of Ottoman control. 
By the spring of 1920, an agreement was reached between Britain and France at San 
Remo on how the former Arab territories of the defunct Ottoman Empire would be 
divided and shared between them. Now that Lebanon had been freed from the Ottoman 
Empire, the League of Nations, ratifying the agreement between Britain and France, 
gave France a mandate over Lebanon which was to last for several decades. This 
mandate, which was intended to later form the state of ‘Greater Lebanon’, expanded the 
country’s borders by combining the mainly Christian and Druze Lebanon Mountains 
with Muslim areas, the coast and the fertile valley of Bekáa. In simple terms, it moved 
Sunni and Shiite Muslims into a new state that was to be dominated by Christians and 
Druze, making up the sectarian mosaic of Lebanon as it can be seen today. This social 
and religious amalgamation made the new country far more viable, but this viability did 
not last for long, as conflict between the ethnic and religious groups developed later. 
Michael Kerr argues that the “Christian communities that coexisted on Mount Lebanon 
have sought to preserve their ethnic difference, both in the past, from the Sunni-
dominated empires, and in the present, through Maronite rejection of Arab nationalism” 
(Kerr 2006). By the 1
st
 of September 1920, four months after the conclusion of the San 
Remo agreement, “General Henri Gouraud, from the porch of his official residence as 
French high Commissioner in Beirut, proclaimed the birth of the State of Greater 
Lebanon, with Beirut as its capital” (Salibi 1993).  
With the country’s independence in 1943, Lebanese political leaders, mainly Bechara El 
Khoury,  the first post-independence president of Lebanon, and Riad al-Solh, the 
first prime minister, agreed on an unwritten National Pact which planned to promote 
collaboration and conciliation among the rival confessional groups. It was the moment 
that chronicled the birth of a concept called confessional democracy. This National Pact 
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ranked the major sects in order of population as Maronites, Sunnites, Shiites, Greek 
Orthodox, Druze, and Greek Catholics. Among the pact's provisions, Maronites and 
Sunnites were assured major leading political roles in proportion with their 1932 
populations. Unfortunately, and after only a short time, the agreement faced external 
and internal tensions in 1948 and 1958, the former being due to the first Arab defeat 
against Israel and the fleeing of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from their homes, 
something which considerably threatened the already fragile confessional balance in 
neighbouring Lebanon. Ten years after this external pressure came internal tensions. 
These took place in 1958, when political antagonists from different sects were 
aggravated by President Camille Chamoun, who challenged the constitution in an effort 
to gain an extended term of office. The result was a short civil war. Ahmad Beydoun, 
the well-known Lebanese writer and sociologist, describes this era very well:  
“In June 1957, the second parliamentary elections during the era of President 
Camille Chamoun were held. These elections were not free from government 
interference, and led to the ouster from parliament of most leaders of the opposition - 
among them Lebanon's most prominent za`ims. Following this, an intense campaign 
began to renew President Chamouns’s presidential mandate, which also provoked 
strong opposition from the president's rivals. When the armed rebellion began in May 
1958, following the assassination of journalist Nassib al-Matni, the ranks of the 
opposition contained Christian members; indeed, the Maronite patriarch himself 
occupied, for some time, a pre-eminent place in the opposition to President 
Chamoun. Despite this, a sectarian tint dominated the opposition. It became obvious 
that a large portion of the Christian masses had rallied around the za`ama of Camille 
Chamoun while Muslim tendencies - attracted by the image of Abd al-Nasser - rallied 
around the intifada. ... The crisis of 1958 began and ended with sectarian divisions” 
(Beydoun 1993). 
Although the sectarian catastrophe of 1958 started and ended with sectarian divisions, it 
paved the way to a new period of nation-building. The era of Fuad Chehab, Camille 
Chamuon’s presidential successor, witnessed a rise in the growth of incorporating 
factors in Lebanon. These included material factors, institutional factors – from the 
extension of state education to modernization of the bureaucracy –, and political factors, 
including the attraction of new groups and tendencies from the margins, and their 
participation at the heart of national political life (Beydoun 1993). Fuad Chehab’s 
presidential successor in 1964, Charles Helou, tried to continue his programme but was 
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thwarted by a series of political and economic crises such as the Intra Bank crisis of 
1966, which led to a levelling off of economic growth
9
, the Six-Day War of June 1967, 
and the crises of 1969 and 1970 (Hudson 1978 & Labaki 1993) . The Six-Day War saw 
another influx of Palestinian refugees to Lebanon. President Helou barely managed to 
keep Lebanon nonaligned during the Six-Days War, and the intensity of the fighting and 
accompanying tensions in the Middle East sparked multifaceted domestic conflicts 
which trapped Helou and his presidential successor after 1970, Sulayman Franjiyah. 
These conflicts were serious and complex, and their complexity and seriousness resulted 
in the unity – during each conflict – of overlapping factions of Muslims, Palestinians 
and a wide variety of leftists, all allying together against Christians as supporters of the 
West, rich rightists, and supporters of the status quo during that period. This set of 
repeated conflicts encouraged the Palestinians to enter the forum of Lebanese politics, 
by assigning themselves to the level of a major player. With the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) having been expelled from Jordan in 1970 during its civil war, and 
with a  government weak enough to challenge them or and impose any significant 
control over them, it was the time for the growing numbers of the heavily armed PLO 
militia to develop a state within a state: “the civil war in Jordan in September 1970 must 
have intensified Maronite fears of the Palestinians considerably”(Hudson 
1978:261:278).  In 1972 the PLO opened its head office in Beirut and started from 
southern Lebanon its hit-and-run attacks on northern Israel. Israel responded with 
serious attacks on the PLO. These attacks, which affected the majority of Lebanese 
territory, were the final straw as the divided Lebanese government was unable to 
restrain attacks from either side and watched feebly as the devastation of Lebanon took 
place. According to Anthony Sampson, during the five years  that witnessed the PLO’s 
expulsion from Jordan and the war with Israel (1970-1975) "the Christians were already 
arming themselves rapidly, smuggling in M16 rifles, Czech M58 rifles and other small 
arms they could fire, and spending their evenings in arms drill" (Sampson 1977:17).  
It was on 13
th
 of April 1975 when the first spark of the Lebanese war broke out. It 
began with a strike and counterstroke: gunmen attacked Christian members of the 
Kataib party at a Beirut church, killing several people, and hours later some Kataib 
                                                          
9 "Intra Bank, Lebanon's largest, was a Palestinian venture and it has been alleged that Lebanese and other financial 
interests helped engineer the liquidity crisis that brought it down.” For further details see Michael C. Hudson, “The 
Palestinian Factor in the Lebanese Civil War”. 
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party gunmen surprisingly attacked a bus full of Palestinians. Months of brutal battles 
followed, prompting military intervention by Syria. In his paper, Michael C. Hudson 
explains the Lebanese war and its causes, he says: 
“It is simplistic to argue that the Lebanese conflict was essentially a Lebanese-
Palestinian war. It is also simplistic to assert that the Palestinians were merely 
innocent bystanders who only fought back in self-defence. The crucial facts to 
remember are these: (a) there was a collapse of authority in the Lebanese state and 
open conflict among Lebanese themselves; (b) there was no effective centralized 
authority over the armed Palestinians in Lebanon, and (c) there were well organized 
efforts by external elements to provoke and maintain the conflict”(Hudson 
1978:267). 
In May of 1976, the era of Syrian military intervention began. The Syrian army invaded 
the northern Lebanese region of Akkar and advanced into the Bekáa valley east of 
Lebanon. However, Palestinians managed to fight on two fronts at the same time, both 
inside the country and in the southern part of Lebanon. The PLO attacks on northern 
Israel continued and, in return, it brought Israeli revenge to Lebanon, later producing a 
limited Israeli invasion of the southern part of Lebanon in March 1978. Between 1980 
and 1982, without restraint and without scruples, vicious militia wars became 
uncontrolled in Beirut again. In 1982, Israel launched an operation seeking peace for its 
northern territory. This operation, which was a full-scale invasion of Lebanon, aimed 
mainly to curb the PLO and chastise the divided Lebanon for sheltering them. Israeli 
armed forces reached Beirut forcing a PLO retreat. In August of the same year, and as a 
result of international negotiation, thousands of PLO troops were forced to evacuate 
from Beirut and Tripoli by sea. At the same time, a multinational force made up of US, 
French, British, and Italian troops was deployed to stabilize the situation, facilitate the 
process and "to provide appropriate assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces as they 
carry out responsibilities for the safe evacuation of the departing PLO ...” (Kelly 2010). 
On 23
rd
 of August 1982, Bashir Gemayel, the leader of the Lebanese Forces Militia, was 
elected as a president and successor to Elias Sarkis. Before the inaugural ceremony 
could take place, the President-elect was assassinated and then replaced by his brother, 
Amin. On 15
th
 of September, Israeli forces moved forward into positions throughout 
much of west Beirut, prompting the White House to call for Israeli withdrawal from 
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west Beirut and a similar demand from the U.N. Security Council. While the fighting 
continued at irregular intervals, an unexpected wave of bombing took place. It happened 
in October 1983 when Hezbollah killed nearly 300 US and French troops, being one of 
the first in history who used what is called now a suicide attack (Hassan 2008). In June 
1985 Israel withdrew most of its army, but left a few thousand occupying forces in the 
south. The Palestinian commando attacks on northern Israel were later replaced by a 
new Shiite extremist group, Hezbollah, which enjoyed Iranian support and Syrian 
approval. 
Although violent fighting generally eased between 1986 and 1988, hostage-taking amid 
near-anarchy became commonplace. With the two wars of ‘liberation’ and ‘abolition’, 
between Michel Aoun and the Syrians on one hand, and Michel Aoun and Samir 
Geagea and on the other,
10
 the beginning of the end of the war drew close. It was when 
Lebanon's parliamentarians met in Taif, Saudi Arabia, from 30
th
 of September through 
22
nd
 of October, 1989 that they reached the Taif Agreement for a National 
Reconciliation Charter. 
 1.5.4.2 From the post-Taif Accord, up to Hezbollah occupation of Beirut 
 
In January 1989, the Arab League Committee of Six was launched. It was decided in 
Morocco to create a Tripartite High Commission consisting of President Chadli 
Bendjedid of Algeria, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, and King Hassan II of Morocco in 
order to resolve the Lebanese problem. Sixty two members of the Lebanese parliament 
were invited to meet in Ta'if, from 30
th
 of September to 22
nd
 of October, 1989. Under 
the auspices of the Arab League Tripartite Committee and with the support of the 
United Nations Security Council, they reached an agreement called the Document of 
National Understanding (Norton 1991). The agreement stopped the war, re-adjusted the 
political power among the country’s confessional groups of people, and called for the 
withdrawal of Syrian troops, which had been in Lebanon since 1976, by mandating their 
departure. Riad El-Khoury discussed this saying:  
                                                          
10 On March 14, 1989, Aoun, along with the support of the Lebanese Forces, declared a ‘war of liberation’ against the Syrian 
presence in Lebanon. In 1990, the alliance between the Lebanese Forces and Michel Aoun reached an end and caused a war 
that was called the ‘war of abolition’. 
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“To end the conflict, parliament met in the Saudi city of Taif in 1989and reached an 
agreement again based on proportional sectarian representation. The accord left a 
weakened presidency as the prerogative of a Maronite, a strengthened Sunni 
premiership, and the somewhat stronger parliamentary Shiite speakership, while 
dividing seats in parliament (and higher echelon civil service jobs) equally between 
Christians and other sects” (al-Khouri 2006:72). 
 
Although fighting had reached an end, the Lebanese were not left alone. They remained 
subjected to the presence of 35,000 Syrian troops occupying their territories and 
restricting their movement and freedom under the expedience of providing them with 
security. Lebanon was consequently under the indirect political control of Syria. It was 
also burdened by the continued presence of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, the 
continual military operations of Hezbollah, and a succession of Israeli attacks, all of 
which held back Lebanon's post-war recovery. However, greeted by the international 
community’s quiet acceptance of Syria's military intervention in the Lebanese civil war, 
Syria decided to stay in Lebanon. This was in violation of the Taif Agreement, which 
demanded its withdrawal. Eric V. Thompson argued that: 
“Hafez Assad, the Syrian president in that era was faced with the challenge either of 
be- coming the target of international pressure to abandon the Syrian deployment in 
Lebanon, or creating a perception of legitimacy for the Syrian action. It is to the 
latter option that Asad quickly turned and which he vigorously pursued for over 
twenty years. From 1976 on, Asad's government attempted to establish de facto 
legitimacy by framing its policies in such a way as to create, retroactively, the 
appearance that they were in compliance with international law and by eventually 
producing outcomes that were widely perceived as "beneficial" by the international 
community” (Thompson 2002:75). 
The Syrian troops’ presence in Lebanon gave the authorities in Damascus the power to 
control the small country by dominating its government and planning its key political 
decisions so that they did not conflict with their interests. Furthermore, they had the 
power to name presidents, prime ministers, ministers and impose their will as to MPs 
should be elected (El Amine 2009). Under Syrian tutelage, the armed sectarian Muslim 
Shiite party Hezbollah thrived (Knudsen 2005:12). During the period of Syrian 
domination, and in the early 80s, Hezbollah, backed by the Islamic revolution in Iran 
started to penetrate the Lebanese wall by trying to implant the radical ideology of Iran 
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in Lebanon, especially the south where the majority of people are Shiite Muslims. After 
a long period filled with bitter conflicts, Hezbollah’s leaders succeeded in penetrating 
the Lebanese culture, specifically the Shiite Muslim culture, and started to call for the 
establishment of the Islamic republic in Lebanon. In doing this they based their 
argument on what they had stated in 1986, namely that “the current composition of the 
Lebanese system is unfair and cannot be reformed, as it is a creature of the west global 
arrogance” (Qassem 2008:41). Hezbollah leaders did not find supporters for their new 
state idea, so they decided to put it aside. They did not, however, give it up as can 
clearly be seen in a book written by Hezbollah’s second in command: “If it was 
available for our people to choose the kind of governing system in Lebanon, they will 
definitely choose the form of the Islamic regime” (Qassem 2008:41). After winding 
down their military activities against the US and Western interests in Lebanon, and 
against some other Lebanese parties and groups, Hezbollah focused on what they called 
resistance activities against the Israeli occupation of some parts of the south of Lebanon, 
while also building up a very large social and cultural program in Shiite areas.   
However, Hezbollah, which rejected the Taif Agreement but still took part in the 
parliamentary elections of 1992, was the only war-time militia that did not surrender 
their weapons after the war. Moreover it still has not surrendered them under the 
expedience of defending the country against the Israeli attacks. These weapons, which 
Hezbollah calls its ‘weapons of resistance’, led Israel to launch destructive wars on 
Lebanon throughout the post-Taif period. Are Knudsen discussed these wars in his 
paper saying: 
 
“In the post-war period, fierce battles also erupted along the country’s southern 
border with Israel in 1993 (“Operation Accountability”) and 1996 (“Operation 
Grapes of Wrath”) which destroyed thousands of homes (19-20,000), killed Lebanese 
civilians and led to a mass exodus of IDPs (300,000) from the conflict zone” 
(Knudsen 2005:12). 
 
 
In 2000, and after some twenty years of Israeli occupation, Israel took a historical 
decision and decided to leave the occupied area in south Lebanon. At that time, and 
while Hezbollah was busy claiming a victory, many in Lebanon were arguing that it was 
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time for Hezbollah to become a political party and give back the liberated territory to 
the Lebanese army. However, Syria, supported by Iran, blocked these arguments while 
Hezbollah came up with a new justification for keeping its “resistance weapons” (El 
Amine 2009).
11
 
After the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the battle for Lebanon intensified with the onset 
of the Bush administration’s aforementioned “War on Terror”. A result of this was that 
Lebanon became more polarized over the presence of Syrian troops in its territory. It 
was the time for a number of Christian leaders to unite in an anti-Syrian coalition with 
Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and the Druze leader Walid Junblatt. Sometime after the 
creation of the anti-Syrian coalition, the UN resolution 1559 of September 2004 was 
passed. This resolution, which mainly targeted Syria and Hezbollah, called openly and 
frankly for “all remaining foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon, and for the 
disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias”12. Dryly, “the 
Syrian leadership blamed Hariri for the 1559 resolution, believing he persuaded his 
friend Jacques Chirac to co-sponsor the resolution with the Americans” (Blanford 
2007:104). On the 14
th
 of February 2005, Prime Minister Rafic Hariri was assassinated 
by a bomb containing some 1000 kilograms of explosives. Demonstrations began to 
take place in Beirut, but a huge demonstration, which took place a month later on the 
14
th
 of March, led to the withdrawal of the Syrian troops from Lebanon. The anti-Syrian 
coalition – now known as the 14th of March coalition – started to look towards 
weakening Hezbollah after the withdrawal of the Syrian troops. But, in fact, the 
complete opposite occurred as Hezbollah succeeded in creating and leading an anti-
American coalition against the 14
th
 of March coalition. With this act, Hezbollah placed 
itself in the heart of Lebanese domestic politics. Iran, the Godfather of Hezbollah, found 
it easier at this point to move and play a direct role in Lebanon, having been sharing the 
supervision of Hezbollah with the Syrians from behind the borders (El Amine 2009). 
Despite continual assassinations, the revolution started to yield its fruits. The 
government designated by the Syrians resigned and the country went to democratic 
elections in which the people voted for the 14
th
 of March coalition as a parliamentary 
                                                          
11 Iran and particularly Syria used their political influence in the country and pressured the Lebanese government not to 
send the Lebanese army to the southern part of Lebanon for more than 20 years. 
12The security council resolution 1559 of Sep. 2004, United Nations official website. 
 http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc8181.doc.htm 
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majority. Hezbollah, enjoying the substantial backing of Iran and Syria, were not happy 
with the results and started blocking any political and economic reforms in the cabinet, 
most of which was made up of the 14
th
 of March coalition. Thus, Lebanon gradually 
started to enter the era of Hezbollah dominance, which decided, in 2006 – due to a 
period of regional and international pressure on Iran –, to fight a destructive battle with 
Israel. 
However, Hezbollah decided to see through its war with Israel. Thirty three days were 
enough to destroy the fragile peace with the Lebanese, and for Hezbollah to claim a 
victory. Forgetting the pain and destruction caused by the war, Hezbollah began to act 
the victor, flagrantly flouting the sectarian tension and accusing the government and the 
parliamentary majority of colluding with Israel. A few weeks later, Hezbollah ministers 
suspended their membership in the cabinet because of the majority decision to adopt 
international tribunal law in the cabinet. The government refused to surrender despite 
the sit-in camp Hezbollah erected around Government House. The camp remained there 
for nearly two years. In May 2008 and despite threats from Hezbollah and intimidation 
from Syria and Iran, the Lebanese government decided to proceed towards the 
establishment of a strong state that could extend its authority over the whole of the 
Lebanese territory. It therefore took the decision to declare the Hezbollah private 
communication network illegal. Hezbollah responded directly through its Secretary 
General, Hasan Nasrallah, who said that “we are entering a completely new stage; the 
government is a gang and trying to blackmail Hezbollah, they are declaring war and I 
am telling them, I will use the arms to protect the arms”.13 Hezbollah carried out its 
chief threat, got its arms from the “closed areas”, closed Rafic Hariri International 
Airport, invaded Beirut with arms, killed some 70 people, blocked the streets, and burnt 
some of the majority leaders’ homes. Faced with this harsh reality, the Lebanese 
Government reversed its decisions and responded to Hezbollah demands. Paul Salem 
argued saying: 
“Hezbollah’s armed insurrection in May, which overran Beirut and other parts of 
Lebanon, has dealt a further blow to the hopes of true state sovereignty in the country, 
strengthening Hezbollah and weakening the Western-backed government. But it also 
brought about a new political accord, negotiated in Doha, Qatar, providing for the 
election of a president after a long stalemate, the formation of a national unity 
                                                          
13 A press conference for the Secretary General of Hezbollah Hasan Nasrallah on the 8th of May 2008 
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government, a new election law, and a return to a national dialogue over relations 
between the state and non-state actors, particularly Hezbollah” (Salem 2010). 
In 2009, a few days before the parliamentary elections, Ahmadi Nijad, the President of 
Iran, said in a press conference that “If Hezbollah wins in the parliamentary elections in 
Lebanon, the situation in the region will be changed and new fronts will be formed to 
strengthen the resistance”14. The results of the election were a blow to Iran and Syria. 
The March 8
th
 coalition, led by Hezbollah again, lost to the governing March 14
th
 
coalition, led by Saad Hariri, who was later nominated Prime Minster. Saad Hariri 
asserted his commitment to the elections results and the constitution which clearly states 
that the PM-designate and President alone should form a cabinet. Again, Hezbollah led 
a campaign to disable the election results, and thus led a coup against the project of 
building the state and the democratic system. The Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan 
Nasrallah was clear enough when he said, after the elections, that the opposition led by 
his militia retained the “popular majority” and the 14th of March coalition should forget 
about the elections results or forget about forming a cabinet. Struggling to form a 
cabinet with the proxies of Iran and Syria in Lebanon for four more months, after 
extensive negotiations Saad Hariri was eventually able to form a cabinet.  
1.5.5 Democracy in Lebanon  
1.5.5.1 Democracy during the Pre-Independence Era? 
Lebanon’s pre-independence democratic system has, as yet, been the subject of little 
discussion. Nevertheless, some scholars have suggested that the independence gained 
sixty seven years ago did not in fact lead to the birth of democracy in Lebanon, as most 
believe, but rather that this came about earlier. These same scholars firmly believe that 
the National Pact, agreed upon with independence in November 1943, merely amended 
the 1926 constitution by curbing the influence of the all too powerful French High 
Commissioner, without, however, intentionally making any change to the prerogatives 
of the legislative or executive bodies or their officials (Tuéni 1993). 
                                                          
14
 A press conference held in Tehran for the Iranian president on the 26th of May 2009 
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Ghassan Tuieni, one of Lebanon's foremost statesmen and political writers, has stated 
that republicanism, or representative government, and the creation of a "Great Lebanon" 
were not bestowed upon the country by the French Mandate. In an article, Tuieni 
outlines three major factors in support of this, discussing Lebanon’s democratic system 
and its workings at that time. Firstly, he argues that, long before the notion of the 
democratic nation-state was universally established, modern Lebanon inherited various 
forms of popular representation. Two types of civic pact are referred to: the Dayr al-
Qamar and the Antelias Ammiyahs (in 1810 and 1840, respectively). These popular 
proclamations set forth the ideals of political harmony so as to defend Lebanon’s 
liberty. In Tuieni’s view, Lebanon’s border is related to the second element of the 
country’s historical democracy. This border was first laid out by Administrative Council 
under its president Habib Pasha al-Sa`ad in December 1918, a fact that is widely 
overlooked. On 1
st
 of September 1920, these boundaries were officially announced 
French High Commissioner General Gouraud, and two years later, in 1922, they were 
accepted by the Representative Council, a body elected on the basis of confessional 
representation. This said, we can of course see early evidence of Lebanon’s natural 
borders in the emirate of Prince Fakhr al-Din II (1572-1635). The Prince’s rule over 
Mount Lebanon took him to Beirut, Sidon, the Akkar in the north, as well as far into the 
Syrian provinces. Therefore, Lebanon is the only Middle Eastern state that can claim 
such a democratically defined border. The third and final aspect of Lebanon’s historical 
democracy, in Tuieni’s opinion, is the centuries-old tradition of bipartisan rivalry, 
which sometimes broke down into warring factionalism. This is described by Tuieni as 
a very significant sign of democracy. During the Qaisi vs. Yamani, Yazbaki vs. 
Junblati, and even "pro-Kussa" and "anti-Kussa" conflicts of the 1870s and 80s, 
bipartisan politics re-emerged. This occurred almost along village lines, with the 
creation of consecutive electoral and parliamentary alliances while the mandate was in 
force. It was seen again in the rivalry between the National Bloc under Emile Eddé, and 
the Constitutional Bloc under Bishara al-Khouri(Tuéni 1993). 
1.5.5.2 Post-Independence Era 
In 1941, the German invasion of France significantly weakened the French presence in 
the Middle East. This marked the beginning of the end of the mandate, which would 
finish in 1946. With Lebanese independence in sight, three major nationalist positions 
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could be seen in the country: Christian nationalists were in favour of retaining French 
protection; Arab nationalists wanted Lebanon to be annexed to Syria; and Lebanese 
nationalists were willing to accept independence within the 1920 boundaries, on the 
condition that Lebanon was committed to true independence and would work closely 
with the Arab world. 
The 1943 National Pact, an unwritten agreement between those representing the largest 
Christian and Muslim communities, was born out of a settlement based on the position 
of the Lebanese nationalists. It facilitated a reconciliation of the Maronite and Sunni 
interests. As such the French were faced with a united Lebanese position to bring the 
mandate to an end. 
A survey of Lebanon’s recent political history and an analysis of the context of the civil 
war show how the system failed in its workings. It was, after all, put in place to deal 
with Muslim-Christian hostility above all other problems. This mechanical and rational 
design was laid out in all government institutions, with fixed proportional representation 
along the lines of religious groupings. With the National Pact (al-mithaq al-watani) of 
1943, agreed by the foremost Maronite and Sunni politicians of the independence era, 
Bishara al-Khoury and Riad al-Sulh, the sectarian problem was, in effect, brought under 
control. For the following three decades, apart from a number of weeks during the crisis 
of 1958, Lebanese politics was not troubled by sectarianism (Tuéni 2003). 
Since the 1950s, it must be made clear that, although the two traditional blocs had a 
wide following across the religious communities, Lebanese parties turned more and 
more towards confessionalism, and were increasingly the outcome of local electoral – 
confessional – alliances. The 1951 Socialist and National Front, a one-off coalition 
comprising Kamal Junblat's Progressive Socialist Party, Camille Chamoun's National 
Liberals, the PPS (Parti Populaire Syrien), the National Bloc, and the Armenian 
Hentchak party, was the last important parliamentary group with multi-confessional 
support. Its eight MPs, in a parliament of seventy-seven, took the leading role in the 
Arab world’s first “White Revolution” which resulted in the deposition of the regime of 
President Bishara al-Khouri's in September 1952. This was a unique moment in the 
history of democracy. Never before had a parliamentary minority managed to attract 
such popular support, even in areas where it had no elected representatives. A general 
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strike was ultimately called and the Front succeeded in persuading parliament to reverse 
its position. President al-Khouri was made to resign, and Camille Chamoun, the 
opposition’s candidate was elected president with almost unanimous support despite his 
party’s minority in parliament (Tuéni 2003).  
This overview of the literature on democratic mobility in Lebanese history helps to 
indicate that the American “democratic wave” may in fact be present in Lebanon. That 
is not to say, however, that democracy in the country has not sometimes faltered as the 
result of external factors connected to internal stability. Certainly, Israeli occupation of 
the south, the presence of Syrian troops, and the influx of Palestinian refugees all played 
into Iran’s strategic objectives in Lebanon. Of course, these factors, which were out of 
Lebanese control, were major obstacles to the promotion of democracy. Furthermore, 
Lebanon had no power over these four pre-conditions (Israeli occupation, the 
“presence” of Syrian troops, Palestinian refugees and Iran strategic objectives in 
Lebanon) being met, and thus its return to independence and full sovereignty. Indeed, 
the four pre-conditions were dependent on the Middle East peace process, which was 
wrongly assumed, by many in the region, to be progressing well. Restoring democracy 
to Lebanon, therefore, depended upon the interested parties, all of which were either 
invisible or visible partners in the Taif agreement – the US, Europe, the Gulf States, 
Syria, and even Israel. These parties had to be willing to work together and invest in the 
internal peace, security and reconstruction of Lebanon. It is evident, then, that the 
balance of power between conflicting groups aiming at regional dominance, and not 
between the executive, legislative and judiciary authorities, is a key precondition for the 
correct functioning of constitutional democracy in Lebanon (Tuéni 2003). 
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2. Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework 
 
2.1 Introduction 
My research on Lebanon is closely connected to the abovementioned dilemmas on the 
promotion of democracy in the developing world, and as such it is important to begin 
my analysis by looking more closely into the concept of democracy and how this 
concept has evolved. In other words, this chapter aims to outline the main theoretical 
aspects of democracy and its practical tools and procedures.  
In the following pages, I provide a historical background concerning democracy and 
democratization. Also, for the purpose of this study, and after providing some 
definitions of the main concepts used in this thesis, an overview of the different 
approaches to the study of democracy and democratization that are relevant to this study 
will be given. Then, in the conclusion to this chapter, an explanation of why the theories 
discussed are relevant to this study will be given.  
 
2.2 Studies on Democracy and Democratization: A Historical Background 
 
“Democracy describes the system; democratization describes the process. This rule 
shows us the boundary between democracy and democratization.” The debate about 
democracy and democratization has a long history. Demonstrably, the debate started 
with Greek philosophers such as Aristotle and Plato. Aristotle was a defender of 
democracy suggesting that, restrained by the rule of law, it was the best form of 
government, while Plato had many unflattering opinions of democracy stemming from 
the fact that he did not accept that it could provide for the welfare of its citizens 
(Daneels 1999). 
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After the Greek philosophers, many intellectuals started to write about what they 
thought was the best form of government and what democracy should consist of.  As a 
result of numerous academic and intellectual engagements, theorizing and writings, 
democracy began, over time, to take on a completely different meaning than it had had 
at the time of the Greek philosophers. Moreover, it became gradually more difficult to 
agree on a common definition of the concept, as subsequent philosophers began to 
define it according to their own understandings and elicitations. For example, 
the Genevan philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau spoke of the hazards and hitches of 
democracy, concluding that democracy could only be successful for Gods and not for 
men (Daneels 1999). He argued that a faultless democratic government does not exist in 
human life as this would only happen if there were Gods governing (Read 1941). 
Rousseau’s argument agreed with what John Locke had argued earlier, emphasizing the 
notion of consent by saying that any civil government depends on the consent of those 
who are governed, which may be withdrawn at any time (Locke 1690). On the one hand, 
John Stuart Mill saw democracy as an important element in free human development 
(Sorensen 1993), but, on the other he feared what he called false and full-fledged 
democracy (Mill 1861). Hobbs was apprehensive about democracy and the unnecessary 
majority-rule, believing that that the only way to protect humans and their lives and 
properties was to consolidate the power of the ruler. Meanwhile, De Tocqueville was 
anxious about the tyranny of the majority (Tocqueville 1998). 
The meanings and the usages of democracy changed in an extremely noteworthy way 
by the turn of the 20th century, and especially after the start of the Cold War. A new 
body of ideas and thought on democracy came into sight and it became “a part of the 
vocabulary of real politics as a way of distinguishing between the free world and 
communism” (Grugel 2002). Most scholars continued to look at democracy from a 
normative point of view while very few adopted an empirical or a cross-cultural 
approach in the study of democracy.
15
 During this time, the good of societies and 
humans was still the focus of studies, but little was done to address how the ideal state 
of affairs could be reached. Habermas and his colleagues at the Frankfurt school in 
                                                          
15 The cross-cultural approach observes how different cultures act towards one another, their similarities, their differences, 
and how well they tend to get along or do not get along. 
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Germany as well as Von Hayek of the Austrian school are typical examples of scholars 
whose work demonstrated the latter trend. Douglas Kellner wrote on Habermas: 
 
“Haberms sketched out various conceptions of democracy ranging from Greek 
democracy to the forms of bourgeois democracy to current notions of democracy in 
welfare state capitalism. In particular, he contrasted the participatory democracy of 
the Greeks and radical democratic movements with the representative, parliamentary 
bourgeois democracy of the 19th century and the current attempts at reducing citizen 
participation in the welfare state. Habermas defended the earlier "radical sense of 
democracy" in which the people themselves would be sovereign in both the political 
and the economic realms against current forms of parliamentary democracy. Hence, 
Habermas aligns himself with the current of "strong democracy" associated with 
Rousseau, Marx, and Dewey” (Kellner 2000:2). 
 
It was principally in the US that we first saw a more detailed and empirical study of 
democracy. Here an examination and analysis of the reasons behind why voters in a 
democratic culture such as that in the US voted in a certain way was the main focus of 
study. This line of investigation quickly became the cornerstone upon which 
methodologies used in future scholarship on democracy were based. Lazarsfeld, 
Berelson, Campbell, Almond and Vebra were among those scholars who upheld this 
trend, analysing the voting behaviour of Americans and further researching US 
democracy. Voter turn-out (the percentage of eligible voters who cast their ballot in an 
election), citizenry, party affiliation, issue voting, and cultural and socio-economic 
factors are among the variables derived from the work of the scholars outline above. 
These findings were subsequently used by other scholars including Lipest, V. O Key, 
Huntington, Eckstein, Lane, Rustow, and Dahl. Of course we must not forget the clear 
impact on the work of these scholars of prior studies by intellectuals such as Weber, 
Marx, de Tocqueville, and Bruke (Daneels 1999). 
It was not until the 1950s that research on democracy ceased being exclusively 
conducted by Western scholars and about the West. This exclusivity could, as 
Huntington argued, have been attributed to the fact that studies in political science were 
more developed in the Western world, where, indeed, democracy was more developed. 
However, the mid-seventies saw an increasing interest in democratic development in the 
Third World (Daneels 1999). Two main reasons may explain this:  
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1. Regions in the Third World increasingly began to call for democratization and 
more and more scholars studying this process came to view it as a feasible 
alternative to the existing authoritarian or totalitarian systems.  
2. With the collapse of Soviet Russia the idea of the Western style of government 
came to be seen as more viable; it was felt to be more adept at addressing the 
people’s political, social, economic and existential needs. This did not, however, 
signal that those studying the Third World had embraced Western thinking and 
political ideas wholesale. In the majority of cases the Western democratic model 
was examined in the context of the Third World, its cultures and its settings. A 
very few intellectuals did, though, unconditionally embrace the Western model, 
but they were met with a negative reception in local academic circles, which 
accused them of being the agents of Western cultural imperialism. The debate 
about whether or not to embrace the Western democratic model is still very 
much current among local thinkers.  
A growing body of literature on democracy in the Third World ties in well with the 
three waves of democratization described by Samuel Huntington in The Third Wave: 
Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (1991). In this work, Huntington 
describes the first wave as having started in 1828 and ended in 1942. He sees this wave 
as being associated with the Pax-Britannica.
16
 The second wave of democratization 
began in 1943, ending more than thirty years later in 1974-5. During this time, a more 
democratic style of government was embraced by some countries, including Germany, 
Italy, Japan and later Brazil and Argentina. The key player in these countries’ 
democratization was, in Huntington’s view, the US. Finally, Huntington describes the 
third wave as having started in 1975. This period saw the inclusion of many more 
countries, especially in southern European and South America, in the democratic world 
(Daneels 1999).  
In short, then, since the time of the Greek philosophers, scholars looking at democracy 
and democratization have made countless attempts to reach an ideal democratic system 
                                                          
16 This was a period of relative peace in Europe (1815-1914) when the British Empire controlled most of the key naval trade 
routes and enjoyed unchallenged sea power. It refers to a period of British imperialism after the 1815 Battle of Waterloo, 
which led to a period of overseas British expansionism. Britain dominated overseas markets and managed to influence and 
almost dominate the Chinese markets after the Opium Wars. 
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and solve the various problems and paradoxes encountered. For example, numerous 
studies have attempted to deduce the requisites and prerequisites needed for a 
democratic system to take hold. Various analyses have been carried out so as to 
ascertain what has contributed to a successful democratic system in some countries 
when this has not been the case in others. Furthermore, it has been questioned why 
certain factors, be they socio-economic, cultural, religious, or class based, have spurred 
on the democratic transition in some countries, when these may have obstructed 
democratic change in others. Certain other scholars have focussed on analysing voting 
behaviour, attempting to deduce how far voting is key to political development and 
democratization on the one hand, and what role the voter plays in electing 
representatives whose actions echo the public’s will on the other (Daneels 1999).  
Regardless of which aspect of democracy scholars have focussed on, two salient 
thoughts can be outlined. The first concentrates on the fluid definition of democracy 
which has changed and evolved over time as different thinkers have analysed and 
defined it. The second considers that intellectuals, and particularly twentieth century 
intellectuals, have not apportioned blame to the inherent nature of democracy when 
problems implementing it have been encountered. Instead they have blamed the absence 
or failure of democracy on, among other things, culture, class culture, economic 
limitations, pragmatic difficulties facing the state, and the imperfect nature of its 
citizens and/or rulers, who may have behaved recklessly or unreasonably (Daneels 
1999). We shall discuss these reasons for democratic failings in greater depth later in 
this chapter.  
 
2.2.1 Definitions  
 
 The main concepts which will be defined below are: democracy, and democratization.  
2.2.1.1 Democracy 
 
As mentioned, ‘democracy’ is the exact translation of two words, originally Greek, and 
its literal meaning is the “power of people”.  All scholars conform on this translation of 
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Democracy, but not ahead of this end. Obviously, a number of important and substantial 
disagreements take place regarding what democracy entails. It is possible that all 
intellectuals, academics and masses are familiar with the general meaning of democracy, 
but not all are familiar with concepts such as: justice, rule of law, effective participation, 
equality, majority rule, minority rights, judicial review, fair and free elections, and the 
separation of powers. Perhaps no one in actuality knows how to approach democracy 
perfectly, but some acceprt that it involves these basic principles. According to Karl 
Popper, democracy is a system whereby governments can be changed peacefully 
(Popper 1999). Robert Dahl was helpful in defining democracy as a political system. He 
defined democracy as a system in which the people participate in the selection of their 
political leaders. Dahl emphasized the responsiveness of the government to the 
preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals, as a key characteristic for 
democracy (Sorensen 1993). Joseph Schumpeter defined democracy as a political 
method and a mechanism for choosing our political leaderships (Sorensen 1993). E.P. 
Thompson saw democracy as a “process set in motion without anyone knowing for 
certain where it is going to end” (Lindberg-Hansen 1994). Some have said that there are 
social, economic, and cultural prerequisites to reach democracy, others, like Tatu 
Vanhanen, believed that democracy is a part of human evolution (Vanhanen 1997). 
Taking into consideration and not ignoring the fact that they weren’t able to agree on a 
common definition of democracy, some scholars managed to arrive at a consensus that 
highlighted the importance of democracy (Daneels 1999). The famous Arend Lijphart 
argued that democracy’s definition is a government by the people and also, in President 
Lincoln’s famous words, as ‘government for the people’ - that is, government in 
accordance with the people’s preferences (Lijphart 1984). While James Bryce, the 
British jurist, historian and politician demonstrated that “the trend toward democracy 
now widely visible is a natural trend, due to the general law of social progress” 
(Huntington 1991:194). Jeremy Bentham, the known British jurist, philosopher, and 
legal and social reformer stipulated and stressed on the importance of democracy and 
argued that it was the best form of government to arrive at the greatest happenings for 
the greatest number of people (Bentham 1830). Robert Dahl was explicitly outspoken 
and discussed clearly the importance of democracy (Dahl 1998). In his famous book 
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“On Democracy”, Dahl talked about the “benefits that make democracy more desirable 
than any feasible alternative to it (Dahl 1998): 
1- Democracy helps to prevent government by cruel and vicious autocrats. 
2- Democracy guarantees its citizens a number of fundamental rights that 
nondemocratic systems do not, and cannot, grant. 
3- Democracy insures its citizens a broader range of personal freedom than any 
feasible alternative to it. 
4- Democracy helps people to protect their own fundamental interests. 
5- Only a democratic government can provide a maximum opportunity for 
persons to exercise the freedom of self-determination - that is, to live under 
laws of their own choosing. 
6- Only a democratic government can provide a maximum opportunity for 
exercising moral responsibility. 
7- Democracy fosters human development more fully than any feasible 
alternative. 
8- Only a democratic government can foster a relatively high degree of political 
equality. 
9- Modern representative democracies do not fight wars with one another. 
10-  Countries with democratic governments tend to be more prosperous than 
countries with non-democratic governments. 
Dahl ended with conviction saying that with such advantages, democracy has a far 
better chance of success than any other alternative system of government. 
Having defined, above, the concept of democracy, and having clarified that the same 
concept is non-static, in continual motion, and characterized by a dynamic and 
interactive nature, and despite the different and complex interpretations of democracy, I 
believe that it is important to end this section by stressing that democracy necessarily 
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involves a certain level of public participation. In his article “Democracy and citizens: 
Patterns of political change”, Russell J. Dalton argued: 
“Democracy requires an active citizenry, because it is through discussion, popular 
interest, and involvement in politics that societal goals should be defined and carried 
out in a democracy. Without public involvement in the process, democracy lacks both 
its legitimacy and its guidance force.” He continues, “A major goal of democratic 
societies is to expand citizen participation in the political process and thereby 
increase popular control of political elites” (Dalton 1996:5-6). 
 
Moreover, the political sociologist, Seymour Martin Lipest, also wrote on the 
importance of public participation. In his article “some social requisites of democracy”, 
he identified democracy as being a social apparatus in which the problems of decision-
making amongst disagreeing social groups can be resolved: 
 “…Democracy (in a complex society) is defined as a political system which supplies 
regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials. It is a social 
mechanism for the resolution of the problem of societal decision-making among 
conflicting interest groups which permits the largest possible part of the population to 
influence these decisions through their ability to choose among alternative 
contenders for political office… this definition implies a number of specific 
conditions: (a) a "political formula," a system of beliefs, legitimizing the democratic 
system and specifying the institutions parties, a free press, and so forth-which are 
legitimized, i.e., accepted as proper by all; (b) one set of political leaders in office; 
and (c) one or more sets of leaders, out of office, who act as a legitimate opposition 
attempting to gain office” (Lipest 1959:71).  
Lastly, Karl Popper clarified the relationship between democracy and citizens. He 
argued:  
 
“Democracy as such cannot confer any benefits upon the citizen and it should not be 
expected to do so. In fact democracy can do nothing - only the citizens of the 
democracy can act (including, of course, those citizens who comprise the 
government). Democracy provides no more than a framework within which the 
citizens may act in a more or less organised and coherent way” (Popper 1963). 
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To sum up, the above quotes lead us to ask both obvious and axiomatic questions 
regarding the case of Lebanon.  For example, can the active citizenry which Dalton 
discussed be identified in Lebanese democracy? In another words, do Lebanese citizens 
participate in the political process in a way which makes them influential enough to act 
and become a “guidance force” of Democracy?  Indeed, the role of the Lebanese 
citizens and their effectiveness in Lebanon and in the Lebanese political life will be 
discussed in depth later in this thesis. 
 
2.2.1.2 The Epistemology of Democracy 
 
Further to these definitions of democracy, a further question must be asked: What are 
the fundamentals or building blocks of a successful democracy? We do not magnify or 
overstate if we argue that since the earliest period of written history, the question of 
who ought to rule and how has been a major debate of mankind. Aristotle put a 
particular emphasis on the composition of social parts to explain a political system’s 
prevailing type (Barker 1961:116). He referred to the different types of society as 
different social classes, occupations and status groups. He noticed the impact of social 
composition or class structure as the real source of the difference between oligarchy and 
democracy. Alex de Tocqueville also argued that there was a direct relationship 
between democracy and the equality of people’s economic and social condition. He 
noticed a great deal of “general equality of condition among the people” in democracies, 
although, for him, law and political institutions were essential in shaping the populace’s 
attitudes toward equality and democracy (Tocqueville 1956).  
Some theorists have attempted to explain the genealogy of various political systems and 
their relationships with democratic norms with discourse on modernization. According 
to them, democracy has “historically risen long with capitalism and in casual connection 
to it”. (Schumpeter 1950). In his book On Democracy, Robert A. Dahl argued that 
“Democracy and market-capitalism are like two persons bound in a tempestuous 
marriage that is riven by conflict and yet endures because neither partner wishes to 
separate from the other” (Dahl 1998:166). Moreover, Dahl found that in the long run 
“market-capitalism has typically led to economic growth; and economic growth is 
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favourable to democracy” (Dahl 1998:167). Analogously, some scholars shared Dahl’s 
point of view and envisaged that modern democracy can only occur under capitalist 
development (Lipset 1993). Lipset argued that the notion of capitalism is the source of 
democracy. His opinion was strengthened by many works by certain development 
economists such as Walt Rostow, who identified a lineal pathway for economic 
development along defined ‘stages’, as they were termed, until capitalism was achieved 
(Grugel 2002). Others like Ian Roxborough argued that democracy appears in those 
societies that are able to replicate the original transition to capitalism (Roxborough 
1979). Max Weber presented a sociological method that connects political economy, 
Protestantism, bureaucratic rationalism and democracy (Weber 1991). He argued that 
bureaucracy goes along with democracy, making the state dependent upon it as 
economic and social differences are blurred and the economic complexity of modern 
civilization imposes more complex administrative tasks upon the modern state and even 
businesses (Weber et al 1978). We may say with confidence that capitalism in the West 
has favoured market growth. The rise of a capitalist bourgeoisie, an industrial working 
class, and with these a tangible middle class, has been the result. All of these classes 
create and stimulate the development of Western democracy. However, because 
capitalism inherently exploits and monopolises it cannot be as profitable in the Third 
World. Furthermore, Karl de Schweintiz argued that the Euro-American route of 
democracy has been a “function of an unusual configuration of historical circumstances 
which cannot be repeated” (Schweinitz 1964). When comparing the democratization of 
Western countries with that of developing countries, and if we work on the basis that 
only the first part of de Schweintiz’s statement is true, we should recognise the need to 
carefully grasp the contexts involved. In this way, Barrington Moore has suggested that 
parliamentary democracy, communism, and fascism were the result of a specific set of 
circumstances that were peculiar to certain historical phases (Moore 1993), and these 
circumstances, both national and international, have drastically altered since the birth of 
Western democracy.  
In short, the situations that gave rise to Western democracy do not rule out a universal 
adoption of this mode of government, but neither do they indicate that a different 
democratic model could not occur in different circumstances. 
 
43 
 
 
2.2.1.3 Concepts of Democracy 
 
As mentioned earlier, democracy and democratization, with all of their related issues 
and topics, are always branded and categorised by their dynamic and continually active 
nature, which makes it hard to provide a final, timeless and typical definition. 
Accordingly, it is essential to be aware that studying and researching such a field 
(Humanities in general), requires one to consider the actual and intrinsic rights and 
wrongs of any issue especially if it is challenged by different and even totally opposite 
views.  
 
Academic or elite debates are of course not the only forums in which democracy is 
discussed. It is also considered as an important issue by people and many societies as a 
whole. Over time, this has meant that the term ‘democracy’ has come to be used in an 
astonishing number of ways. In other words, Democracy as a term and concept are no 
more monopolized, but has become like an essential commodity for everyone. People 
debate it, each in their own way, within the family, in their communities, in their offices, 
in their cultural and social seminars, and at their gatherings. In fact, these leads us to say 
that as modern societies grow more open and free, democracy will become a more and 
more noticeable and important part of their demands.  
 
Moreover, Democracy and democratization are the two concepts around which our 
discussion is structured. In a certain sense, democracy as the idea of self-rule, “the 
people, the many, the multitude” (Popper 1963), has taken on too many definitions with 
the result that it has become abstract. Democratization, the process by which the 
concept of democracy is established, has a number of methods and schemes. We cannot 
discount either the multiple definitions of democracy or the different methods of 
implementing it. A fluid yet anchored definition of democracy is therefore required, 
leading to an understanding of the democratization which follows as a long term process 
of social construction (Whitehead 2002). It seems fitting, therefore, to view 
democratization as a process of social re-construction whereby certain developments 
(e.g. structural) are brought to the main social (gender, class, ethnicity, religion, and 
44 
 
nationality), economic (production methods, income generation, right to possess and 
taxation) and political institutions. With these developments the foundations of a 
situation where the state and the people work together as democratic equals in a lasting 
way can be laid.  
 
First, I need to define democracy based on its theoretical grounds, as this will help lead 
to the answer of what we mean by democracy. In this chapter, by exploring the different 
forms and models of democracy, I aim to broaden the definition of democracy, so as to 
reach a more well-matched and flexible model for those countries seeking to apply it 
properly. In this chapter I will also try to survey current theories of democracy and the 
process of democratization. By doing so, we will optimistically reach a firm and solid 
groundwork for the assessment of the Lebanese procedure of democratization and find 
out whether or not the democratization process in this country has actually occurred. 
This will help us to discover what is hindering and/or sabotaging Lebanese democracy, 
or if indeed democracy can be applied in Lebanon at all. In addition, we cannot simply 
rely on the establishment of modern and some democratic institutions in Lebanon. This 
will indeed make up only a part of our assessment, while the remainder will focus on 
the conceptual and structural dimensions of the Lebanese state and its political and 
social structure, as well as the ramifications resulting from these.  
 
Furthermore, a self-styled and self-proclaimed democracy or the functioning and 
performance (in theory sometimes) of some democratic basics, such as holding regular 
elections, do not grant the appropriate grounds for one to believe and judge that a 
certain government or system is running democratically, especially if such an election 
happens in the presence of an illegal weapons, foreign intervention and/or 
bribery and vote buying. We must therefore distinguish between two models, one 
involving a number of seemingly democratic overhauls of political power and the other 
involving a self-supporting and deeply-ingrained democratic system. In the former, we 
see political actors working together in a potentially unstable situation in order to 
preserve the existing state of affairs and interest-based system. In the latter, on the other 
hand, we see agreement between social bodies and politicians, which protects the 
workings of democracy. It should now be questioned, then, whether particular criteria or 
one overarching theory can distinguish between democratic and non-democratic states. 
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The rhetoric of several regimes shows how operating a genuine democracy is more 
difficult than simply claiming to be one. As illustrated in Dahl’s argument, some leaders 
claim that their regimes are really a special type of democracy that is superior to other 
sorts. He wrote about Lenin and quoted him: “Proletarian democracy is a million times 
more democratic than any bourgeois democracy; Soviet government is a million times 
more democratic than the most democratic bourgeois republic” (Dahl 1998:100). 
 
Perhaps it is also necessary that this research should engage the application of general 
factors to the concept of democracy as this will judge whether Lebanon is a real 
democracy, semi democracy or none of them. David Beetham, in his book The 
Legitimation of Power, explained democracy as a method of decision making about 
collectively binding rules and policies over which the people carry out control (Beetham 
1991). Beetham argues that “the most democratic arrangement is that where all 
members of the collectivity enjoy effective equal rights to take part in such decision-
making directly” (Beetham 1991). Frank Cunningham declares that "democracy is of 
unlimited scope which goes beyond political relations of public and government 
leaders” (Cunningham 2001). He explains that the "notion of democracy is appropriate 
to all modes of human association: the family, industry, religion, or any other site of 
extensive and enduring mutually affecting interactions among people” (Cunningham 
2001). Moreover, John Dewy demonstrates that "temporal and local diversifications are 
two prime marks of political organisations.” Thus, the attempts of any society to 
regulate its common affairs, which are the core of political democracy, are experimental 
and will differ widely from one era to another and from place to place. Thus, 
“democratic progress” or “inhibiting regress” depends on a number of factors: socio-
cultural (the people), economic, those pertaining to security (politicians, government), 
etc. Because these factors differ, the relevant political bodies, policies and practises also 
differ (Pedram 2007). Here, we must ask the question: Will there be any “democratic 
progress” if a so-called democratic country was subject to intervention from another 
country, and in a way subject to control by a local agent or proxy for that 
country/countries? And here, will the people exercise control over the rules and policies? 
Perhaps it is clear that any visible “democratic progress” will not take place, and the 
people, in such a case, will not be ‘ruling’ or ‘controlling’ in any obvious sense of the 
terms (Schumpeter 1976).  
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However, in order to demonstrate the absolutely necessary components of democracy as 
the leading and central conceptual and institutional practice of contemporary ideology 
starting from the end of Cold War, it is necessary to provide a less technical definition. 
Although such a definition might not be enough and prove too challenging and 
demanding, the lack of standards and minimums will result in the dilemma remaining a 
dilemma. In his book “Democratization, Theory and Experience”, Laurence Whitehead 
argues that the technical or practical definition is scarce because it does not consider the 
inevitability of the teleological component of democracy which is what gives it moving 
energy. It is also too demanding and challenging because in reality existing democracies 
cannot be expected to conform consistently to the minimum standards that it specify 
(Whitehead 2002). 
 
Professor Philippe C. Schmitter, the Emeritus of the Department of Political and Social 
Sciences at the European University Institute, studied the existing beliefs on what 
democracy means (Schmitter 1986). In the book he edited, Transition from the 
Authoritarian Rule, Schmitter managed to differentiate between the concepts, 
procedures, and operative principles of democracy. In his view, a democratic system is, 
at the “conceptual level”, characterised by the existence of a large representation of the 
populace, who may hold those they elect accountable via the elects’ willingness to 
compete for power and work with the citizens. The existence of “democratic 
procedures” is essential for the proper functioning of a democratic system, yet alone 
they are not enough to ensure this. Lastly, “operative principles” of democracy are used 
to control the system and ensure that it continues to function in the long term. The work 
of Schmitter and Karl helps us to reach a better understanding of these levels. Not only 
did they summarize Robert Dahl’s seven “procedural minimum” conditions for 
democracy, they also included the addition of a further two conditions, thus 
demonstrating the progression in this field of study since Dahl’s initial study. These 
conditions are: 
 
 
I. Control of government decisions about policy is constitutionally vested in public 
officials.  
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II. Elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly conducted elections in which 
coercion is comparatively uncommon.  
 
III. Practically all adults have the right to vote in the election of officials.  
 
IV. Practically all adults have the right to run for elective offices in government.  
  
V. Citizens have a right to express themselves without the danger of severe punishment 
on political matters broadly defined.  
 
VI. Citizens have a right to seek out alternative sources of information. Moreover, 
alternative sources of information exist and are protected by law.   
 
VII. Citizens also have the right to form relatively independent associations or 
organizations, including independent political parties and interest groups.  
 
VIII. Popularly elected officials must be able to exercise their constitutional power 
without being subjected to over-riding (albeit informal) opposition from unelected 
officials.  
 
IX. The polity must be self-governing; it must be able to act independently of constraint 
imposed by some other overarching political system (Schmitter and Karl 1993).  
 
According to Schmitter and Karl, minimum procedures reflect the actual way in which 
democratic systems function. They form the people’s willing and participant agreement 
to a more onerous and conditional arrangement by the contingent agreement of political 
actors who should behave according to given conditions (Schmitter and Karl 1993).
 
Of 
course, it could be debated that the measures mentioned in the earlier section are both 
too accurate and too brief. They are too accurate because they point out that there was 
no democracy before universal adult suffrage, for example: Switzerland became a 
democratic state in 1971 when women got the right to vote in federal elections and 
stand for parliament after a national referendum. But this opinion is not seen as credible 
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in most people’s eyes. The argument is flawed because it does not satisfactorily protect 
the ideal of democracy: highlighting public accountability and decision-making 
processes might result in the outcomes being overlooked (Beetham 1994:76). 
 
If we admit to these less procedural measures and compare them with reality, i.e. the 
subject of our case study, Lebanon, we very soon realize that five out of nine of the 
above mentioned measures hardly work and are not valid in practice. We should 
mention that constitutionally these measures are valid as they are, in a certain sense, 
mentioned and approved in the constitution of Lebanon. Nevertheless, in practice they 
are scarcely implemented. Measures I and III are fairly applicable, as is measure II to a 
degree and depending on the province. In measure III’s case, all Lebanese citizens from 
the age of 21 can vote in the general parliamentary and municipal elections, although 
debates over the new electoral law are considering lowering the voting age from 21 to 
18. With regard to measure II, elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly 
conducted elections only in some parts of the country. With the significant presence of 
weapons in the southern part of the country, not many people feel brave enough to vote 
for anyone who opposes the de facto armed militias. And this can only be considered if 
any opposition member was allowed to run for a position or have anyone representing 
him in the constituencies and polling centres in the first place. Notably, measure IV 
stipulates that practically all adults should have the right to run for elective offices in the 
government. In the Lebanese constitution this is guaranteed as no particular 
specification is needed apart from judicial positions and some other posts which require 
a certain level of education.  
 
Equally, measures V and VI provide the citizens with the minimum rights to self–
expression, freely obtained information, and the freedom to establish political parties. 
Again, according to the parliamentary legislation or institutional practices in Lebanon, 
these rights are practically implemented and respected to a limit. Lebanese reality today 
shows that the implementation of democratic measures and values are seemingly better 
than during the previous era (Syrian intervention), and the state is constitutionally 
bound to adapt and undertake democratic norms. Nevertheless, there are other reasons 
to suggest that the aforementioned minimum procedures are insufficient: being obliged 
only to follow these minimum measures can result in a totally inappropriate direction. 
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To discuss more, emphasizing unfair and unjust laws on certain political groups through 
a democratic referendum can be mentioned as an example. Thus, only insisting upon 
democratic norms does not prevent anti-democratic outcomes (Pedram 2007). The 
following example might further clarify the meaning of this: Having a situation 
whereby a third of the cabinet ministers can resign for the purpose of disabling the 
cabinet and preventing it from functioning is a democratic right, but making obtaining 
the third in the cabinet a condition before the formation of the government in order 
to resign later, is an un-democratic act. This leads to anti-democratic outcomes but with 
a democratic cover.
17
 
 
Usually, democracy is stretched and pressurised by procedures of public accountability 
and decision-making which can result in overlooking the critical outcome of social 
values. In this sense, the various types of democratic rule, which are based on a number 
of different social values, can be outlined. The Scandinavian social democracy, for 
example, forms one case in point, while Japanese money politics forms another. These 
remain, however, democracies in essence. As both of these demonstrate the relevant 
democratic procedural requirements, they do fall under the category of a democratic 
political system; regardless of any social inequalities they might sustain (Pedram 2007).   
 
We should also recognise that minimal procedural definition of democracy might result 
in the reduction of the capacity for a wider variety of legal rights. In other terms, if we 
do not take into account results, the minimal definition might result in incomplete 
preservation of those basic personal freedoms, such as liberty and security. In this way, 
a prospective off-licence owner could be prevented from opening a business or women 
could be banned from swimming, driving, and mixing with the opposite sex all in the 
name of democracy.
18
 Furthermore, immigrants could be disadvantaged and refugees 
                                                          
17 Cabinet of post-Doha agreement 
18
 For example, in some parts of Lebanon, mainly in the southern suburb of Beirut and south Lebanon, you get things like 
these happening. In 2011,  in south Lebanon, several off-licence stores got attacked and closed. Some political parties in 
designated cities managed to gather some women and kids to protest against these shops and then force them to close. The 
explanation of such a thing was by arguing that these shops were operating in contrary to the will of the people. Since 
democracy is a clear expression of the will of the people, it appears to the observer, that imposing such a closure was 
democratic. While, if audited, it will be found that such an action meets the will of some, but deprive the other some from 
exercising their will and freedom. Another example, some political parties which controls the southern suburb of Beirut, put 
banners everywhere, which says: “My sister, your headscarf is much more important than my blood.” Of course, In a 
democracy, Citizens , whether individuals or groups, political parties or associations, have the right to express their opinions 
and raise their political and religious slogans unless these slogans causes harm to the society and give rise and incite hatred 
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denied an education. These examples do not merely belong to the realms of theory; 
rather they are real-life implications of working from a minimal procedure-oriented 
account of the facets of a political democracy. In fact, Kant himself supports this 
argument in his discussion of the limits to freedom. He believed these were necessary 
and argued in favour of a “constitution allowing the greatest possible human freedom in 
accordance with laws by which the freedom of each is made to be consistent with that of 
all others” (Kant 1963:312).   
 
In short, the implementation of a series of democratic procedures within a political 
system does not provide sufficient prerequisites for becoming a democracy or even 
approaching a democracy.  
2.2.1.4 Theoretical Aspects of Democracy 
 
In this study, democracy as a governing system is chosen over other types of regimes 
such as totalitarian and authoritarian. Therefore, it is necessary to strengthen our 
understanding of this kind of regime as the preferred model. Here, a point has to be 
clarified: being preferred does not mean that it is not open to further revision, 
discussion, or criticism, as nothing is final and fixed, especially when it comes to 
theories, ideas and concepts. They are subject to continuous evolution. However, it is 
crucial to take certain principles of methodology into consideration when studying a 
concept like democracy. Therefore, the researcher believes that reviewing this concept 
from its theoretical aspects to its practical tools and procedures is essential.  
 
David Beetham describes the concept of democracy as “a mode of decision-making about 
collectively binding rules and policies over which the people exercise control, and the most 
democratic arrangement where all members of the collectively enjoy effective equal rights...” 
(Beetham 1993:103). Jean Grugel understands that democracy can be dealt with as a 
theory, concept or as an ideology. He argues that it can be understood as an ideology in 
                                                                                                                                                                          
and imposes a case that prevents people from exercising their freedom. : “My sister, your headscarf is much more important 
than my blood” is a slogan that gets raised in an area which is completely outside the state’s authority, and since the state is 
the guarantor of individual’s freedom, such slogans , when imposed by political parties without the state’s control, may 
affect citizens’ freedom. In other words, citizens cannot, in the absence of the state’s authority that preserves their freedom, 
enjoy their right to accept or reject what they want, including religious and political slogans which are absorbed with 
coercion. To sum up, democracy in this case may result in the reduction of the capacity for a wider variety of legal rights 
and personal freedom. 
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so far as "it embodies a set of political ideas that detail the best possible form of social 
organisation" (Grugel 2002:12).  However, there are two broad movements among 
supporters of democracy. On the one hand, there are the supporters who believe that 
democracy is the best political system. And on the other hand, there are those who 
believe that democracy as a concept is just a window-dressing through which legitimacy 
is achieved for the sake of leading and ruling the community. A model and a sample of 
the latter can be found across developing countries, including Lebanon. 
 
In this study, I contend that democracy implies faith in people, a belief that people have 
the absolute right to make decisions for themselves, and a commitment to the idea that 
all people are equal in some fundamental and essential way (Grugel 2002:42). However, 
in a country like Lebanon, which has a multiplicity of religions and sects, it might be 
valid to argue that a variety of considerations, regardless of whether legal or not, imply 
that the essence of such notions can be engaged in opposing ways.  
 
In order to define democracy, two main forms of practice ought to be taken into 
account: direct and representative. The first finds its roots in the Athenian tradition of 
government by the people in a small city state and is intended to safeguard the 
democratic rights of the community as a whole. It is therefore suggested that Marxism is 
a development of this form of democracy, since it is an ideology based on collective 
actions and decisions made by the population as a whole (Grugel 2002:14). In this way 
direct democracy can be defined as ‘rule by the people through referenda’, as the right 
to pass or veto laws rests with the people. In expanded societies, the model is not 
tenable, and so representative democracy has led to the creation of normative 
democratic practices. Recently, however, direct democracy has regained its position and 
been practiced from a broad base as a result of new technologies that allow people to 
express their preferences easily and securely, for example, holding regular referendums 
on the issue of the EU
19
 (Pedram 2007). 
 
Representative democracy, on the other hand, allows voters to choose their 
representative, privately and freely, in an election contested by many parties, who will 
                                                          
19 For example, holding regular referendums on the issue of the EU. 
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then act on their behalf, and will have enough power to carry out initiatives faced with 
changing circumstances. Modern liberal democracies are important examples of this 
system, which is centred on the liberal idea of the individual’s right to be involved in 
politics, even though he or she is not obliged to be so. Thus, through incorporating 
liberal traditions into a democratic system, it can be seen as the most common form of 
democracy, and can be most effectively put in place by safeguarding the autonomy of 
the individual (Grugel 2002:14). Alongside this, an aim of this liberal type of 
representative democracy is also to justify, but at the same time restrain, the sovereign 
power of the state. 
 
Direct democracy, however, cannot anymore be implemented in modern societies as 
their populations are too large and their state and civil structures are too complicated. 
The original aim for direct democracy can now be rather seen in some aspects of 
participatory democracy, particularly, for example, now that new communication 
technologies are available. Updated voting systems, whereby the preferences of the 
people can be instantly and securely recorded, are thought necessary by some for 
participatory democracy. Certain techno-political structures and a suitable political 
culture would be required in such a democratic system (Parry and Moran 1994:4). 
Indeed, the democratic model is still evolving, and Geraint Parry can write that 
“democracy is not a condition which has been achieved, but one which still must be 
striven for” (Parry and Moran 1994:4). Moreover, in modern societies, with their 
inevitable bureaucracies, organisations and compromises, political leadership remains 
the central requirement. A system of accountability, which therefore appears more 
productive and practical compared with participation alone, becomes the only way they 
can be democratically governed. 
 
In liberal democracy, which we shall examine separately later, an appropriate 
mechanism of liability has been created with competitive elections where the vote of the 
electorate is contested by the different candidates for political leadership. Politics 
becomes a profession and Schumpeter can describe such a system as one where 
"democracy becomes the rule of politician rather than of the people in any direct sense” 
(Schumpeter 1976). Furthermore, some significant choice is made available by 
politicians presenting different bundles of policies. The power to govern for a time span 
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numbering some years is the reward for leaders successful at the election (Parry and 
Moran 1994:5). 
 
Briefly, studying the empirical theory of democracy will make it easy to find out how 
and why liberal democracy emerged as the widespread democratic theory in the 
contemporary era. We will also be able to consider its strengths and weaknesses. 
 
 
a. Democracy’s Empirical Theory 
  
It has become clear that the importance and utilization of democracy has shifted in a 
major way. This happened over the last six decades or so when it clearly became a part 
of the vocabulary of daily political life as a way of distinguishing between `the free 
world' and the Communist bloc. Over time, democracy has therefore become more and 
more connected with the political systems of Western Europe and the US. The result 
was that the concept of democracy became exclusively linked to that liberal or 
representative form that was common in the West. More accurately, the empirical 
realities faced by Western governments fell in line with the use of democracy as a 
particular mode of government. Jean Grugel has observed how the Cold War and thus 
the requirement to justify liberal democracy affected empirical democratic theorising. 
The negative aspect of this type of thought was its focus on the benefits of current 
political systems in the West as opposed to “Marxism”, its perceived opponent (Pedram 
2007). 
 
More importantly, abstract conceptions of the ‘good society’ became less central to the 
empirical theory of democracy, while the implementation of democratic procedures 
became, for the majority of political scientists, the single criterion in defining a political 
system as democratic or not (Pedram 2007) . Our understanding of democracy, however, 
has been dramatically challenged with the rise of Behaviouralism.
20
 Arernd Lijphart 
                                                          
20 Behaviouralism which relates to the school of politics that developed in the 50s and 60s in the USA, is a movement in 
political science which insists on analysing the observable behaviour of political actors. In another word, represented a 
revolt against institutional practices in the study of politics and called for political analysis to be modelled upon the natural 
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claimed that democracy was a reality of ‘the real world’, and in doing so clearly 
intended to show that the political systems of Western Europe and the US were as ideal 
as could be expected of a democracy (Lijphart 1984:48). In this passage Dahl 
perceptively outlines the difference between descriptive and normative conceptions of 
democracy: 
 
      “One way to define democracy is to specify a set of goals to be maximised. 
Democracy can then be defined in terms of the specific governmental process 
necessary to maximise these goals. A second way might be called the descriptive 
method is to consider as a single class phenomena [of] all those nation states and 
social organisations that are commonly called democratic by political scientists and 
discover first the necessary and sufficient conditions they have in common and 
second, the necessary and sufficient conditions for social organizations possessing 
these characteristics” (Dahl 1956:63). 
 
Behaviouralists applied the second method, attempting to justify the normative tradition 
of democracy which resulted in the empirical theory of democracy. Schumpeter could 
only imagine democracy as a form of government and a mechanism for the election of 
leaders (Schumpeter 1994:34). He highlighted the important meaning of restricting 
popular prospects of the democratic system. Schumpeter's key approach was an 
assumption that the majority of the population could not be entrusted with the important 
task of decision-making (Schumpeter 1994:79). To make it clearer, democracy has 
created competing for power more institutionalised and like a regular process under 
institutional control. Therefore, in Schumpeter’s opinion, the circumstances that will 
seemingly foster considerable competition between elites are the focus. Creating these 
circumstances requires: high calibre party political leadership; the separation of the state 
and the political elites; bureaucratic autonomy; a society and an opposition who accept 
the rules in play; and compromise and acceptance in the political culture (Pedram 2007). 
 
Dahl, by contrast, paved the way to a different approach. He took care not blur the lines 
between democracy in practice and democracy as an ideal. Instead he proposed the use 
of the term ‘polyarchy’ following his findings that Western systems of government did 
                                                                                                                                                                          
sciences. That is to say that only information that could be quantified and tested empirically could be regarded as 'true' and 
that other normative concepts such as 'liberty' and 'justice' should be rejected as they are not falsifiable. 
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not tally with ideal democracy. The practicalities of polyarchy are certainly preferable 
to authoritarianism in which even the basics of political accountability and competition 
are not met. To put it simply, the institutions of polyarchy are based on a combination 
of elected government and civil liberties which should secure the access of different 
groups in society to the political system. Dahl argues that polyarchy is a political order 
distinguished by the presence of seven institutions (Dahl 1989:221): 
 
1) Elected officials. Control over government decisions about policy is 
constitutionally vested in elected officials. 
2) Free and fair elections. Elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly conducted 
elections in which coercion is comparatively uncommon. 
3) Inclusive suffrage. Practically all adults have the right to vote in the election of 
officials. 
4) The right to run for office. Practically all adults have the right to run for elective 
offices in the government, though age limits may be higher for holding office than 
for the suffrage. 
5) Freedom of expression. Citizens have the right to express themselves without the 
danger of severe punishment on political matters broadly defined, including 
criticism of officials, the government, the regime, the socioeconomic order, and the 
prevailing ideology.  
6) Alternative information. Citizens have the right to seek out alternative sources of 
information. Moreover, alternative sources of information exist and are protected 
by laws. 
7) Associational autonomy. To achieve their various rights, including those listed 
above, citizens also have a right to form relatively independent associations or 
organizations, including independent political parties and interest groups. 
 
In fact, if we look closely at the above attributes we will find that attributes 1 to 4 tell us 
that a basic aspect of polyarchy is that elections are inclusive, fair, and competitive, 
while attributes 5 to 7 refer to political and social freedoms that are minimally essential 
not only during but also between elections as a condition for elections to be fair and 
competitive (O’Donnell1996). 
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Accordingly, an overall view of the above list written by Dahl and debated by the 
political scientist O'Donnell points out that most current democracies can be 
characterised as polyarchy, instead of real democracy.  
 
Of course, understanding how power functions in any society can make clear why 
policy-making is not democratic despite having regular free and fair general elections. 
In other words, it is not democracy or democratic elements that always form polities in 
societies, but sometimes, unelected wealthy bourgeois can play an important role in 
society thus ignoring the government polity (Pedram 2007). Aristotle supported this 
assertion when he wrote about the rivals for political authority. He argued that one of 
the most obvious rivals for political authority is the rich as they use their authority to 
keep rich, while their political slogan, by which they propose to secure their own 
exclusive authority, is that those who contribute to the city ought to be given a 
proportionate say in determining how resources are to be used (Winthrop 1978). 
 
Furthermore, only electoralist or procedural understanding of democracy are promoted 
by empirical democratic theory. In other terms, through its focus on the visible actions 
of politicians it overlooks the role of hidden power structures, such as the cultural 
practices and dimensions that influence politics on the ground. The model it provides, 
therefore, is inadequate for the study of the political systems of developing countries. It 
also omits the political realities behind the official and visible structures of government. 
Another difficulty is that empirical theory has a prescriptive approach to developing 
countries, which are assumed to arrive at democracy by following the route of Western 
governments. It is false, however, to hope that all societies should follow this particular 
path. Furthermore, empirical democratic theory does not deal properly with the issue of 
how economic resources, or their absence, influence the running of a political system 
(Pedram 2007). Indeed, empirical democracy (including liberal democracy), puts 
forward few proposals about socio-economic issues or different types of structural 
inequality, either globally or inside a state, for the simple reason that it considers them 
of little importance for the exercise of citizenship and thus in preserving the democratic 
system. Additionally, from the experiences of developing countries and the Third World, 
in seems that extreme income inequalities and equal citizenship cannot exist side by 
side (Grugel 2002:22). 
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b. Liberal Democracy 
 
Liberal democracy can be defined as a particular type of democracy with its philosophy 
being essentially based on a set of theories about individuals, states and societies. 
Schumpeter states that democracy "is that institutional arrangement for arriving at 
political decisions in which the individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a 
competitive struggle for the people's vote" (Schumpeter 1950:269).Likewise, the 
American political sociologist, Barrington Moore (Barrington Moore 1966:414) and 
Samuel Huntington (Huntington 1984:195) focus on the democratic rule dimension. In 
other definitions, the traits attributed to liberal democracy fall under both dimensions. 
 
A considerable amount of literature has been published on Liberal Democracy. To begin 
with, Liberalism can be portrayed as follows: It is a group of ideas or principles, given 
substance in democratic political institutions, that have developed, modified, adapted 
and changed over time. These values are mainly centred on freedom and equality. 
Despite this recognizable core of values, Liberal Democracy, as a product of culture, 
has been a challenged territory, both in the real world of electoral politics and in the 
academy (Katerberg 1995). Moreover, George Bragues argued that Liberal democracy 
was founded on the enlightenment notion that there are principles, accessible to 
unassisted reasons, demonstrating that political life should be dedicated to the 
protection of rights common to all human beings (Bragues 2006:158). Rorty thinks that 
liberal democracy is prior to philosophy in the sense that it simply does not need any 
philosophical justification (Bernstein 1987). 
In his book Democracy and Democratization, George Sorensen argued that “Liberalism 
developed in opposition to the medieval, hierarchical institutions, the despotic 
monarchies whose claim to all-powerful rule rested on the assertion that they enjoyed 
divine support.” Sorensen demonstrated that Liberal Democracy was called Liberal at 
first, and it mainly aimed at restricting state power over sovereign people and civil 
society, then, in a secondary motion, it became democratic, mainly aiming to create 
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structures that would later secure a popular mandate for holders of state power 
(Bernstein 1987). 
In his Models of Democracy, David Held wrote that John Stewart Mill’s liberal 
democratic state operates on behalf of all citizens and protects its claim to legitimacy 
with the pledge to sustain security and safety of persons and property while, at the same 
time, promoting equal justice and fairness among individuals (Held 1996). Mill himself 
is well-known for his theories and involvement in classifying the ethos of liberal 
democracy. In his famous work On Liberty and Consideration on Representative 
Government, he points out what is regularly seen as the first systematic clarification and 
defence of liberal democracy. He says: 
 
“In the past, as many observed, tyranny was something experienced by the majority 
of a nation's people at the hands of a minority so there was no danger of the majority 
tyrannizing over itself. But with the emergence of large democratic nations (like the 
US) a need was created for people to limit their power over themselves” (Mill 
1991:7). 
 
Thus, the goal of On Liberty was to spot and identify the principles in accord with 
which the people should secure this limitation. In short, Mill claims: “the only purpose, 
for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community 
against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good is not a sufficient warrant” 
(Mill 1991:14); In other words, "it is a command against government paternalism as 
well as against overt tyranny. In fact, it favours what is often now called the pluralist 
mandate that citizens ought as far as possible to be able to pursue what they see as their 
own goods and in their own ways” (Mill 1991:17). Chiefly, Mill outlines the most 
significant freedoms to preserve: freedom of conscience, thought and feeling; holding 
and expressing opinions; following personal life plans; and meeting with others for any 
non-mischievous purpose (Pedram 2007).  
 
As these freedoms usually only direct affect those who enjoy them, the state, including 
democratic states, and others should refrain from any interference in them, whether 
paternalistically or not (Mill 1991:16-17). Mill, although he outlines little detail on how 
citizens’ freedom should be preserved, clearly considers some aspects of a citizen’s life 
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should be free of regulation, and also some legal restrictions on areas where even a 
democratically mandated government should be able to legislate. He therefore lays 
emphasis on the "preservation of a distinction between private and public life and the 
rule of law” (Mill 1991:16-17). Furthermore, Mill prescribes the direct participation of 
citizens in matters of government, in order that "people in this way are able to develop 
intellectual talents, communal and moral values.” Mill considers that, as direct 
participation is unworkable in large societies, the ideal type of government must be 
representative (Mill 1991:256). 
 
In summary, there are political freedoms to the extent that a country’s citizens have the 
freedom to form or take part in political groups and the freedom to express political 
opinions in a variety of media. For this reason, the foremost interpretation of democratic 
theories during the second half of twentieth century and also the twenty-first century 
was liberal democracy. It was drawn on by nearly all the well-known workable 
democracies, which incorporated its strengths in their structure and mandate and tried to 
profit from it to the greatest extent possible (Pedram 2007).  
 
c. Alternatives to Liberal Democracy 
 
“Democracy” is a vague term with several meanings, and Liberal Democracy is not the 
only form of democracy or even the only valid type of government. Inasmuch as Liberal 
Democracy is a system which has its advantages and disadvantages, it is in our interest 
not only to critique it, but also, if possible, to look for alternatives to it. 
 
I. Participatory Democracy  
 
During the course of my research, I found that everybody suggests a founder or a father 
of the participatory democratic theory. Without entering this debate, I will try to 
reconcile all of these viewpoints in a way which benefits this research. 
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  The argument, assuming there is one and only one classical theory of democracy 
which is liberal democracy, seems far from reliable as many scholars have managed to 
suggest an alternative or an equivalent theory, the participatory theory of democracy. 
Today, most political scientists advocate participation in politics because it is 
democratic, and a degree of participation is useful to make government secure: To keep 
even an inefficient and imprudent government functioning it may be necessary to permit 
at least minimal participation. Most agree that participation is justified in part because it 
satisfies individuals who, by participating, can force the ruling "elite" to meet their 
substantive demands (Winthrop 1978). 
 
As Aristotle explained, those who support democracy and political equity do so because 
they believe that liberty is the fitting choice for humans. The democratic principle of 
equal participation is defended not to ensure efficient or stable rule, nor because it is 
satisfying in itself, but rather it is grounded in the opinion that equal political 
participation is necessary in order to fulfil the human condition (Winthrop 1978). 
 
Jürgen Habermas, the German sociologist and philosopher in the tradition of critical 
theory and pragmatism, is a participatory democrat who developed a theoretical account 
of why we might expect the individual capacities necessary to democracy to be 
produced by democratic settings. His explanation, according to Delba Winthrop, does 
not equate democracy with any particular set of institutional mechanisms, such as 
voting, separation of powers, or representation. Rather, he understands democracy as 
any institutional order whose legitimacy depends on collective will-formation through 
discourse (Winthrop 1978). Democracy, according to Habermas, "is a question of 
finding arrangements which can ground the basic presupposition that the basic 
institutions of the society and the basic political decisions would meet with the unforced 
agreement of all those involved, if they could participate, as free and equal, in 
discursive will-formation"(Winthrop 1978:). 
 
The Professor of Sociology Gordon Marshall, who believes that participatory 
democracy is a “reincarnation of the ancient Greek ideal of government by the people” 
(Marshall 1998:482), argues that the strength of participatory democracy is that it binds 
individuals to the group through their active involvement in all decisions (Marshall 
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1998:482). Professor David Held argues that ‘participatory democracy’ is among other 
things a “direct participation’ of citizens in the regulation of the key institutions of 
society – including the workplace and the local community” (Held 1996:271). 
 
A belief in the importance of liberty and activism and an understanding that changes in 
government and people having the right to vote do not necessarily equate to democracy 
are what participatory theory is founded upon. Indeed, the theory works on the basis 
that democracy is achieved through trust and mutual relationships. Crawford Brough 
Macpherson, the Canadian political scientist, set forth the idea of participatory 
democracy. This model stood apart from what was known as Schumpeter’s model, 
which had a negative outlook on human kind (Macpherson 1977:43). 
 
An extremely unclear vision of the state characterizes participatory theory, although it 
does still recognise its role. It is a theory that took shape following the Second World 
War, which saw the state play a fundamental and comprehensive role. However, it 
encounters problems when one attempts to apply it to a vast community such as the 
nation state. The merits of participatory democracy, then, speak for themselves at a 
small-scale level (city councils, regional governments, etc.), but whether it can cope 
with issues on a national scale is uncertain (Pedram 2007). Macpherson appears to make 
a statement supporting this:  
 
“Not how to run it but how to reach it.... What roadblocks have to be removed i.e. 
what changes in our present society and the now prevailing ideology are prerequisite 
or co-requisite conditions for reaching participatory democracy? ... One is a change 
in people's consciousness (or unconsciousness) from seeing themselves and acting as 
exercisers and enjoyers of the exertion and development of their own capacities. This 
is requisite not only to the emergence but also to the operation of a participatory 
democracy. The operation of a participatory democracy would require a stronger 
sense of community than now prevails. The other prerequisite is a great reduction of 
the present social and economic inequality, since that inequality ... requires a non-
participatory political system to hold the society together” (Macpherson 1977:93). 
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The ideals of participatory democracy would have citizens amending and protecting 
their constitution, creating policies and setting their priorities and laws. In reality 
politicians are necessary to implement policy, but the final and unquestionable power to 
shape it rests with the people. There is a direct correlation between how far the people 
influence the constitution, table or veto legislation, and set budget or social priorities 
and the amount of involvement they opt for. This rather than the politicians whom the 
people have elected permitting them these influences. Certain people might state that 
participatory democracy is in fact "direct democracy" or "deliberative democracy", but 
in a more complete form (Pedram 2007). 
 
II. Deliberative Democracy 
 
According to its dictionary definition, deliberation is the act of deliberating, or the act of 
weighing and examining the reasons for and against a choice or measure. In other words, 
it is the careful discussion and examination of the reasons for and against a measure. 
Austen-Smith defined deliberation as a “conversation whereby individuals speak and 
listen sequentially” before making a collective decision (Gambetta 1998), while Adam 
Przeworski defined it as a form of discussion which intended or intends to change the 
preferences on the bases of which people decide how to act( Przeworski 1998).   
Interestingly, Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson argue that Deliberative democracy 
asserts the necessity to justify decisions made by citizens and their representatives. They 
debate that Deliberative democracy makes room for many other forms of decision-
making (Gutmann and Thompson 2004).
 
Diego Gambetta mentions two points of view 
in one of his essays. He argues, on the one hand, that deliberation does not invariably 
bring positive effects to light, but, in certain circumstances it does more damage than 
good (Gambetta 1998). He gives an example of this, saying that if the quality of 
outcomes declines rapidly with time, deliberation may simply waste precious time. On 
the other hand, Gambetta mentions the viewpoints of several scholars who argue that 
“deliberation does more to benefit than to harm to quality of decisions or legitimacy or 
both” (Gambetta 1998). He discusses this, saying that effective deliberation can affect 
the quality of decisions in four ways: Firstly, it can render the outcomes of decisions 
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pareto-superior
21
 by fostering better solutions; secondly, it can make the outcomes fairer 
in terms of distributive justice by providing better protection for weaker parties; thirdly, 
it can lead to a larger consensus on any one decision; and fourthly, it can generate more 
legitimate decisions that target both minorities and majorities (Gambetta 1998). Susan C. 
Stokes argues that deliberation improves the quality of decisions and enriches 
democracy (Stokes 1998).  
Jon Elster demonstrated that deliberation among democratically elected delegates may 
be part of the process of adopting the constitution, while promoting deliberative 
democracy may be one of the goals of the framers (Elster 1998). Elster argues that the 
methods by which constitutions are implemented differ broadly. He points out that not 
all constitutions engage deliberation, nor are all adopted by democratic procedures. 
Elster adds what he calls a look at the history of constitution making and concludes that 
it suggests that the procedure may perhaps be nondemocratic and non-deliberative (the 
Prussian constitution of December 5, 1848 which was imposed by the king, and the 
Japanese constitution of 1946 which was imposed by the U.S. occupying army); 
democratic and non-deliberative (the French constitutions of 1799, 1802, and 1804, 
written by and for Napoleon I, and the constitution of 1852, written by and for his 
nephew Louis Napoleon); democratic and deliberative (the Frankfurt assembly of 1848, 
the Lebanese constitution of 1943); or non-democratic and deliberative (various pre-
revolutionary French assemblies) (Elster 1998) .  
In 1989, Joshua Cohen wrote that deliberation aims to appear as a rationally motivated 
consensus to find reasons that are influential and convincing to all who are committed 
to acting on the results of a free and reasoned assessment of alternatives by equals 
(Cohen 1989). In another paper Cohen, argued that the main idea and concept of a 
deliberative democracy is entrenched in the spontaneous ideal of a democratic 
organization or association in which the justification of the terms and conditions of the 
organization or association proceeds through public argument and reasoning among 
equal citizens. Cohen pointed out that the formal conception of a deliberative 
democracy has five main features (Cohen 1989):  
                                                          
21 Pareto-superiority:  a move from one distribution point to another is said to be superior one at least one party is better off 
and no one else is worse off. This includes moves that benefit all parties; the essential concern is that no one is worse off after 
the move compared to welfare before the move. 
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1- A deliberative democracy is an on-going and independent association, whose 
members expect it to continue into the indefinite future. 
2- The members of the association share (and it is common knowledge that they share) 
the view that the appropriate terms of association provide a framework for or are the 
results of their deliberation. They share, that is, a commitment to co-ordinating their 
activities within institutions that make deliberation possible and according to norms that 
they arrive at through their deliberation. For them, free deliberation among equals is the 
basis of legitimacy. 
3- A deliberative democracy is a pluralistic association. The members have diverse 
preferences, convictions and ideals concerning the conduct of their own lives. While 
sharing a commitment to the deliberative resolution of problems of collective choice 
(D2), they also have divergent aims, and do not think that one particular set of 
preferences, convictions or ideals is mandatory. 
4- Because the members of a democratic association regard deliberative procedures as 
the source of legitimacy, it is important to them that the terms of their association not 
merely be the results of their deliberation, but also be manifest to them as such. They 
prefer institutions in which the connections between deliberation and outcomes are 
evident to ones in which the connections are less clear. 
5- The members recognize one another as having deliberative capacities i.e. the 
capacities required for entering into a public exchange of reasons and for acting on the 
result of such public reasoning. 
Cohen summarized by saying that the theory of deliberative democracy aims to give 
substance to this formal ideal by characterizing the conditions that should be obtained if 
the social order is to be manifestly regulated by deliberative forms of collective choice.  
Debating Ideal Deliberation, Cohen found that it is free in that it satisfies two conditions. 
The first is that the participants look upon themselves as bound only by the results of 
their deliberation and by the preconditions for that deliberation. Their consideration of 
proposals is not constrained by the authority of prior norms or requirements. The second 
condition is that the participants suppose that they can act from the results, taking the 
fact that a certain decision is arrived at through their deliberation as a sufficient reason 
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for complying with it (Cohen 1989). Cohen continues to argue that Ideal Deliberation is 
reasoned in that the parties to it are required to state their reasons for advancing 
proposals, supporting them or criticizing them. They give reasons with the expectation 
that those reasons (and not, for example, their power) will settle the fate of their 
proposal. In Ideal Deliberation, as Habermas puts it, “no force except that of the better 
argument is exercised” (cited in Cohen 1989). Cohen thinks that in Ideal Deliberation 
parties are both formally and substantively equal. They are formally equal in that the 
rules regulating the procedure do not single out individuals. Everyone with the 
deliberative capacities has equal standing at each stage of the deliberative process. Each 
can put issues on the agenda, propose solutions, and offer reasons in support or in 
criticism of proposals, and each has an equal voice in the decision (Cohen 1989).  
Given that Lebanon is a country with a multicultural-society and competing political 
parties, some of which seemingly have foreign agendas, deliberation plays an important 
role in daily political life. Deliberation is involved everywhere: in the cabinet, the 
parliament, and in all other political institutions. But in the case of Lebanon, reaching an 
Ideal Deliberation and, through this, a proper deliberative democracy, as Cohen argues, 
looks like an impossible and a complex issue. Perhaps, the only two agreements to 
involve successful but not ideal deliberation in Lebanon were the National pact of 1943 
and the Taif agreement of 1989, when deliberation arrived at a rational consensus. Since 
then, and particularly after the 90s, deliberation started to affect negatively the 
functioning of the state and its institutions.  
 
III- Consociational Democracy 
 
Consociational democracy, as Arend Lijphart defines it, means “government by elite 
cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable 
democracy” (Lijphart 1969:216). According to Lijphart, efforts made on 
consociationalism are not essentially successful. However, successful consociational 
democracy, as Lijphart argues, requires (Lijphart 1969:216): 
 (I) that the elites have the ability to accommodate the divergent interests and demands 
of the subcultures. 
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 (2) This requires that they have the ability to transcend cleavages and to join in a 
common effort with the elites of rival subcultures.  
(3) This in turn depends on their commitment to the maintenance of the system and to 
the improvement of its cohesion and stability.  
(4) Finally, all of the above requirements are based on the assumption that the elites 
understand the perils of political fragmentation.  
The above four requirements, as Lijphart demonstrate, are logically implied by the 
concept of consociational democracy as defined by himself. Back then, as Lijphart 
argues, a study of the efficacious consociational democracies in the Low Countries, 
Switzerland, Austria, and Lebanon proposes a number of “conditions favourable to the 
establishment and the persistence of this type of democracy. These have to do with 
inter-subcultural relations at the elite level, inter-subcultural relations at the mass level, 
and elite-mass relations within each of the subcultures” (Lijphart 1969:216). 
To sum it up, Lijphart finds that several connections have a positive impact on the 
establishment and successfulness of consociational democracy. These are: the 
relationship between elites themselves, the relationship between masses, and the 
relationship between elites and masses within one subculture. However, all of the 
aforesaid relationships began to change in the 1960s.  
Speedy modernization was one of the main reasons. It is argued that speedy 
modernization caused harm to the relationship between elite and masses. For example, 
people belonging to specific sects started to look at the popular members in their sects 
as members that grant them a piece of the modernization cake. This happened in many 
developing divided societies (Nordlinger 1972:114). Indeed, Lebanon was admitting no 
exception (Barclay 2007). 
One of the disadvantages of the consociational system is that its efficiency, 
effectiveness and workability relies heavily on cooperation amongst different sects. 
When corporation fails, consociational democracy fails. Lijphart who believes that “the 
Second World War marked the beginning of consociational democracy in Lebanon” 
(Lijphart 1969:217),  argues that “decision making that entails accommodation among 
all subcultures is a difficult process, and consociational democracies are always 
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threatened by a degree of immobilism” (Lijphart 1969:218). Quoted in Lijphart’s paper, 
Michael C. Hudson argues that the Lebanese political system is "attuned to incessant 
adjustment among primordial groups rather than policy planning and execution." As a 
result, its "apparent stability … is deceptively precarious: social mobilization appears to 
be overloading the circuits of the Lebanese political system” (Lijphart 1969:219). 
However, the “apparent stability” that Hudson wrote about didn’t last for long. The 
1975 civil war proved that the Lebanese political system was nothing but a fragile 
system and that consociational democracy did not help much in preventing conflicts 
amidst Lebanese political parties.  After the Lebanese Civil war –which was reflected 
on the political stability in the country through entrenching sectarian divisions and 
causing sectarian segregation- a debate took place as regards to the Lebanese political 
system and whether it is considered a consociational system and, accordingly, applies 
consociational democracy. To all outward appearances, the Lebanese political system 
looked so, but if thoroughly examined, it will appear that it was not more than a false 
label or a window dressing that was not practically implemented. From the Taif 
agreement hitherto, Lebanon has suffered from a plethora of foreign interventions in 
various fields. Moreover, whenever Lebanese politicians disagreed on how to run the 
country, a foreign mediation was summoned in hope for resolving the outstanding 
disagreement. The following examples illustrate some of the impediments preventing 
the application of consociational democracy:  
1- The continuous intervention of the Syrian regime which gives arise to the 
question The question how can a system claims to be applying 
consociationalism while that system is being partially operated by a dictatorship 
(the Syrian regime)?   
2- In the crucial decisions, such as war, for example, Hezbollah was waging war on 
Israel without taking the permission of the State or the Lebanese citizens. 
3- In 2008, when Hezbollah found that the Government will not be subject to its 
conditions, it managed to force the government to abdicate its sovereign 
decisions, by the use of arms. 
The aforementioned problems and many more proves that consociational solutions for 
problems that Lebanon suffered after that Taif agreement was not applied. In other 
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words, consociational solutions were abandoned; however, what took place instead was 
either the use of arms or the foreign intervention. In both cases, the foundations of 
consensual democracy were demolished and accordingly, I believe that consensual 
democracy cannot be applicable on Lebanon. 
 
 2.2.1.5 Democratization 
In The Third Wave, Samuel Huntington argued that “causes of democratization could 
differ substantially from one place to another” (Huntington 1991:83) and causes 
responsible for the initial regime changes in the wave (Huntington 1991:380). In spite 
of this, however, Huntington stressed that, in general, “elections, open, free and fair are 
the essence of democracy, the inescapable sine qua non” (Huntington 1991:9). And he 
emphasised that political reform should be gradual and incremental and should be 
“undertaken by moderate, realistic men and women in the spirit of soul-at-a-time” 
(Huntington 1991:9). 
Most writers on democracy and democratization would not refute the stages and the 
conclusion that Huntington reached in the third wave. Very few would disagree with the 
idea that what might work in one country might not work in the other, as the political 
environment is highly complex and involves many quantifiable and non-quantifiable 
variables. Prezeworski has noted that democratization is “a process of institutionalising 
uncertainty” (Marks and Diamond 1992)  It might, therefore, be more practical to define 
democratization in general terms, as David Potter did. Potter kept the definition of 
democratization very broad when wrote: “the word democratization refers to political 
changes moving in a democratic direction” (Potter et al 1997:3). Rex Brynen, Baghat 
Korany and Paul Noble, defined democratization as follows: “Political democratization 
initials the expansion of political participation in such a way as to provide citizens with 
a degree of real and meaningful collective control over public policy” (Brynen et al 
1995:3). 
2.2.1.5.1 Democratization and the State   
When discussing democratization it might be helpful to demonstrate its purpose. The 
purpose of democratization is the building of a democratic state. But the question is: 
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How does this happen? The general consensus is that democracy entails more than 
simply holding elections. However, academics have so far been unable to agree on what 
exactly is necessary. We are aware that the state is, in the final analysis, a means of 
dominating society. In a democracy, then, hierarchies which act combining legitimate 
power, persuasion and bureaucracy tend to hold power. A further characteristic of a 
democracy is the existence of several bodies that hold authority and make decisions. In 
an undemocratic state, meanwhile, democratization makes the state apparatus its main 
target. Therefore, it is rather illogical to believe that an undemocratic state will itself try 
to carry out democratization. 
Overall, a democratic government’s legitimacy is reliant on its ability to convincingly 
demonstrate it is truly representative of the people, acts in their interest, and can be held 
accountable by them. Therefore, a democratic government should adhere to these 
principles. Although democratic and capitalist states naturally work to a business- and 
profit-oriented agenda, it is more likely that they will answer demands for social and 
economic justice given that they rely on a healthy balance between this and economic 
prosperity in order to survive. With regard to force, it is widely agreed that the state can 
coerce and use violence. However, it is argued that in a democracy there is no need to 
resort to this unless it is to protect against outside threats or against criminals or those 
causing social disorder (Pedram 2007). 
 
Grugel has assessed some fundamental characteristics of a democratic state: 
 
I. Territorial integrity, either as a result of the belief that the state represents a nation or 
through negotiations and legitimate and binding agreements that make a multinational 
state possible. 
 
II. The rule of law, that is, minimal rights and duties of citizens are legally encoded and 
the parameters of state activity legally defined. 
 
III. A minimal use of legally sanctioned violence against its own citizens. 
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IV. A popularly elected and representative government that is formally controlled by 
constitutional channels of accountability. 
 
V. A complex bureaucracy that can make claims to impartiality. 
 
VI. The existence of multiple centres of power. 
 
VII. The formal existence of channels of access to decision making, even for 
subordinated social groups, which are operational to some degree. 
 
VIII. Some commitment to social and economic justice (Grugel 2002:37-40).  
 
In short and to end this section, the only way that leads to fully democratizing any state 
involves applying, to a degree, the following three conditions: 
 
1- Institutional change.  
2- Representative change.  
3- Functional transformation.  
 
These three steps create the path towards full democratization, regardless the fact of that 
in contemporary democratizations, most attention focuses on having and implementing 
institutional change. 
 
2.2.1.5.2 The Epistemology of Democratization  
 
The course of modern democratization is actually far more difficult than Huntington 
suggests in his theory, the Third Wave of Democratization. In fact, this theory fails to 
elucidate very different explanations for democratization. First of all, it is required to 
make a separation as to the causes of democratization. Secondly, the wave approach 
takes for granted that there is now a global movement to establish democracy. This 
argument might be true to an extent, considering what is happening in certain countries 
all over the world, and especially in the Arab world.  But, according to a more precise 
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consideration, the number of stable and liberal democracies is actually growing very 
slowly (Diamond 1999:24). Huntington presumed that more democracies were 
emerging because more elections were being held. However, holding elections, as 
mentioned in previous sections, does not necessarily indicate the implementation of 
democracy and democratization. In other words, if elections were taken as the only, or 
the main sign of democracy and democratization, then a country like Lebanon would be 
considered one of the most democratic countries in the world, and certainly in the 
region.  
 
Social conflict theory has also been pointed to in conventional studies as sparking the 
democratization process (Marx 1972). This theory, based on a critique of capitalism, is 
regarded as another classic method of analysing political reform. It states that class 
structures were overturned by capitalism, which led to the formation of a middle class 
and thus an insistence from a new section of society for greater social and economic 
reform. Indeed, Seymour Lipset asserts that capitalism bread bourgeois and middle class 
professionals, who are essential for political reform and hence democracy (Lipset 
1959:27).   
 
Some researchers believe that democratization has its roots in the 1776 American 
Revolution. Dahl, for example, dates the process to the success known by the question 
of representation which brought about the Revolution and ultimately saw the birth of the 
United States. Other scholars, such as Huntington, equate democracy with individualism 
and consequently hold the view that its first wave began in the 1600s. The rapid spread 
of capitalism in the West and the fierce social conflicts that ensued should equally be 
considered (Pedram 2007). 
 
The non-elite or lower classes were increasingly empowered by growth in the economy, 
creating a situation where they came to recognize those rights that had so far been 
denied them. The process of democratization, therefore, resulted from social conflicts. 
Meanwhile, capitalism and its ensuing social conflicts resulted in the development of a 
modern and fairly independent state able to play a pivotal role in further social reform. 
In Europe, this new state enabled the advancement of socio-economic reforms which 
helped pave the way towards democratization (Grugel 2002:37). In other words, socio-
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economic pressure played a key role in leading to democratization, taking into 
consideration the combination of this pressure with the development of a liberal state 
that was to some degree autonomous (Pedram 2007). 
 
We can see various different types of self-declared democracies in modern experiments 
with democratization. Certain countries have seen the emergence of a liberal 
democracy, while others have seen a degree of electoral change. But the overall picture 
is completed by the problems democracy faces in most Third World countries. It is thus 
imperative that we make a distinction between democracies with problems or part-
democracies, and those that are secure and strong. In short, contemporary processes of 
democratization encompass failures and successes. The question raised here is: why do 
some democratization experiments succeed where others fail? The following is Grugel's 
short answer to this question: 
 
“Democracies are political systems comprising institutions that translate citizen's 
preferences into policy, have effective states that act to protect and deepen democratic 
rights, and count on a strong participatory and critical civil society. A consolidated 
democracy is one in which this political order is routinized and accepted. 
Consolidation, then, implies both the deepening and stabilizing of democracy. In 
addition, the chances for consolidation are greatest in cases where favourable 
international circumstances are allied with state capacity and a growing, vocal and 
effective civil society” (Grugel 2002:36).  
 
 
Initially, the process of democratization started most powerfully in countries which 
were economically strong and well developed. In other words, stable democracy 
seemed to be a luxury only rich nations could afford. But this form of democracy or this 
concept was not to succeed all the time as it was challenged in some developed, 
capitalist economies such as the former German Democratic Republic in the 1930s, in 
which the state claimed to distribute wealth relatively equitably and was officially 
dedicated to social justice, but could hardly be considered a functioning democracy 
(Case 1993). Also, in some authoritarian regimes democracy was replaced by fragile or 
semi-democracies. This implies that although capitalism seems essential, it still does not 
ensure the emergence of genuine democracy (e.g. the semi-democracy in Malaysia). 
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Meanwhile, democratic types of government have continued to exist in some countries 
for considerable periods, even though economic development was slow and elitism was 
still in force. This happened, for example, in the island nations of the English-speaking 
Caribbean, Venezuela and India. (Pedram 2007) 
 
In summary, we should see the wave theory as a useful way of placing democratization 
in its global setting. However, it must be noted that it is not capable of including all of 
the various factors implicit in the process. It stresses the need to note that democracy 
has more chance of developing following social conflict at certain times in world 
history. But, as we have seen above, on a wider scale the application of wave theory can 
be rather limited. Furthermore, it falls short of clarifying how democracy develops on a 
national level. With this in mind, we must examine theories of social and economic 
change and political action in order to gain an understanding of the matter. (Pedram 
2007) 
2.2.1.5.3 The Process of Democratization 
 
It is not a matter of surprise if we find that the number of successful and 
thriving democracies is overshadowed by either failed or stalled democratic 
experiments. It certainly seems that, in some countries around the world, problems like 
socio-economic imbalance and gender inequality mean that democratization will keep 
on being slow process and will remain a painful, and sometimes impossible, task.  
 
Since the Portuguese dictatorship was overthrown in 1974, the number of 
democratically ruled countries has dramatically increased. Prior to this, there were an 
estimated forty democracies word-wide; these were joined steadily during the late 1970s 
and early 1980s as a number of states made the transition from authoritarianism to 
seemingly democratic government. The late 1980s and the decline, and ultimate 
collapse, of the Soviet Union saw a significant boost to the pace of world-wide 
democratization (Pedram 2007). Consequently by the end of 1995 there were, as Larry 
Diamond has noted, between 76 and 117 democracies, depending on the method used to 
measure them (Diamond 1999:154). This post-1974 period is what Samuel Huntington 
has termed the third wave of global democratic expansion; he demonstrated how 
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important the effects of regional and international democratization were (Huntington 
1991). 
 
Undoubtedly, holding elections or toppling an authoritarian regime and replacing it with 
another, even if this receives the support of the people, does not permit a country to 
wear the badge of democracy. Huntington describes supplanting military regimes as the 
extremely important beginning to third wave democratization. However, he unwillingly 
skims over the underlying principal behind taking such action. He states that countries 
came to begin the process of democratization because of a huge growth in democratic 
discourse. But it was in fact a result of social and economic change at both the national 
and supra-national levels. Quite simply the old political system became unable to 
function in the context of accelerated change to socio-economic structures and had to be 
exposed and taken apart (Pedram 2007). 
 
It is possible to view democracy today as the culmination of a steady but important 
development in political thinking. Since the 1800s it has gradually taken root and grown 
across throughout the world, demonstrating its ability to spread modern values and 
beliefs. This development, however, was not straight forward and has faced challenges, 
but the reasons behind and the incentives involved in democracy have been different in 
space and time. In the nineteenth century, for example, change was spurred on by social 
class, whereas in the last two decades of the twentieth century it was carried forward by 
a complicated mixture of social conflict, state building, free global trade and external 
influences. There has been considerable effort made to provide an explanation for the 
expansion of democracy; the most convincing of these has been Huntington’s 
aforementioned wave theory. With its wide ranging ability to include different issues, it 
argues that the causes of democratization in those countries to which the wave is 
common are comparable. Huntington’s theory also makes note that reverse waves of 
authoritarianism have followed those of democratization. This viewpoint is backed up 
by his mention of those societies that have either been unable to secure lasting 
democracy or have seen its collapse (Pedram 2007).  
 
Huntington explains a wave of democratization as follows: 
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“A wave of democratisation is a group of transitions from nondemocratic to 
democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly 
outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period of time. A wave 
also involves liberalisation or partial democratisation in political systems that do not 
become fully democratic. Each of the first two waves of democratisation was followed 
by a reverse wave in which some but not all of countries that had previously made the 
transition to democracy reverted to non-democratic rule” (Huntington 1991:11). 
 
 
In his book, Huntington finally comes to the third wave of democratization which, he 
argues, started in Portugal in 1974, then spread to Greece and Spain, and after that, in 
the 1980s, reached some Latin American countries. This wave, according to 
Huntington, ended up in Eastern and Central Europe and the Soviet Union. One can 
argue that the profound need for economic growth and popular awareness about 
political developments contributed greatly to the smooth and painless integration of 
these countries into the democratic union. 
 
To sum up, adding to what Huntington demonstrated in his book, one can extend these 
three waves some other encouraging developments that have occurred in certain other 
developing countries which have showed a great desire for democratization. However, 
one should bear in mind that in many of these countries these objectives have been 
counterbalanced and outweighed by conditions that have rendered electoral democracy 
increasingly shallow, illiberal, unaccountable, and afflicted (O'Donnell et al. 1986:81). 
In other words, establishing some democratic institutions which are believed to be taken 
or filled by elected members from the public cannot, in itself, be seen as a proof of 
successful democratization (Pedram 2007).  
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3. Chapter Three: The Foundation of Lebanon and the 
Structure of the Lebanese Political Regime.  
 
3.1 Introduction 
The chapter looks specifically at the development of Lebanon as a nation-state since 
1943 when it gained its independence from the French mandate, and examines how the 
Lebanese political system operated before and after the civil war, and whether the 
functioning of its institutions helped to strengthen the democratic functioning of 
the State or failed to do so. In others words, the chapter will look at the institutional 
framework of the Lebanese political system and how the translation of the confessional 
structure of rule impacted on the stability of this claimed “model of democracy”. But 
before examining these details, the first section of this chapter will briefly outline the 
French mandate of Lebanon, the 1926 constitution and some of its articles that 
respected, recognized and documented democratic principles of governance, 
and finally the gradual transition from the Mandate Era to the independent state. 
3.2 The French Mandate of Lebanon 
For almost four centuries, the population lived in provinces under Ottoman rule which 
were organized in a millet system, bounding people to their societies and communities 
by their religious relationships or confessional backgrounds. In late 1912, the Ottoman 
Governor of Beirut, Adham Beck, sent a report on the political situation in the city to 
the Grand Vizier Kamil Pasha, saying: 
“There are many interactions occurring in the country due to various factors, and a 
large section of the population has looked to England or France to repair 
the unfortunate situation that they are facing. If you do not make a real reform the 
country will inevitably get out of our control” (Hallak 1985:13). 
Thus, the Ottomans started to lose control of the situation, culminating in end of their 
system of rule after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire directly following First World 
War, when the League of Nations mandated the five provinces that make up present-day 
Lebanon to the direct control of France. Consequently, when the Ottoman Empire was 
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formally split up by the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920, it was agreed that four of its territories 
in the Middle East should be League of Nations mandates temporarily governed by the 
United Kingdom and France on their behalf. The British were given Palestine and Iraq, 
while the French were given a mandate over Syria and Lebanon which was a part of 
Syria. 
On September 1, 1920, General Gouraud declared the establishment of Greater Lebanon 
with its present boundaries and with Beirut as its capital (Takiyieddine 1997). However, 
this state, which was announced on the stairway of the Palais des Pine in Beirut with 
the participation of Christian and Muslim spiritual leaders, incorporated a large number 
of contradictions. Although the historical picture had included figures from all sects and 
parties, they were still not all satisfied with this settlement. These contradictions were 
exacerbated by the fact that the majority of Muslims and Orthodox Christians wanted to 
join the Arab state announced by Prince Faisal, while the Maronite Christians 
were supporters of the French announcement of the new Lebanese State. In 
spite of this division, the State of Greater Lebanon was established and wholly governed 
under direct French rule from 1920 until 1926. The situation continued when it was 
transformed into the Republic of Lebanon after the declaration of the constitution in 
May 1926. 
 
The Lebanese Constitution of 1926, which in its preamble officially declared Lebanon 
as a “parliamentary democratic republic based on respect for public liberties, especially 
the freedom of opinion and belief, and respect for social justice and equality of rights 
and duties among all citizens without discrimination”22, also recognized 17 religious 
families, Christian, Muslim and Jewish, and granted them all as Lebanese Citizens 
equality before the law. This was outlined in Article 7: “All Lebanese are equal before 
the law. They equally enjoy civil and political rights and equally are bound by public 
obligations and duties without any distinction.”23  It also declared in Article 9 that the 
State guarantees the communities, no matter of what religion, respect for their personal 
status, laws and religious interests.
24
 Article 10 grants them the right to decide on 
                                                          
22 The Preamble of 1926 Lebanese constitution, section C.  
23 The 1926 Lebanese constitution, Article 7, [Equality]. 
24 The 1926 Lebanese constitution, Article 9, [Conscience, Belief]. 
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education
25
, while Article 13 gives them the freedom of expression, freedom of press, 
freedom of assembly and freedom of association.
26
  
 
Clearly, after examining the articles above, in addition to many other articles that made 
up the 1926 constitution, it is clear that Lebanon was given political structures dictated 
by a coherent constitutional philosophy. Indeed, although the 1926 Lebanese 
Constitution was made under the French mandate, it is clear that the country’s different 
groups saw the need to implement the Constitution which laid out the rules of 
parliamentary democracy, human rights and public freedoms. Additionally, it may be 
said that some of the constitution’s articles and the institutions that were put in place 
met to an extent what Robert Dahl mentioned when he outlined the political institutions 
of modern representative democracy. 
 
 Later, the Lebanese found both Opponents and Approvers opposing each other in one 
state with the French running its affairs. However, the announcement of the constitution 
and the establishment of the Republic in 1926, and the election of the president and the 
formation of a government that included all the major communities, also had an 
impact in shaping new political trends in other ways, including:  the Christian political 
movement which demanded more independence and national sovereignty and 
criticized the Mandate because its authority exceeded its role , and asked for 
cooperation with Muslims in defending the interests of Lebanon and 
promoting involvement in the national movements of the Arab world. It also allowed 
the Islamic movement to start realistically taking the Lebanese entity into consideration 
(Al-Jeser). 
 
At that time Lebanon was still under French mandate. With the beginning of the Second 
World War in Europe in 1939 and the German occupation of France, Lebanon and Syria 
continued to the be under the mandate of the collaborating Vichy regime. Two years 
later, the Vichy French regime in both countries was removed by British and Free 
French forces moving northwards from Palestine, and the latter now proclaimed the 
                                                          
25 Ibid, Article 10 
26 Ibid , Article 13 
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independence of Syria and Lebanon. It was soon understood that independence would 
only be enforced at the desire of the British, and there was much uncertainty as to what 
course events would take in Lebanon after it had achieved independence (Salibi 1988). 
 
By 1943 it had been realised by many that the influence of France in world affairs was 
declining, and both the British and Americans were keen to remove both Lebanon and 
Syria from French control (Salibi 1988). 
3.3 The Emergence of the Post 1943 State 
As the circumstances of the First World War led to the formation of the “Greater 
Lebanon”, it was during the Second World War that the country achieved its 
independence, once again determined largely by outside events. The path to 
independence made genuine progress by the summer of 1941 with the entrance of 
British troops and Free French forces into Syria and Lebanon. It could be said that this 
was a pivotal moment for those Lebanese Leaders whose dreams were to see an 
independent Greater Lebanon with the borders of 1920 which was not under the 
hegemony and domination of a single community but belonged to them all (Ziser 2000). 
Under pressure from the British Government, France, through the Free French High 
Commissioner, General George Catroux, publicly issued “a statement proclaiming 
France’s commitment to the Independence of the States in the region” (Ziser 2000:26), 
but continued to exercise its authority even after reaffirming on 26 September 1941 this 
commitment in a second declaration of independence. In 1943, Lebanon formed its first 
democratic government of independence and amended the constitution which ended the 
mandate.  
The response of the French authorities was to arrest and imprison the Prime Minister, 
President and several others. It can still be argued, however, that despite this the 
elections of 1943, in which the parliament and the president and government were 
chosen, constituted the practice of real Democracy. They were contested by the two 
Kiyanist parties as well as the ‘anti-Lebanese’ elements without obvious foreign 
interference. This was perhaps a result of a timely balance between the authority of the 
officials of the French mandate and the newer British influence. 
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A. 1943 National Pact 
 
In 1943, when Lebanon finally gained independence under the government of the 
Constitutional Bloc and its Muslim allies, the whole population had divided opinions 
regarding the so-called National pact: Intellectuals and Politicians supported it on one 
side, and others criticized it on the other side. In actuality, as Kamal Salibi has outlined, 
what was agreed was an unwritten gentlemen’s contract between the Constitutional 
Bloc and its Christian leaders and the Muslim leaders with the aim of bolstering 
Lebanon’s formal constitution and at the same time ensuring its effectiveness (Salibi 
1988).
 
 
It is suggested by the majority of scholars that 1943 National Pact “was not, in fact a 
formal constitution but rather an addendum to the constitution” (Deegan 1993:106) or 
that it was a “Para-constitutional implicit pact” (Salameh 1996:2-3). On the other hand, 
it should be stressed that the Pact is the constitution translated in procedural terms. It 
therefore functioned, even more than the constitution, as a testing ground of the 
consociational model that was later put in place in Lebanon, as it reflected how some 
social groups of Lebanon held such a dominant position, and how this results in the 
effective exclusion of other social groups. Suleiman, for example, describes the pact as 
the “unwritten constitution of Lebanon” (Suleiman 1967:21) and Hudson characterises 
it as “an act of creative statesmanship by two liberal politicians” and “Lebanon's "real" 
constitution” (Hudson 1995:733). 
Kamal Salibi wrote that what was generally understood, from the very beginning, was 
that the National Pact involved Muslim consent to the continued existence of Lebanon 
as an independent and sovereign state in the Arab World, provided it considered itself, 
so to speak, part of the Arab family. Salibi has demonstrated in his book that the pact 
had the result, in a way, that the Christian Maronites in the country “could keep the key 
political, security and military positions as their special preserve: the presidency of the 
republic; the directorate of public security; the command of the army” (Salibi 1988). 
This is in regard to Christians, but in regard to Sunnite Muslims, they were guaranteed 
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the premiership of the government while some other key positions were distributed 
equally among the different Lebanese communities (Salibi 1988). 
However, this researcher thinks that it is more important to point out the convergence of 
procedure which came about as a result of given internal and external factors, rather 
than talking about how the division of power between Christians and Muslims 
happened. As mentioned above, there is no doubt that the defeat of France in 1940 
deprived the High Commissioner of prestige and power and provided an opportunity to 
Lebanese leaders to meet and consult. At the same time, Britain began to call on 
Lebanese leaders suggesting the idea of the independence of Lebanon and to support it 
publicly. Britain approached the powers of independence in Lebanon, and was brought 
into a direct confrontation with France which was trying to keep its influence. In the 
context of this confrontation, the UK worked on bringing together and reconciling the 
pro-independence figures of the Christian and Muslim communities, and helped 
Bechara El Khoury, a candidate for the Presidency, to meet with leaders from Egypt and 
Syria, which led to a loose agreement on the plan which El Khoury would adopt in case 
he became President of the Republic. In this context, Bechara El Khoury writes in 
his book Lebanese facts: 
 
 “The Consul of Egypt in Lebanon Ahmed Ramzi visited him 
in May 1942 and handed him an invitation from the Prime Minister of Egypt to 
visit Cairo to discuss the Arab cooperation, also the same invitation was received by 
the Foreign Minister of Syria, for the same reason” (Al Khoury 1961:245). 
 
 In June 1942, a preliminary involving several leaders took place in Cairo. Bechara al-
Khoury stated after the meeting that “it is necessary to cooperate with Arab 
countries, with a condition of keeping and protecting Lebanon's independence, and that 
there was incompatibility between him and the leaders of Egypt and Syria, who 
attended the meeting” (Al Khoury 1961:245). 
 
These internal and external facts allowed internal convergence, and contributed 
in facilitating the birth of the National pact, which can be summarized as the following: 
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1-  Lebanese Muslims relinquish and stop demanding unity with Syria 
or joining any other Arab entity. 
2- Lebanese Christians give up their adherence to French or foreign protection for 
them and for the Lebanon. 
3-  Keeping Lebanon's independence and its full sovereignty, and not having and 
treaty with any foreign country that grants this country any privilege or any 
special position.   
4- The full recognition of Lebanese Muslims in the Lebanese entity and also of the 
Lebanese borders of 1920. 
5- The full recognition of the Arab countries, especially Syria, of this entity, its 
sovereignty and independence. 
6- The sovereign and independent Lebanon should be considered a corporative 
member in and with the Arab family (Rabbath 1986:545). 
 
Consequently, it is clear that Lebanon’s internal maturity, coupled with external factors, 
helped and led to the birth of the National Pact. Perhaps, that both the   Lebanese 
Muslims were convinced to abandon the idea of unity with Syria, as well as that the 
Lebanese Christians were to abandon the idea of asking for foreign protection, led to the 
birth of this pact. 
 
To sum up, this pact was the the main foundation on which Lebanon was established, 
and it placed internal convergence before calls of unity with Arabs and calls for foreign 
protection.Perhaps this delicate balance was the national political balance which 
supported the foundation of Lebanon as a free, independent and sovereign state and 
perhaps the experience has shown that if any of the internal political parties, Islamic and 
Christian, works to overcome this balance, then it undermines and endangers internal 
stability.  
 
B. The 1926 Constitutionalised Confessional System 
 
Confessionalism is important in the history of modern Lebanon and was widespread 
within its community and political system directly after the weakness of the Ottoman 
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Empire had emerged. Social backwardness was apparent in the system of the Ottoman 
Empire and was accompanied by political repression and cultural paralysis, which 
together were a suitable environment for the emergence of partisanship and intolerance. 
Unfortunately, this led to a critical situation:  instead of the religious diversity of 
Lebanon acting as a source of spiritual, cultural and political enrichment, it became 
rather a heavy burden. Surprisingly, this situation favoured some local political parties, 
and thus made them supportive of relocating religion into a confessional and sectarian 
ideology as a prelude to later tightening their grip on society.  
 
These events and facts helped to later forge a Lebanese Republic based on the idea of 
"confessionalism", based on the following theory: the Lebanese political community 
consisted of human groups, not citizens, belonging to their sects, and that Lebanon as a 
state consists of eighteen sects, but not of citizens. Therefore, for these reasons, the 
citizens’ affiliation with their homeland and their representation in the state and its 
political system cannot be structured directly but rather through their own private sects 
and communities. 
 
More precisely, Lebanon, like other countries in the region, has many different religious 
groups and ethnic communities, but, unlike other countries, Lebanon was the only state 
that recognized these sects and ethnicities in its constitution. The Lebanese Constitution 
of 1926 officially recognizes 17 religious families (now they are 18): 12 Christian sects, 
5 Muslim sects and Jews. Consequently, with the announcement of its constitution, 
segmental autonomy and confessionalism appeared to clearly take on a new aspect. We 
may ask ourselves how this could happen.  
 
Regarding segmental autonomy, if we examine the Lebanese constitution, we will find 
that Article 9 recognises the freedom of conscience, the freedom and respect of religion 
and general belief, and the respect of affairs of personal status: 
 
“Liberty of conscience is absolute. By rendering homage to the Almighty, the Sate 
respects all creeds and guarantees and protects their free exercise, on condition that 
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they do not interfere with public order. It also guarantees to individuals, whatever 
their religious allegiance, respect of their personal status and religious interests.”27 
 
Article 10 of the constitution acknowledges the right of the different religious sects to 
have and run their own schools and teaching institutions, as long as this does not harm 
public order: 
 
“Education is free so long as it is not contrary to public order and to good manners 
and does not touch the dignity of creeds. No derogation shall affect the right of 
communities to have their schools, subject to the general prescriptions on public 
education adicted by the state.”28 
 
An in depth analysis of Article 9 shows that it is not the type of article that could 
damage Lebanon’s society or political system, as it refers to different communities, 
beliefs and religions. Considered alongside Article 10, however, we will find different 
outcome. Although the legislator’s goal in both was to formally permit these different 
groups to keep their own religious beliefs and values, it is such laws that, whether 
deliberately or not, can create a community with different cultural bases. Such closely 
match Arend Lijphart’s description of segmental authority which results in greater 
plurality and in the greater individuality of communities (Lijphart 1980). Furthermore, 
both articles resulted in: 
 
1. An increase in societal separatism: i.e. a negative impact on societal stability and 
therefore on the stability of the Lebanese system as a whole.  
2. Religious and sectarian intolerance: loyalties to particular sects of party leaders 
were place before loyalty to the state and Lebanon itself. 
 
These articles, then, and particular Article 10, have allowed all the different 
communities a false sense of their own individuality and distinctiveness. They have 
helped, in stopping the formation across all levels of society, regardless of sect, of a 
common national educational system, in forming the procedural separations within 
                                                          
27 Article 9 of the Lebanese Constitution  
28 Article 10 of the Lebanese Constitution  
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Lebanese society. Furthermore, the existence of different religious courts, which 
regulate the affairs of different communal groups, shows the influence of such 
segmental autonomy, as does the existence of a superfluous number of schools, welfare 
organisation, hospitals, clinics, charities, televisions, radios, construction companies and 
even supermarkets. To add to this, there are divisions within each sect, with each group 
attending its own place of worship, which also function to attract others and influence 
its own supporters. Put differently, the factors outlined above were the means and 
instruments of ideological dissemination which lead to greater and greater divisions in 
society, and therefore helped to facilitate manipulation by the elites. 
 
In relation to Confessionalism, there is clearly a paradox in the Constitution. Article 12 
of the Constitution states: 
 
“All Lebanese citizens are equally admitted to all functions without any other cause 
for preference except their merit an competence and according to the conditions set 
by law. A special statu shall govern Civil Servants according to the administrations to 
which belong.”29 
 
Article 95, which speaks about communal representation, however, effectively 
weakened Article 12. It states: “Temporarily, and in deference to equity and accord, the 
various sects shall be equitably represented in public offices and in the formation of 
Cabinets, barring any detriment to the interests of the state.”30 
 
The article above (which was later changed in the Ta’if Accord of 1989, but not since), 
stipulates that there should be equitable representation of the various communities in 
public employment and in the Cabinet. So, any of the main sects would be entitled 
through the constitution to more than a third of government ministries if they had due 
representation in Parliament. Also, as every community is entitled to a proportional 
share of the state’s resources as political power, this article has a relevance to the 
political and economic factors of Lebanon’s system of government. 
 
                                                          
29 Article 12 of the Lebanese Constitution  
30 Article 95 of the Lebanese Constitution  
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The system outlined above for recruitment to the civil service and political 
representation, however, proves to be damaging to the interests of the state and the 
country. Relative representation of the communes, particularly in the civil service, 
embodies such an approach to confessionalism.  It may force the state to recruit more 
officials in the state, army and education system than are necessary, only to satisfy the 
criteria on the representation of different communes, and it also may prevent, 
irrespective of difficult communal considerations, the state from effectively providing 
for the needs of the population.
31
 
 
We conclude with the words of Ghassan Tueni: “in constitutional terms, Lebanese 
democracy moved from the doctrine of separation of powers to the notion of the 
distribution of powers among the communities, a strange and most unpractical form of 
partition”. Article 95 will provide evidence of this. Furthermore, we shall see that it 
contains an inbuilt tension which results in communal resentment and therefore has a 
negative impact on social stability. It could even lead to communal conflict and 
therefore a reduction in the likelihood of a stable democratic system. 
 
3.4 The Pre-war Lebanese Political System 
 
The traditional definition of any political system demonstrates that political systems are 
organizations of governance with three branches: executive, legislative and judicial. 
According to the Encyclopaedia Britannica, a Political System is a “set of formal legal 
institutions that constitute a government or a state.”32 The same source acknowledges 
that this definition, which is accepted and used by numerous legislators, researchers and 
analyses of developed political systems and their legal constitutional frameworks, takes 
                                                          
31 In most of the Lebanese ministries, there is a surplus of staff that does not work or attend at all. They were and still are 
employed in order to serve the principle of finding the sectarian balance needed, as well as to favor the Lebanese political 
leaders. 
32 "Political system", © Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc... Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc... 05 Mar. 2011. 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/467746/political-system 
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in both real and prescribed modes of political behaviour, that is both the reality of how a 
state functions and its legal organisational framework.
33
 
In the coming section, we will define the Lebanese Political System, its institutions, and 
examine how it functions. The aim is to discover whether the Lebanese Political System 
meets the democratic standards of democratic political systems or not. 
3.4.1 Institutions 
Institutions are to be defined as those bodies which have been formed through 
democratic politics within constitutional rules. Terry M. Moe has examined the different 
types of institutions normally created by democracies. He argues that the legislative, 
executive and judicial institutions, i.e. those with authority, which are constitutionally 
prescribed as well as the system of democratic rule, are the focal point for studies by 
political scientists (Moe 2005). These, then, are the institutions by which we will 
structure the following sections. 
3.4.1.1 Executive Branch  
The executive branch of the Lebanese government consists of the President, the Prime 
Minister and the Cabinet (Council of Ministers) which is chosen by the Prime Minister 
in consultation with the President and members of the Assembly of Representatives. 
a. The Presidency 
The Lebanese Constitution, promulgated in 1926, was inspired by many articles of the 
French Constitutional Laws of 1875 which were in force at that time, especially with 
regard to the powers granted to the President of the Republic. It is not difficult to 
examine this position, as it is sufficient to examine to the constitutional texts which lay 
out the powers of the chief of the executive branch of the Third French Republic and 
compare these with the powers that were given to the Lebanese President before the 
constitutional amendments of the Taif accord. This comparison reveals that both of 
them were granted the right to: 
                                                          
33 "Political system", © Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc... Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc... 05 Mar. 2011. 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/467746/political-system 
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1- Propose laws. 
2- Authenticate laws passed by the legislative authorities. 
3- Issue special amnesty. 
4- Negotiate and conclude international treaties. 
5- Appoint who they find appropriate in all civil and military positions. 
Before the amendment of the Lebanese constitution by the Lebanese political leaders 
who met in the city of Taif in Saudi Arabia, this constitution expressly stipulated that 
the President had the right to appoint the ministers and choose one of them to become 
Prime Minister, and also the right to dismiss them all.  
After amending the constitution in Taif, the the President of the Republic’s share of 
power was reduced in a way which transformed him from monopolizing power 
to sharing it. Most of the power was shifted from him to the Cabinet and to the Prime 
Minster who became a visible partner in forming the cabinet and signing the decree of 
its formation. Therefore, after having been at the mercy of the President who had the 
right to dismiss him, he became a real partner in power.  
Perhaps the most important amendment that took place was the way of choosing the 
Prime Minister, as the President was now obliged to stick to the outcome of the 
Parliamentary consultations which were conducted by MPs casting their ballots for the 
person they believed most appropriate to head the Cabinet. Moreover, the full executive 
authority which the President used to exercise with the help of ministers was taken from 
him and entrusted to the Cabinet as a whole, as well as the power to conduct 
international treaties, dismiss cabinet ministers and appoint first class government 
officials. Also, the Taif constitutional amendments took from him the right to develop 
the agenda of the cabinet, coordinate between the ministers and monitor the situation of 
public departments and institutions. Needless to say, these rights were given to the 
Prime Minister.  
However, the President of the Republic remained in the constitution after the Taif 
Agreement as the Head of State and the symbol of the unity of the country, and the 
trustee of respecting the constitution and preserving Lebanon's independence, unity and 
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territorial integrity. In this case, Thomas Collelo argues that the President should now 
work together with the Prime Minister and that they are the most influential figures in 
the executive. He also argues that they and are able to exercise personal and immediate 
influence over their deputies and other political figures (Collelo 1987). 
The constitution states that “the President presides over the Supreme Defence Council 
and is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces which fall under the authority of 
the Council of Ministers”, and is “elected by secret ballot and by a two thirds majority 
of the Chamber of Deputies” and that his “term is for six years”.34 Furthermore, the 
constitution lays out clearly the duration of his term in the presidency, and also about 
the case of re-electing the same president by mentioning that “he may not be re-elected 
until six years after the expiration of his last mandate.”35  
To sum up, it might be rightly argued that the President’s role meets, theoretically, the 
democratic standards called for by the constitution, as it does not exercise any absolute 
monopoly of power. However, on the other hand, there are many questions that arise: 
Did the institution of the presidency manage, before the civil war of 1975, during it, and 
after the Taif agreement, to play its role impartially and without any obstacles or 
interventions? And thus, did the President violate, willingly or unwillingly, the 
constitution which specified his role clearly? And so, did the President protect one of 
the democratic institutions in the country, which is the institution of the presidency? 
Apparently, the “1975 Civil War has left an indelible mark on the institution of the 
presidency” (Collelo 1987), which resulted in the office being more accountable to the 
demands of the President’s narrow community, rather than the result of homeland unity. 
In addition, the pre-Taif era did not differ from post-Taif era, as external factors 
continued to affect the institution of the presidency and the President himself. External 
actors such as Syria and Israel managed to influence the presidential elections before 
1975, and after the Taif agreement Syria kept its influence, while other countries took 
over the Israeli role. Iran, France, the United States and Saudi Arabia, in addition to 
                                                          
34 The Lebanese constitution , Article 49 of Chapter 3. 
35 Ibid. 
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Syria, directly or through their proxies managed to intervene in every arcane detail, and 
this interference in some cases led to a flagrant violation of the constitution.
36
 
Finally, an examination of how the constitution was violated, and thus how the 
democratic standards were not respected, will be pursued in detail in the coming two 
chapters which discuss the internal and internal hindrances of the Lebanese Democracy 
and the external hegemony. 
b. The Prime Ministry and the Council of Ministers 
 
As mentioned above, the Lebanese President, after the constitutional changes of the Taif 
Agreement, did not become more constitutionally empowered to appoint the Prime 
Minister and the Cabinet. Rather, constitutionally, he became obliged to accept the 
result of the parliamentary consultations and so was committed to the majority decision 
of the MPs. In other words, although a Prime Minister does not have to be a member of 
the Chamber of Deputies, he normally has been, particularly because the President is 
required to consult with the deputies before a Prime Minister is named. The 
composition of the Cabinet is agreed by the President and the Prime Minister and they 
present the nominees to the Chamber of Deputies to solicit a vote of confidence (Collelo 
1987). 
It is clear that, before Taif, the constitutional powers of the Prime Minister were limited. 
This changed after the agreement as the Prime Minister gained a greater share of 
governance, as mentioned above. His appointment was no longer the decision of the 
President. This gave him a real strength, whereas before Taif he had lacked effective 
methods of action. 
There have been about 23 presidents since independence, and these have formed about 
90 cabinets. Collelo argues that the Cabinet is the administrative body in Lebanon, as it 
is supposed to prepare legislative bills, set policy and appoint or dismiss top figures of 
the bureaucracy (Collelo 1987).
37
 That is the theory, but in practice, the situation is 
                                                          
36Amending the constitution at the behest of the Syrian regime which led to extending the period of two post-Taif sitting 
presidents.   
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quite different. The ministers that often use their positions to add to their personal 
wealth or increase their networks of patronage within their constituencies are not a 
group of officials with attitudes and goals that are in the interest of the whole country, 
but are the products of the political leaders that proposed and appointed them (Collelo 
1987). Therefore, they function chiefly to satisfy their leaders, political parties they 
belong to and their communities. Furthermore, they function to “accommodate diverse 
sectarian interests” (Collelo 1987). 
In addition, history shows that the House of Representatives (the Parliament), which 
constitutionally has the right to withdraw its confidence from any government, has 
never done so since the creation of the Lebanese State. To explain further, according to 
the constitution, Lebanon is a Parliamentary Democratic Republic based on the 
separation of powers, which means that the basis of this parliamentary system is having 
the Cabinet presenting and submitting its ministerial statement to the Parliament to get 
the vote of confidence, and in return, the Cabinet has the right of dissolving the 
Parliament, after a direct request from the President of the Republic to the Council of 
Ministers to this end. But things are different in Lebanon, as they do not function the 
way they are set out. The Parliament does not withdraw confidence from the Cabinet 
nor does the Cabinet dissolve the Parliament, even if the conditions for dissolution were 
clear and available.   
To sum up, the above discussion raises some questions about the effectiveness of the 
Lebanese cabinets that have been in power, and the reasons that stand blocking and 
paralyzing its operation, and thus preventing it from functioning democratically as it 
should do. Also, this leads us to question how much external factors are sometimes 
involved in paralyzing the Cabinet’s work, and other times allowing it to operate and 
function only when they implement their agendas. And then whether the Prime Minister 
can reach that office without the acquiescing to or taking into consideration the will of 
external actors. And thus, whether democracy functions properly in Lebanon if it is 
proved that there is external intervention in its institutions. Again, these questions will 
be discussed in the coming two chapters which examine the hindrances to Lebanese 
democracy and the external hegemony. 
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3.4.1.2 Legislative Branch  
 
   a. Assembly of Representatives (The Parliament) 
 
Michel Chiha, the Lebanese thinker who is considered one of the fathers of the 
Lebanese Constitution, argues that shared past the common history are the basis of a 
collective memory that provides each individual with the will of common life, and that 
the parliamentary system is the only system that opens the way for the freedom of 
practicing such a common life (Chiha 1964). With regard to the Parliament, Chiha 
demonstrates that it should not be only an expression of democracy, but also a place 
where different sectarian groups meet, so they can express their desire to live together 
(Chiha 1964), as the Parliament, Chiha continues, is a beautiful attempt to have and see 
a peaceful cohabitation between different religions, traditions and ethnic groups (Chiha 
1964). 
As agreed in the constitution, the Lebanese political system is a parliamentary 
system where the Parliament, since independence, has enjoyed a privileged position, as 
general elections that take place every four years let it derive its authority directly from 
the people of Lebanon. The Parliament enjoys wide legislative and monitoring 
powers which cover all aspects of public life. It is the place where laws are passed to 
govern the entire state and to monitor and correct the government’s work. In this 
context, Collelo writes that “the Constitution details the duties and procedures of the 
Chamber of Deputies and grants it considerable authority in such matters as budgetary 
oversight and amending the Constitution” (Collelo 1987). In addition, the Parliament 
exercises a crucial and fateful role in the emergence of other authorities as the 
Parliament elects the President and the parliamentary consultations lead to the 
assignment of a new government which cannot rule before gaining the vote of 
confidence of the Parliament. 
The Lebanese Parliament, which is divided equally between Christians and Muslims, 
was never a two-party parliament. To be more accurate and precise, party politics have 
played almost no part in Lebanon and candidates campaign as part of a "list" sponsored 
by a local political leader (Collelo 1987). In other words, as Collelo states, a 
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“competition within districts is intra-sectarian, in which, for example, a Greek Catholic 
from one list would campaign against Greek Catholics from other lists” (Collelo 1987). 
However, perhaps one quasi-attempt at two-party politics recently happened in Lebanon 
in the elections of 2009, where the March 14 and March 8 coalitions competed in most 
constituencies.  
Despite the obvious un-representativeness and unfairness in the electoral system and 
laws, and, of course, the misuse of public money and the issue of candidates bribing 
voters, which will be discussed in later chapters, many important constitutional reforms 
took place in Taif. These reforms, however, apparently did not prevent the Speaker from 
controlling the mechanism that regulates the meetings of the parliament in its regular or 
exceptional sessions. For example, after 2005, at the height of the division that hit the 
political life of Lebanon, the Speaker of the Parliament aligned himself with the 
opposition and refused to invite the Parliament to convene because the parliamentary 
majority at that time was in favour of the political group he supported and belonged to. 
Although Article 65 in the constitution speaks about the dissolution of the Parliament in 
case it does not convene, in Lebanon constitutional articles, because of their lack of 
clarity, need constitutional scholars to interpret them, and until they do the democratic 
system will suffer from massive violations.  
3.4.1.3 Judicial Branch 
 
   Lebanon’s legal system takes inspiration and basis from that of France and, like 
France, it is classed as a country of civil law which employs its own set of codes. The 
most important of this, the “Code of Obligations and Contracts”, was set out in 1932 at 
the time of the French Mandate and is the equivalent of the French Civil Code, aside 
from matters of personal status, such as marriage, divorce and inheritance. The sectarian 
diversity of Lebanon requires that such personal issues are rather governed by separated 
sets of laws that are particular to its different communities. Christians, for example, 
resolve issues of personal status in the Christian spiritual courts, whereas Muslims use 
the Islamic courts. 
However, the courts in Lebanon are divided as follows: 
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   a. The Constitutional Council 
This Council is charged with ensuring that laws are consistent with the constitution, and 
also with considering and settling any claims about parliamentary and presidential 
elections. 
b. The Administrative Court 
The “Shoura Council” in the most important administrative court and it is required to 
review the decisions of the lesser administrative courts. It also has a role in assisting 
with the drafting and reviewing of legislation to be put in place by the Legislature. 
    c. The Civil Courts 
The civil courts can be divided as follows: 
First degree courts: charged with examining claims of civil law and composed with one 
judge or a panel of three judges. Those with one judge are usually charged with claims 
of less importance than those with a panel of judges. 
Courts of appeal: located in each governorate and serve as a second degree court which 
can review decisions taken in the lower court. 
Court of Cassation: the ultimate judicial recourse, this will only deal with cases of 
greater importance. 
    d. The Commercial Courts: 
These can be classed in the same category as civil courts but are able to rule on 
commercial matters. 
   e. The Criminal Courts: 
These are organized along the same lines as the civil and commercial courts above, 
however the first degree courts are responsible for dealing with cases involving 
misdemeanors and felonies. They are subject to review by the Court of Appeal. 
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The Court of Appeal is the second degree court for the same types of cases, and is the 
first degree court for more serious criminal offences, which are subject to review by the 
Court of Cassation. 
    
  f. The Personal Status Courts: 
 
These are made up of clergymen and have the responsibility for matters of personal 
status relating to their own sects. They are subject to review by the higher civil courts. 
Having outlined above the courts that comprise the judicial branch in Lebanon, it is 
important to now discuss this branch and the problems that it has encountered and still 
does that prevent it from functioning properly. Collelo argues that the judiciary branch 
used to reflect various features which are familiar to western European systems, 
particularly that of France, but like other branches of government, “the judiciary 
suffered as a result of the 1975 Civil War and the ensuing disruptions” (Collelo 1987). 
Collelo, who describes the Lebanese society as being based on patronage, argues that 
political meddling in judicial affairs is common in Lebanon, as political leaders exert 
pressure on judges and are very often able to influence their rulings (Collelo 1987). His 
conviction in this matter is based on observers who have illustrated that confessionalism 
has also disrupted the judicial system in its selection of judges and also in the 
determination of criminal penalties (Collelo 1987). To explain further, in Lebanon, 
mystery surrounds the role of the judicial system, as while all political leaders insist on 
the independence of the judiciary pursuant to what is approved in the constitution, it is 
clear that there is a general lack of impartiality in the judiciary and limitations to its 
ability to act as an independent authority. The former President of Lebanon Suleiman 
Frangieh demonstrates this in a letter to Charles Helou, who was also a Lebanese 
President, by saying that “In a small country like Lebanon, where the norm 
is that political life is at the service of individuals rather than institutions, the prevailing 
belief was that that it is difficult to keep the judiciary in complete isolation from 
political interference in all its aspects” (qouted in Nawaf 1996) Walid Junblatt, the 
Druze leader, argues in this context that ultimately the judge in Lebanon is an 
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employee of the political powers, and that he himself is a politician that puts pressure on 
judges and that any politician who says otherwise is a liar (quoted in Salam 1996). 
To sum up, constitutionally the judicial branch is an independent authority, but the 
above discussion reveals that the rule of law in Lebanon is only one point of view and 
that the judiciary is not an independent authority in itself, but suffers from various 
political interventions, and this is incompatible with democracy which is based on the 
separation of powers. 
 
3.5 Political Parties and Media 
 
   3.5.1 Political Parties and its role 
 
Earlier, we pointed out the principles and basic standards of democracy and argued that 
any democratic system should take into consideration these principles if it is to be called 
and described as a democracy. Some of these main principles are ensuring public and 
political freedoms, in particular the freedom of expression and association. 
For decades, perhaps one of the most significant features that have distinguished 
Lebanon from its Arab neighbours is that it is an anti-authoritarian state, which has no 
one ruling party and no official state ideology (Nawaf 1966). Additionally, while power 
in many parts of the Arab world was being acquired by parties using violent means, 
which subsequently made these regimes authoritarian with militarized institutions, this 
did not occur in Lebanon. Here, political parties could operate openly and actively in a 
pluralistic society under a government that was not authoritarian. Khazen has described 
this as a ‘neutral state’, and as such the state does not control all social and economic 
capabilities or claim that it alone owns the truth. These conditions, including open 
political parties and functioning civil society, are not seen as having been granted by the 
government, or as a waiver of certain powers and rights that this government had 
achieve by violent means (el Khazen 2002). 
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In Lebanon, political parties existed before the state, which was founded in 1920, and 
Lebanon’s major communities of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries have been 
associated with one or more parties (el Khazen 2003:607). MP Farid el Khazen, the 
Professor of Political science and the former chairman of the Department of Political 
Studies and Public Administration at the American University of Beirut, speaks about 
three generations of political parties which have emerged in Lebanon. The first 
generation emerged during the French mandate, the second generation emerged after 
independence and the third generation emerged during the civil war of 1975 (el Khazen 
2003:605). Khazen considers that Lebanon’s political parties are comparable to such 
organisations in other countries (both Western and non-Western), since they had their 
origins in two areas: 1. institutional or internal, i.e. from inside government institutions, 
usually those operating in the legislative process or electoral politics; 2. external (crises 
or developments), these are connected to factors of modernization and a changing 
society, such as conflict, mass education, economic development and conflict. 
Examples of the first kind are such parties as the Constitutional Bloc Party, the National 
Bloc Party, and the National Liberal Party, which appeared after coalitions in 
parliament. Whereas parties like the Kata'ib (Kataeb, Phalanges) Party, the Syrian 
Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), the Lebanese Communist Party (LCP), and the 
Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) can be placed in the second category, as they were 
founded due to certain social, political and ideological developments. Social divisions 
(political, ideological and confessional) and elite rivalries have been paralleled in the 
political parties. These differ greatly in influence, size and representation across the 
regions. Some have relevance to a national audience and so can call on a broad base of 
support, while others are confined to single regions or communities, or even to a 
particular place in a particular city (el Khazen 2003). 
One or more parties have come to be seen as representative of Lebanon’s major 
communities. Post 1920, for example, the Maronite community identified with parties 
with various political and ideological ideas, but the Druze community became to be 
represented by the Progressive Socialist Party. This was led by Kamal Junblatt, who had 
founded the party towards the end of the 1940s and was its leader until his assassination 
in 1977. In the early 1970s, the Shi’i community began to identify with certain parties: 
firstly the Movement of the Deprived, which then became Amal, and a decade later 
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Hezbollah (The party of God), which was supported by Iran. The Sunni community, 
both before and after independence, usually favoured Arab nationalist parties. The 
Armenian community followed its own parties which involved themselves with 
Armenian affairs and communal interests. These were mostly removed from the 
political process apart from during elections to the parliament. Lebanon’s leftist and 
nationalist parties, on the other hand, were not associated in this way with any particular 
group or region (el Khazen 2003). 
However, in the post-war era, nothing much really changed. The Christian Maronites 
kept their association with the Lebanese Christian parties, the Phalanges and the Free 
Patriotic Movement, and a large number of Sunni’s moved to associate with the Future 
Movement, while Hezbollah and Amal monopolized the Shiite scene.  
However, these parties mentioned above, did and still do suffer from major problems: 
1- The power structure of these parties did not engage with any democratic practice 
in any way, e.g. through elections. 
2- Most of these parties imitated and still imitate the secular temperament of 
Lebanese society (after 2005 the secular barriers were reduced a little as wide 
political coalitions were formed; also, both the Future Movement Party and the 
Free Patriotic Movement tried to overcome the barriers by appointing party 
officials from other sects). 
3- All parties, including the secular parties which overcame confessional obstacles, 
failed to demonstrate a national agenda and were and still are subject to various 
foreign political and ideological influences coming from Arab and non-Arab 
countries (chiefly the Iranian-backed Hezbollah, which in addition to being 
influenced by foreign political and ideological influences, still did not go 
through any official registration procedure, and thus did not get a permit of 
establishment from the Ministry of Interior).  
4- Most of these political parties were involved in armed conflicts during the 1975 
civil war. Hezbollah, in addition to its involvement in the civil war, was 
involved in various armed conflicts with Israel in the post-war era and used its 
military strength to take over and control the entire city of Beirut in 2008. 
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Political parties in Lebanon face a deep problem which stems from them opposing the 
concept of democracy when dealing with internal issues. In other words, the prevailing 
model of these political parties opposes democracy and their structure defies wholly the 
actual mechanisms of representative democracy. Furthermore, the relationship 
between the Lebanese parties and its partisans is conducted only through two 
channels and not more: the first channel is the sectarian channel and the second channel 
is the channel of the leader’s personality. 
 
Party activities in Lebanon are linked to the leader in a way which makes him dominate 
the party and, as a result, the relationship between the party and its supporters becomes 
a relationship between the supporters and the party leader. Here lies the danger that such 
a model of relations between the supporters and the party leader makes the 
community accept the idea of political inheritance within the party, and this is contrary 
to how parties work institutionally.  
To sum up, the Lebanese political system has proved itself stronger than its political 
parties, and this is not a healthy scene. If we examine how things happen in Europe, we 
will see that political parties are stronger than their political systems. In France, for 
example, the political system changed from a Monarchy to become a Republic, then the 
Republic moved from the First to the Fifth, and that happened because of the 
effectiveness of these political parties. In Lebanon, on the other hand, the political 
parties are in a unique position in the Arab world, since they had been able to operate 
during eighty years of uninterrupted activism. All the parties had the opportunity to 
influence policy and expand their base in the pre-war period. During the war, militias 
were in reality the ruling parties of the areas under their control (el Khazen 2003:605). 
These practices were internalized during the war, and political parties have not yet been 
able to break free from this model. Some which attempted the transition from militia to 
political party were not successful, and others were unwilling or unable to attempt it. 
Hezbollah, for example, which we shall examine later in detail, refused to disarm and 
hand its weapons to the government. In sum, the moral claim of being organisations 
superior to those of ‘traditional’ political parties has been lost since the pre-war period, 
and similarly the claim that they were forces for democracy and reform (el Khazen 
2003:605). 
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3.5.2 Media in Lebanon  
 
Lebanon’s media has been described as a “beacon of plurality” in a region that houses 
some of the most restrictive media environments in the world. Its own media 
environment has long been viewed as open and diverse, and few of the censorships 
imposed in neighbouring countries can be found here. Religious, social and economic 
issues can be discussed, and criticism of the authorities and public figures is a common 
feature of many outlets.
38
 Lebanon’s pluralistic character is reflected in this open and 
diverse media scene. It has also meant that Beirut has become a shelter for Arab 
dissidents who have attacked Arab regimes in the newspapers of the Arab-speaking 
world (Kraidy 2011). 
Oral and written freedom of expression, including the freedom of the press and of 
assembly and association are laid out in article 13 of the Lebanese constitution. The 
introduction to the constitution characterises that Lebanon as a parliamentary 
democratic republic with a basis in the respect of freedom of belief and expression, as 
well as other common liberties. Article 13 states that “The freedom to express one's 
opinion orally or in writing, the freedom of the press, the freedom of assembly, and the 
freedom of association are guaranteed within the limits established by law.”39But to date, 
Lebanon does not have any law which gives citizens the right to the access of 
information or protection for whistle-blowers or those individuals who report corruption 
(El Rafei 2006). Also Lebanon does not have any electronic media law which regulates 
this sector in a way that guarantees citizens the right of freedom of expression.
40
 
  
                                                          
38 International Press Institute, “Media in Lebanon: Reporting on a Nation Divided”, Report on IPI’s Fact Finding Mission to 
Lebanon - 8-13 December 2006. 
http://www.freemedia.at/fileadmin/media/Documents/IPI_mission_reports/Lebanon_Mission_Report.pdf 
39 The Lebanese Constitution. 
40 In 2010, the Lebanese authorities arrested four people who used the social networking website Facebook to slander 
President Michel Suleiman. The justice ministry said in a statement that media freedom in Lebanon and any civilised 
country reaches its limits when the content is pure slander and aims at undermining the head of state. They argued in the 
statement that "The inappropriate comments published on websites are subject to prosecution and punishment as they meet 
the requirements for litigation as stipulated in the media law and penal code.” Such action is an assault to the freedom of 
expression. 
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Kraidy, the Associate Professor in the Annenberg School for Communication at 
the University of Pennsylvania, has however argued that private broadcasting flourished 
during the 1974-1990 war. By 1990, over 100 radio stations and 50 television stations 
were functioning without any kind of overall framework, a unique situation in the 
history of modern broadcasting (El Rafei 2011). The 1990 Taif agreement, which ended 
the civil war in Lebanon, developed the general policies, procedures and enforcement 
measures for the media in Lebanon. It was mentioned in the agreement that "the 
information media shall be reorganized under the canopy of the law and within the 
framework of responsible liberties that serve the cautious tendencies and the objectives 
of ending the state of war".
41
 
 
Developing countries, according to Kraidy, use the media in general to strengthen 
national unity and promote socio-economic progress, national reconciliation and 
reconstruction (Kraidy 2011). On one hand, it could be argued that the Lebanese media, 
regardless of its blurred relationship with politics, helped in the reconstruction 
process after the civil war and also in the promotion of civil peace, to a certain extent.
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But on the other hand, there was other private media promoting a contradictory project. 
Calling itself the Station of Resistance, Hezbollah’s Al-Manar TV, which began 
broadcasting in 1991, became a mass media outlet with a global audience. Continuous 
funding from Iran, as well as its privileged position within Lebanon, has allowed the 
station to grow rapidly into a complete satellite station from its beginnings as a 
disorganised underground operation (Kraidy 2011). 
 
This huge number of media outlets has allowed us to believe that media in general is 
thriving in Lebanon, but facts show that it is growing without being framed within any 
healthy framework. In other words, most of the media in Lebanon were granted 
‘sectarian licenses’ but not ‘national licenses’, and their existence was based on some 
political considerations but not with the purpose of fostering Lebanese unity. Moreover, 
it is usual that during periods of political stability the media shows a kind of moderation 
which ends as soon as political tension returns. Political parties in Lebanon which have 
                                                          
41 The Taif agreement of 1990. 
42 Rafik Hariri, the former Prime Minister used his private media and other media which used to benefit from him (TV 
stations and Newspapers) to promote to his reconstruction project which he managed to succeed in. 
103 
 
established their newspapers, magazines, and radio and television stations, use their 
media to criticize the government as well as to achieve their objectives even if it causes 
political and sectarian tension in the country.   
 
At this point, we should return to what we outlined above in the theory chapter about 
the theories of Dahl. He argued that access to information is one of the fundamental 
rights guaranteed to citizens in a democracy, and this is intended to produce responsible 
and informed citizens capable of making decisions healthy for a democracy. Access to 
information and free media also have the purpose of placing checks on politicians and 
officials. They can monitor whether they are acting in the interests of the electorate and 
fulfilling their election promises. This is not how they function in Lebanon. The media, 
by behaving in the irresponsible manner outlined above, aggravates social, political and 
sectarian tensions within the country. This is symptomatic of an aspect of democracy 
that is not working properly. 
 
In connection to this, Karl Popper discusses freedom by mentioning the following story: 
 
“An American is accused of having struck someone on the nose. He defends himself 
by arguing that, as a free citizen, he has the liberty to move his fists in any direction 
he pleases. To which the Judge replies: the freedom to move your fists has its limits, 
and these may sometimes change. But the noses of your fellow-citizen nearly always 
lie outside those limits" (Popper 1997:73-74).  
 
Actually, Popper when he mentioned this story was discussing the theory of the state 
and freedom, but it might be helpful for us to use it to point out that freedom, when used 
as a tool to abuse others, is no more rightful and no more accepted. In other words, it 
can no longer be called Freedom. The aforementioned can be applied on the Lebanese 
media, since it has never used the freedom it was granted to address people’s problems 
and to speak out about corruption and other troubles the country suffers from. Many 
times, however, it used this freedom, granted by the political parties which fund it, to 
sow division in the country and among its people. 
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3.6 Post-civil War Period: Political reforms and failures  
 
3.6.1 The Taif Agreement 
 
In her book Mirror of the Arab World, Lebanon in Conflict Sandra Mackay, who has 
won awards for her writing on culture and politics in the Middle East, argues that after 
nine years of relentless civil war Lebanon was left broken in 1989 (Mackey 2008:131). 
Describing the real and realistic image of Lebanon at that time, she reported: 
 “Militiamen standing guard over their respective enclaves outnumbered the army. A 
twenty-five-thousand-man Syrian army of occupation spread out over the north and 
east; Israel claimed its “security zone” in the south; the Hezbollah, provided bone 
and muscle by Iran, plotted the destruction of Lebanon as a secular state. Lebanon 
remained a country only through the symbolism of a sitting president accepted by all 
the major factions within the intricate Lebanese mosaic” (Mackey 2008:131).  
 
However, peace was exposed by other states, particularly Syria and some other 
countries, after fifteen years of war, and the Second Republic was created with the Taif 
Agreement. We should examine how this occurred. It was the 29
th
 of September 
1989 when 62 Lebanese MPs arrived in the city of Taif in Saudi Arabia. When the 
MPs arrived in Taif, they had the impression that the meeting would 
not take long, but the conference sessions, which began on the September the 
30
th
, lasted for more than twenty days and ended on the 22
nd
 of October with an 
agreement which ended the civil war in Lebanon (Mackey 2008). 
 
3.6.1.1 The Reforms  
 
In the opening session, which began with a speech by the late Saudi King Fahd bin 
Abdul Aziz on behalf of the Arab Tripartite Committee, a copy of the national accord 
document was distributed for discussion. Prince Saud al-Faisal, the Saudi Foreign 
Minister, and the rest of the members of the Tripartite Commission, followed the 
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proceedings of the conference moment by moment (Mansour 1993:31). It had emerged 
from the very beginning of the conferences that Prince Saud al-Faisal, the Foreign 
Minister of Saudi Arabia, was in charge of the following details and intricacies of the 
debates, and was assisted by the former Algerian Foreign Minister Lakhdar Brahimi, 
and Rafik Hariri (Bkasini 1993). 
It had emerged since the first day of the conference that the debate focused on two main 
issues: political reform and the issue of sovereignty, which is basically the issue 
of the redeployment of the Syrian troops. These split the MPs into several political axes. 
However, discussing political reform made the interlocutors divide along sectarian lines 
and begin to at times defend, and at times demand, powers for communal political 
positions, or for reaching communal political positions. The Christian MPs backed 
and defended the powers of the President of the Republic, while the Sunni MPs argued 
in their speeches for the strengthening of the powers of the Council of Ministers. The 
Shiite MPs focused on enhancing the powers of the Speaker. A little group of MPs 
who did not line up along sectarian lines backed the idea of having reasonable 
constitutional amendments. However, the sharp division between Christians and 
Muslims had already appeared during the discussion of the issue of sovereignty and 
the redeployment of the Syrian army. It happened that the Christians MPs, who 
backed scheduling the redeployment of Syrian troops, argued that this was one of the 
key conditions that must be met, and their position regarding other points would be 
based on how the discussion of the redeployment proceeded (Bkasini 1993).  
However, the National Accord document which was approved in Taif included ten 
general principles, among them was an introduction to be added to the constitution 
which declared Lebanon a sovereign, independent, free, final homeland for all its 
citizens, united in its land, people and institutions, in the limits stipulated in this 
constitution and recognized internationally.  This paragraph in the introduction, and 
specifically the statement that indicated that Lebanon is the final homeland for all its 
citizens, settled a long controversy and became a form of Islamic recognition of the 
finality of the Lebanese entity, which reassured the Christians. In addition, the 
amendments that were approved included the following: The presidency, the Parliament 
and the Prime Minister. 
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1- The Presidency :  
 
The former Prime Minister Salim el-Hoss argues that the amendments made to the 
powers of the President of the Republic were a qualitative constitutional reform (El-
Hoss 1991:102). Boutros Harb, the Maronite MP and the 2005 candidate for the 
presidency, mentions that the amendments were intended to solidify customs that were 
prevalent in written texts.
43
 However, the main amendments in the reform are the 
following:  
 
(a) - Entrust the executive authority to the Cabinet before it was granted to the President 
of the Republic. This amendment transferred the authority from the President of the 
Republic, the individual, to the Cabinet as a collective body which is accountable to the 
Parliament for its actions.  
 
(b) – Before the amendments, it used to be that during the absence of the President of 
the Republic, the Council of Ministers was not allowed to assemble. But after the 
amendments, calling the Council of Ministers to assemble became a power of the Prime 
Minister, and if the President of the Republic attends, then he is not allowed to vote. 
However, the President of the Republic was given the power of veto for a period of 
fifteen days afterwards. 
  
(c) - Choosing the Prime Minister became a result of binding parliamentary 
consultation, and it was for the Prime Minister to designate to hold parliamentary 
consultation. Also the Prime Minister was granted the right to make parliamentary and 
political consultations before the formation of the government, but in agreement with 
the President.  
 
 
                                                          
43 A statement to the Lebanese daily Al-nahar,18/11/1994. 
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2- The Prime Minister:  
 
The Prime Minister of the Council of Ministers was almost absent in the pre-Taif 
constitution of 1926, as he was only mentioned in the Constitution twice. The first 
mention was when it was pointed out that the President appoints the 
ministers and chooses from them a Prime Minister, and the second when it was 
indicated that the Prime Minister makes the Governmental statement in the House of 
Representatives. In both cases, the Constitution of 1926 did 
not give any powers to him at all. But in Taif, an independent section which addresses 
the Prime Minister was added and it outlined the following powers: 
 
1 – He presides over the Council of Ministers, and shall be automatically the Vice-
President of the Supreme Defence Council.  
2 – He calls for parliamentary consultations to form the Cabinet and signs with the 
President the decree of forming it.  
3 – He presents his cabinet’s general policy to the House of Representatives. 
4 – He signs with the President all decrees except that which designates him as Prime 
Minister and the decree of the government's resignation. 
5 – He signs any decree calling for a special session and decrees issuing laws and re-
examinations of them. 
6 – He calls the Council of Ministers into a session and sets its agenda. 
7 – He follows the work of public departments and institutions to coordinate between 
the ministers and give knowledgeable guidance to ensure proper functioning. 
8 – He holds working sessions with stakeholders in the state in the presence of the 
competent minister. 
 
 
3- The parliament: 
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A few amendments were added to the powers and the status of the House of 
Representatives and the Speaker, including the following: 
1- Modifying the duration of the mandate of the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives from one year to four years like other parliamentary democracies. 
2- Allowing the Council for one time only to withdraw their confidence after two years 
from electing the Speaker and his deputy. 
3- Until the election of the Chamber of Deputies, to make up electoral law free of 
sectarian restriction and to distribute parliamentary seats in accordance with the 
following rules:  
 
(a)- Equally between Christians and Muslims.  
 
(b) - Proportionately between the sects of each religion. 
  
(c) - Proportionately between the districts. 
  
4- Increase the number of members of the House of Representatives to 128, divided 
equally between Christians and Muslims.  
5- With the election of the first Chamber of Deputies on national and not sectarian basis, 
a senate shall be formed which represents all spiritual families and shall be confined to 
only crucial issues. 
 
Moreover, the reforms did not include the three presidencies only, but they also 
affeted other sectors, including media and information, education, and the courts. They 
also called for the adoption of administrative decentralization and the abolition 
of political sectarianism. 
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3.6.1.2 Militias Disarmed, Israel, Lebanese-Syrian Relations and Other Issues  
 
The Taif agreement did not ignore the issue of sovereignty and the militias that were 
involved in the civil war. These two issues were mentioned under a separate section 
entitled "Extending the state sovereignty over all the Lebanese territory". The agreement 
mentions that it has been concluded between the Lebanese parties to build a strong state 
based on the basis of national accord. The agreement reports that it is the mission of the 
first government of national unity to develop a security plan which aims to extend the 
state’s sovereignty over all Lebanese territory through its own forces. However, the 
guidelines referred to by the agreement are the following:  
 
1- The declaration revoking all the licences of all the Lebanese and non-Lebanese 
militias which are obliged to deliver their weapons to the Lebanese state within six 
months.  
2- Strengthening the Internal Security Forces. 
3- Strengthening the armed forces (The Lebanese army). 
Also, the right of Lebanon to restore its authority to the Lebanese border with Israel was 
pointed out in the agreement. The agreement suggested that such a right could be 
achieved through the following: 
 
1- Working on implementing Security Council Resolution 425 and the other 
international resolutions which call for the removal of the Israeli occupation of southern 
Lebanon. 
2- Adherence to the truce agreed with Israel which was signed in 1949. 
3 - Taking all necessary measures for liberating all the Lebanese territories and restoring 
the state’s sovereignty over all its territory and deploying the Lebanese army on the 
internationally recognised border. 
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The Taif agreement also addressed Lebanese-Syrian relations, pointing out that there 
should be a special relationship which brings benefits to both countries, while taking 
into consideration and respecting the sovereignty and independence of the two 
countries. Also, the agreement mentioned that Lebanon must not be a source of threats 
to Syria's security, and also asked Syria not to be a source of threats to Lebanon's 
security under any circumstances. Consequently, Lebanon must not become a pathway 
or a base for any force, state, or organization seeking to undermine its security or Syria's 
security, and that Syria is a country which supports Lebanon’s security and 
independence, as well as unity and harmony among its citizens, and therefore does not 
permit any act that threatens its security, independence and sovereignty.  
The agreement, which addressed the problem of the displaced Lebanese who left their 
villages during the civil war, proposed finding a solution for this problem, and 
recognized the right for each and every displaced citizen to return to the place he was 
displaced from. 
 
3.6.1.3 The Taif Agreement: Approved but not Applied  
 
The agreement was a compromise between many groups in Lebanon – leaders, political 
parties and militias – and was intended to address problems of Lebanese sovereignty 
and the structure of the political system. Indeed, the agreement helped to put an end to 
the war and provided the best way to remove Lebanon from the contemporary regional 
conflicts. However, we should consider whether the agreement reached these goals, i.e. 
whether it was properly respected and applied to strengthen Lebanon’s sovereignty and 
rebuild its damaged political system. 
On one hand, looking at the amendments and reforms that were made to the political 
system, including the attempt to strengthen the general participation of the sects, reveals 
that each sect received its specific share, and each institution had its powers specified. 
However, the behaviour of the political leaders showed that the agreement prevented the 
Lebanese authority from running in a systematic manner. We should ask some questions 
about this behaviour: Who has the real power in Lebanon: Is it the President, the Prime 
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Minister or the Speaker? In fact, looking at the period after the agreement was approved 
in the Lebanese Parliament reveals that the equation which emerged after the Taif 
agreement is the equation of opposite powers. The era which followed the Taif 
agreement carried the seeds of the disputes and the estrangement between the three 
presidents. In the period of the President of the Republic Elias Hrawi, the relationship 
between the three presidents were very tense, as in the era of President Emile Lahoud, 
as things had come between them to such an extent that they failed to meet and regulate 
the fundamental interests that facilitate the work of the state and its institutions. 
However, the system of government, not in its essence, but in how it was applied, 
revealed the absence of stability and steadiness, and indicated the lack of commitment 
of Lebanese political groups that run the political system, and the lack of commitment 
to the power limits of the new institutions that were operating in the post-Taif period. In 
every stage, new indicators have emerged which show the preponderance of one official 
or another, or one leader over the rest of the leaders. To elaborate, officials who occupy 
high-ranked positions in Lebanon did not attain their offices on the basis of a national 
consensus, but rather, through their statuses as representatives and leaders of certain 
sects. Consequently, the success of a certain official is seen as a success of the 
community and the sect which he represents, and the decline of him is a decline for his 
community and sect. Therefore, it can be argued that representing the interests and 
demands of the Lebanese citizens is not a priority on those official’s agenda since the 
latter does not look at his electors as a public opinion which has the power to ensure that 
rulers rule for the prosperity of their people. On the contrary, they look at them as 
submissive followers. Furthermore, communities within the Lebanese political system 
started to act on the basis that the share of each community and sect must be obtained 
and maintained whether peacefully or by force. 
 
On the other hand, the process for strengthening the state and allowing it to enforce its 
sovereignty was hampered from within Lebanon and by external forces. We should 
examine how this occurred. As outlined above, the Taif agreement provided the right 
criteria to end the war, but at the same time, as Norton argues, it curiously also required 
that Lebanon surrender its sovereignty over some of its territory for a significant period 
of time (Norton 1991:466). The period that Norton outlines does not accord with the 
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details of the agreement. According to Taif, the Lebanese government was to confiscate 
the weapons of all the militias within six months. Some militias had handed in their 
weapons before the process started, and the government confiscated some others by 
force. Here, the Lebanese considered that who started to monopolise the use of force 
became the military forces of the Lebanese state, but a row of events occurred, most 
recently in 2008, to show that the militias that fought during the civil war still retained 
their arms, and only part was delivered to the state. As for the issue of the Syrian 
military presence, the Taif Agreement stipulated the withdrawal of Syrian military 
within no more than two years, but the Syrian army did not abide by the spirit of the 
agreement, and remained on Lebanese soil, intervening in every detail, until 2005. As 
for the issue of the Israeli occupation of part of Lebanese territory in the south, the 
Lebanese government did not adhere to what was stipulated in the text of the Agreement, 
but allowed the military forces of the Iran-backed Hezbollah to fight Israel, and thereby 
turn south Lebanon into a huge military barracks belonging to Hezbollah, with no trace 
of the legitimate Lebanese authorities.  
In conclusion, the Lebanese state was able to regain some sense of stability as a result of 
the Taif agreement, but this was not harnessed to help stabilise Lebanon’s sovereignty 
or to properly rebuild its democratic institutions. Political leaders did not act in unison 
after the agreement and did not follow the conditions it laid out for re-establishing the 
institutions of state on a firm foundation. In fact, what did emerge in Lebanon was a 
series of dysfunctional institutions that do not act in the public interest, but are rather 
rife with corruption and unnecessary extravagance. They do not favour competence and 
integrity, but rather reward favouritism and blind subordination to political leaders and 
not to the interests of the state.  
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4. Chapter Four: Lebanese Democracy and its Internal 
Hindrances 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In a speech at one of the first meetings of the United Nations, Charles Malik, the 
Lebanese philosopher and diplomat who played a vital role in shaping the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (Klug 2008), characterised the history of Lebanon by 
saying:   
“The history of my country for centuries is precisely that of a small country 
struggling against all odds for the maintenance and strengthening of real freedom of 
thought and conscience. Innumerable persecuted minorities have found, throughout 
the ages, a most understanding haven in my country, so that the very basis of our 
existence is complete respect of differences of opinion and belief” (Malik & Malik 
2000:16). 
Malik’s characterisation is almost the same as that made by Michel Chiha, the father of 
the Lebanese Constitution, when he argued that Lebanon is a country with traditions 
worth protecting from violence, and the coexistence of its peoples, even if the result of 
an agreed misunderstanding, should be the coexistence between free peoples where their 
freedom allows them to be the finest political group in the east. This freedom, according 
to Chiha, is a freedom that exists at the heart of the Lebanese entity and can be 
described as a freedom haven. 
However, this freedom, which is expressed and described as a fundamental pillar 
supporting the democratic system in Lebanon and strengthening its foundation, was 
exposed to many domestic and foreign violations since the country’s adoption of its 
liberal constitution in 1926. This negatively affected the democratic system and 
hampered its development. Thus, the finest political group in the east that Chiha hoped 
the Lebanese would create, and the religious coexistence between the nineteen sects of 
Christians and Muslims which was hoped to serve as an inspiration for a pluralistic 
democratic region, both suffered a severe blow.  
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In Lebanon, there is a commonly held misconception in people’s understanding of 
democracy. There, many of the public and some politicians understand freedom to be 
the same as democracy, and that when the level of freedoms declines; it means that 
democracy declines too. Of course, freedom is inherent to democracy and vice versa, 
but this correlation does not mean in any way that freedom is democracy or equal to 
democracy. In other words, describing and calling a regime a democracy needs to be 
investigated in a way that allows us to conclude whether the political system meets with 
the conditions needed and required by democracy, and, of course, these conditions are 
not met by freedom alone.  
In the following, the researcher will try to review some of the internal barriers and 
hindrances that have impeded the development of an effective democratic system in 
Lebanon. 
4.2 Internal Hindrances 
When it comes to internal hindrances, Lebanon falls short regarding most of the 
requirements for democracy. The country faces a considerable number of 
problems that hamper its internal and external sovereignty, not to mention the problems 
with its electoral system, in addition to some other problems which hamper and hinder 
the establishment of a strong functioning state. The aim of the next section, which 
discusses sectarianism, is to find out whether it is a barrier that represents an obstacle to 
the stability and development of the Lebanese political system, and thus to democracy. 
 
4.2.1 Sectarianism  
 
It would be easy enough for anybody who looks at Lebanon’s history to find out that 
sectarianism is deep-rooted and extensive in influence, and that the efforts made by 
many supporters of secularism over the years have not come to fruition and have 
showed that it is incredibly hard to overcome. 
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Indeed, there are two arguments in Lebanon over the issue of sectarianism. The first 
considers it necessary that sectarianism be abolished, since it does nothing for Lebanon 
and is damaging to the interests of both state and nation. It is an obstacle to achieving a 
functioning democracy and gives cause to further conflicts. The second considers 
sectarianism to be essential for democracy, since it is only the result of adherence to the 
right of holding a belief and allowing others to hold a contrary belief (which can be 
beneficial if it is not politicised) (Al-Khouri 200). Actually, the two points of view both 
hold some rights and wrongs. However, there are some questions to be raised in further 
discussing these two points of views. The first question that occurs is: how does 
sectarianism trouble the interests of both the nation and the state? The second question: 
is sectarianism a kind of legal and constitutional formula that can be eliminated through 
the amendment of the constitutional and legal provisions which legitimize it or it is 
rooted in society, culture and behaviour? The third question: in which sense does 
sectarianism form an essential part of democracy in that it represents no more than 
adherence to the right of citizens to be different while maintaining the privilege of 
others to hold contrary beliefs? 
While Lebanese sectarianism is represented in legal and constitutional formulae, it is 
essentially based on the value systems of Lebanese society which not only allow the 
religious and political spheres to intermingle, but the religious sphere to dominate the 
political. This system reaches well beyond the constitutional level to deeply affect 
political parties, administrative bodies, the education system and the institutions of 
social welfare and health. Sectarianism also manifests itself in networks of financial 
structures and interests, as wells as mechanisms whereby the services and resources of 
the state are redistributed, which treats citizens as customers, but customers with 
unequal rights and duties. 
 It can also be used as a kind of power to reap illegal profits and accumulate wealth, 
thus enabling the wealthy to use their wealth as a means for getting into politics and 
being politically powerful. Sectarianism then ingrains itself further and further into the 
social subconscious and becomes a latent dredge which appears in public only at the 
height of conflict. Therefore, this has turned Lebanon into a group of minorities battling 
with each other and rallying to achieve their rights. But why? Is this diversity the root of 
the problem? Or are there other reasons for this?  
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Actually, this problem has nothing to do with the diversity that Lebanon enjoys, but it 
has other reasons. In addition to the above mentioned, some of the religious and 
political authorities in the country built their own private links with the outside world, 
and specifically associated with foreign religious and political authorities, so that they 
could maintain their good livelihoods and have the power to bully other internal 
authorities. This led to and made each sect practice its own policies and build its own 
foreign relations and also invite, when needed, its overseas partners to Lebanon. 
Moreover, the sectarian Lebanese system, which is one of the oldest ruling systems in 
the Middle East, has become psychologically fixed in the lives of the Lebanese. They 
have mingled it with the concept of religious sectarianism and political and 
administrative sectarianism, so that they became lost between sectarian 
loyalty and national loyalty. This led to a situation where the citizen started to feel that 
the community that he belonged to represents   the framework in which he feels his 
political presence, and thus he became a follower of his sect leader. Of course, this 
problem and its results are not the responsibility of the citizens of Lebanon, since they 
were not the causes of its emergence, but some political leaders, who in order to remain 
in power and maintain their gains, worked on the isolation of their 
communities. Otherwise, how can we explain, for example, the survival of the President 
of the House of Representatives (the Speaker) for more than twenty years in 
office without allowing anybody to compete or run against him? Furthermore, as 
discussed above, sectarianism has spread to other parts of Lebanese society. It was 
manifest in the courts, so that religious courts began regulating the personal statuses of 
personal groups. It became evident in a superfluous numbers of schools, welfare 
organisations, hospitals, clinics, charities, television and radio stations, reconstruction 
companies and even supermarkets and petrol stations. It even spread within the different 
sects, with different groups using their own places of worship to attract and influence 
followers. All this allowed ideological dissemination which fostered, and continues to 
foster, societal separatism, giving the individual communities a false sense of 
uniqueness. In this way sectarianism is not in the interests of the nation or state. It is an 
obstacle to a functioning democracy and fosters more conflict. 
Conversely, in proper functioning democracies, the law ensures the protection of the 
individual, his rights and interests, by prohibiting all forms of discrimination and 
differentiation. In other words, the law, when dealing with governance, management 
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and administration, does so through a mechanism that respects the individual and his 
rights.  As for Lebanon, the opposite happens because the sectarian system, made from 
the sectarian groups, is the dealing centre of the organization, management 
and governance, which forces the individual to seek his protection from his sectarian 
group, and this leads him (the individual) to believe that belonging to the sect and his 
own community is much more important, beneficial and valuable than belonging to 
the state. It stands as a barrier preventing the growth of the state and the development 
of its institutions, and thus reduces its effectiveness and services. Also, when 
sectarianism decays the body of the state and society in such a serious way, then it is 
considered as a violation of human rights, which usually calls for justice, equality 
and equal opportunities. In this sense, where sectarianism has spread everywhere, it 
prohibits democracy from playing its role as a safety valve for the stability of society. 
Also it encourages corruption, nepotism, expediency, careerism and demagoguery. In 
this sense, it troubles the interests of both the nation and the state and has thus become 
an obstacle to reaching a proper democracy. 
 
On the other side, it is argued that sectarianism is no more than adherence to the right to 
be different while admitting the privilege of others to hold a contrary belief, essential 
for democracy (Al-Khouri 2006). Many scholars have shown that preserving the right to 
be different is important to many democracies. In this view, democracy is a social 
covenant between people who agree to recognise the rights of individuals to live 
according to their beliefs, as long as they recognise the right of others to do the same. 
The right to be different is therefore as important as a free press, free elections, an 
independent judiciary, and the separation of powers, transparency and the right to access 
of information. Sectarianism therefore favours and fosters democracy when viewed 
from this perspective. In other words, if sectarianism means diversity and demographic 
intermixing, freedom of worship and practicing religious rituals, then, undeniably, it is a 
healthy situation. Also, sectarianism might be looked at as healthy to the state and its 
political system if it is considered as participation of all for the good of the country. In 
other words, if applying the Fifty-Fifty principle between Christians and Muslims 
means an affirmation of equality and responsibility, and an embodiment of sharing, but 
with the condition of healthy representation, then it could be viewed as beneficiary. And 
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naturally, when we speak about healthy representation, it means that representation 
should be based on competence and not on favouritism. 
Under these paradoxical realities, what is the most appropriate solution that does not 
make sectarianism an obstacle to the integrity of the State, political system and thus to 
democracy? Returning to the Taif Agreement, of which some aspects were discussed 
earlier, we can observe that this agreement discussed sectarianism and suggested 
solutions which do not affect the principle of equality between Muslims and Christians. 
Also, the Taif Agreement, in an advanced stage, mentioned abolishing sectarianism 
after establishing the National body of abolition of political sectarianism. 
The Lebanese politicians who were present at Taif implicitly and explicitly promised to 
overcome sectarianism by reforming the political system. An agreement with forward-
looking terms was therefore reached: 
1- The abolition of political sectarianism was to be a national objective central to 
producing a united and stable state and political system. However, what emerged 
from the implementation of the Taif Agreement was not the abolition of 
sectarianism, as had been mentioned, but a political scene with a balance of 
power between confessions. However, Article 95 of the constitution adopted the 
terms that call for the abolition of sectarianism, which gave it strength and 
special legitimacy, but after more than twenty one years of amending the 
Constitution, officials have not moved a single step toward forming the required 
national body, which can be considered as laggard in the application of the 
Constitution without any explicit justification.  
2- Electing the Chamber of Deputies on a national and not sectarian basis. After 
achieving this goal, the next step would then be the establishment of a 
Senate where all spiritual families are represented. Of course, these two terms 
which Taif called for were not implemented.  
3- Strengthening state control over private schools and school textbooks which 
would lead to the strengthening and fostering of a sense of national belonging. 
Also, twenty one years after amending the constitution, this term was left in the 
drawer without being implemented, which led to the emergence of chaos in the 
education sector, so that each sect, party or religious group established its 
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private schools where its education program is in line with the vision of the 
party or the group, not the State.  
4-  Working to achieve a comprehensive social justice through financial, 
economical and social reform. However this term, with its utmost importance, 
was also left unimplemented. Through social justice, which means sponsoring 
all citizens in all parts of the country, the role   of the State is fostered and 
ensured. Also, having social justice implemented means having the key to 
development and modernization and a starting point for reform on all levels. 
However, the State failing to apply this term has benefited the political parties 
and groups, as they have managed to take over the state’s role, and have begun 
to provide services to citizens in places where they have gained influence, which 
facilitated the process of buying their loyalty and thus leading citizens away 
from national interests. The prominent role of militias and other non-state 
organisations, which hold much influence and are able to affect decision-making 
processes in Lebanon, are the next obstacle. Most exist simply to provide the 
services and perform the roles that the government fails to provide. Essentially, 
if the government manages to properly provide for its citizens, then they will no 
longer have needed any political party or militia or Leader to gain access to, for 
example: education and medical supplies. The state should be providing these 
services, which would eliminate the need for non-state actors. They will then 
lose authority allowing the government to reassert itself and perform its role as 
the sole authority. Such a pattern is beneficial for Lebanese authority and it will 
raise the profile of the secular state in providing positive services for its citizens.  
These forward-looking terms, however, which either directly or indirectly lead to the 
abolition of sectarianism; still provide a framework for the modernisation of the state, 
since they provide the only path for Lebanon to move from the federal state of 
communities to a state of conscious citizenship. Clearly, as mentioned above, they 
reveal that the Taif agreement, to some extent, suggested effective solutions to 
overcome sectarianism and political sectarianism. However, the political leaders seem 
to have been content with bringing the war to an end, and have not moved on to 
building a modern democratic political system. 
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However, the reforms that Taif called for do not appear by themselves to be a 
sufficient solution to remove the obstacles to the democratic system, as they do not lead 
the system to divide the issue of religion from the exercise of political power. In 
addition to what was suggested, the civil law should be updated. A stronger division 
between secular and communal law needs to be made in dealing with issues such as 
marriage and inheritance, which are currently usually left to the religious customs and 
beliefs of one of the different sects involved. Such separation would be another means 
of strengthening the government while freeing it from a few more sectarian obligations.  
For example, marriages can still be held according to the customs of sects, by the civil 
marriage certificates issued by the government should be recognised for legal purposes. 
This would also enable young couples to move away from old family traditions, 
contributing to secularism by reducing the role of clans in the younger generations. 
Furthermore, it would make citizens equal before the law and move towards a situation 
with no religious based representation, where the status as a citizen comes foremost. 
This would help create a state based on equal competence and justness, which is a 
fundamental pillar of democratic systems.  
Earlier, a number of political Leaders tried to introduce some reforms regarding the civil 
marriage in Lebanon, in a move to reduce the rupture among Lebanese citizens, but they 
failed because of facing a lot of obstacles. When interviewed on 08/11/2008, Walid 
Jumblatt, the Druze Leader and the Head of the Progressive Socialist Party, pointed and 
referred clearly to this issue and the obstacles he and his political allies faced when 
trying to fix the optional civil marriage Law. He demonstrated:  
“We should one day abolish the sectarian system in Lebanon, and if you want to do 
that, you will face the obstacle of the clergy, most of them are Christian clergy and 
some of the Muslims also, because they have the privileges. You remember when we 
tried to fix up the non-compulsory civil marriage; the Sheikhs and the Bishops were 
against it. It is a way to forbid people to mix together” (Junblatt 2008). 
To sum up, sectarianism, as discussed above, reveals itself as an obvious source of 
disruption for the stability of the Lebanese political system. This aspect of the problem 
is also argued by Professor Tarek Mitri, the former Minister of Environment, then 
administrative reform and then Information. When interviewed on 5/01/2009, the 
former Minister argued that communal and sectarian loyalties are a “hindrance for the 
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spreading of a democratic culture” (Mitri 2009). Professor Mitri added that not only are 
communal loyalties a hindrance for the spreading of democratic culture, but also 
communal and sectarian power sharing which is “in theory stands in contradiction with 
the principle of political equality of all Lebanese” (Mitri 2009). However, some argue 
that implementing the reforms concerning the abolition of sectarianism and political 
sectarianism outlined in the Taif agreement is an impossible mission and task in the 
presence of illegal weapons and the absence of a strong government that is able to 
safeguard the rights of its citizens. In the next section, the armed Hezbollah, which is 
most organized armed party in Lebanon, and which is integrally linked to Iran, will be 
discussed. This will help to find out whether the previous argument is right, and 
whether these arms are an obstacle to democracy.  
 
4.2.2 The Armed Hezbollah 
 
The aim of this section is to briefly discuss the arms of Hezbollah. On one hand, this 
will provide a useful base for a better understanding of the entire role of the armed party 
which will be discussed deeply in the sixth chapter. On the other hand, it will find out 
whether the arms of Hezbollah represent a threat to domestic sovereignty, and thus, to 
democracy. It is, however, not possible to explore if the arms of Hezbollah represent a 
threat to sovereignty and democracy without discussing the relationship between 
sovereignty and democracy. In other words, it is necessary to discuss the chances for 
establishing democracy in cases of debatable domestic sovereignty, which is the case in 
Lebanon. But before that, a brief overview of Hezbollah’s arms will be undertaken, and 
we shall discuss how these arms prevent the government and its official security 
forces from carrying out the legitimate duties assigned to them.  
Hezbollah, the Iranian backed militia, which defines its identity as an Islamic jihadi 
movement, and “whose emergence is based on an ideological, social, political and 
economic mixture in a special Lebanese, Arab and Islamic context” (Cobban 2006:13) 
started its military activity in Lebanon in the early eighties engaging in acts that 
“constitute terrorism in its more precise and generally understood sense” (Norton 
2009:77). Augustus Richard Norton, who is the professor of international relations and 
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anthropology at Boston University, justifies the latter description by arguing that “by 
definition, any act of violence that it commits or seeks to commit is an act of terrorism, 
and so there are no gray areas of justifiable behavior in which terrorists may lurk. 
Whether for law enforcement officials, spies, or soldiers, the issue is assumed to be 
settled” (Norton 2009:75). He gives examples of clear instances of terrorism conducted 
by Hezbollah, including the 1985 skyjacking of TWA flight 847 en route from Athens 
to Rome, and the 1988 kidnapping of the unarmed UN observer Colonel Higgins of the 
U.S. Marines, who was tortured and murdered (Norton 2009). While Judith Palmer 
Harik, the American Professor of Political Science at the American University of 
Beirut, reports that it was in 1983, when acts of terrorism, apparently ordered by the 
Islamic republic of Iran, were implemented by local actors about whom very little was 
known (Harik 2005:IX). According to her, an example of this was when a suicide 
bomber drove an explosives-laden car into the American Embassy on 19 April 1983, 
killing 63(Harik 2005:IX). Hezbollah, the Shiite fundamentalist organization backed by 
Iran and Syria, was accused by Washington of this act and many other acts (Harik 
2005:X). Hezbollah’s military activity did not stop at this point, as its military leader 
Imad Mugniyah, who was killed in a car bombing in Damascus in 2008, was accused by 
the Kuwaiti Government of “hijacking a Kuwaiti passenger plane in 1988 that led to the 
killing of two Kuwaiti men whose bodies were dumped on the tarmac of Larnaca airport 
in Cyprus.”44 These hijackings and acts exposed “the deep tension between Hezbollah 
and Amal leader Nabih Berri” (Norton 2009:43) which “exploded in 1988-89 with two 
militias fighting to win the Shi’i heartland in the south, as well as the teeming southern 
suburbs of Beirut, where fully half the Shi’i population resides” (Norton 2009:43). 
Augustus reports that Amal was badly defeated and Hezbollah’s attempts to roll back 
Amal influence succeeded in eroding Amal’s position (Norton 2009:44). 
However, these battles and sporadic armed activities carried out by Hezbollah happened 
during the Lebanese civil war while the government was not in control; the state was 
divided against itself and rival militias were fighting each other throughout Lebanon. 
Also, they happened before the Taif Agreement, and thus before any agreement had 
been reached which required the disarmament of militias. In other words, Hezbollah, 
                                                          
44 NOW Lebanon, “Kuwait names Mugniyah perpetrator of hijacking and urges national restraint”,[online],available at: 
<http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArchiveDetails.aspx?ID=31259#ixzz1P7CO6aUR>[Accessed April  2011]. 
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which “certainly served as a stalking horse for Iranian interests, especially in the 
1980’s” (Norton 2009:44) was not just the only militia which took up 
arms, but was part of a whole, and therefore one of many which participated in 
violating  sovereignty and being in rebellion against the state’s military forces. This 
means that Hezbollah’s rebellion was not a unilateral rebellion, as at that point there 
was, because of the civil war, a collective rebellion against the state and its sovereignty 
and a collective violation of the rule of law. However, after the Taif Agreement, the 
agreement which called all militias to surrender their illegal arms, Hezbollah retained its 
arms under the pretext of resisting Israel and repelling any possible attack on Lebanon. 
In this context, Norton argues: 
“The civil war came to a close in Lebanon by the early 1990s, when all the militias, 
except Hezbollah, agreed to disband in accordance with the 1989 Taif accord. 
Hezbollah, which signed on to the accord only after the Iranian government gave its 
blessing, justified the maintenance of its armed forces by calling them “Islamic 
resistance” groups, not militias, committed to ending Israelis occupation. The forces 
were said to be needed to defend the country against the Israel-sponsored SLA (South 
Lebanon Army)” (Norton 2009:83). 
Here, it becomes clear that Hezbollah accepted an agreement, which is the Taif 
agreement, but did not accept the requirements and implications of this agreement, such 
as those relating to the withdrawal of the militia’s arms. In addition to this, Hezbollah 
did not try to legitimize its weapons, i.e. put them under the aegis of the state and the 
legitimate Lebanese authorities, perhaps in an indication that those who ordered them to 
accept the Taif agreement, the Iranian authorities, did not allow Hezbollah to step 
towards the legalization of its weapons by letting the army and the state do the job of 
defending Lebanon and leading the resistance to Israel. This leads to the conclusion that 
these weapons have a third-party mission not only related to resistance to Israel and 
protecting Lebanon, but related to an agenda outside the Lebanese border. However, 
perhaps the most important aspect that should be considered is that there was no 
consensus reached on these weapons since it was not been agreed upon by a significant 
number of Lebanese citizens. Also, these arms did not receive any legal and 
constitutional legitimacy, and therefore are contrary to the law. Moreover, it should be 
noted that the militia that owns these weapons, Hezbollah, is not a legal party, as it did 
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not request for a license to operate as a political party, which means that dual offences 
are taking place: an illegal militia owning illegal arms.  
Apart from the fact that Hezbollah is doing a job which is primarily a responsibility 
of the Lebanese state, the vast quantity of arms, in addition to the nature of the military 
actions required, forces Hezbollah to ensure the safety of these arms by establishing 
buffer zones which are forbidden to inspection by the State, as well as ensuring the 
protection of the militia military commanders and political leaders and also building 
trenches which are used to shelter its guerrillas. After the Taif agreement, Hezbollah’s 
military activity significantly detracted from the prestige of the state and damaged its 
sovereignty over its territory. 
Perhaps it is useful to make a summary of the most prominent military activities carried 
out by the party. Hezbollah went to war with Israel alone three times, with neither the 
permission of the Lebanese state nor any mandate from the people of Lebanon. These 
wars happened in 1993, 1996 and 2006. Moreover, in May 2008, Hezbollah occupied 
the city of Beirut by force of arms and surrounded the Grand Serail in downtown Beirut 
after the Lebanese government approved sovereign decisions to stop the private 
telephone network of Hezbollah. On that day, Hezbollah fighters only withdrew from 
Beirut’s streets after forcing the Lebanese government to back down from its decisions. 
After the armed Hezbollah took over Beirut, the Secretary General of 
Hezbollah Hassan Nasrallah “called Hizbullah’s 7 May 2008 military takeover of West 
Beirut “glorious day” for Resistance.” 45  In August of the same year Hezbollah shot 
down a helicopter belonging to the Lebanese army and killed an officer with the rank of 
Major in it. Hezbollah sources described the downing of the helicopter by claiming that 
resistance fighters of Hezbollah, after spotting a military helicopter equipped with a 
camera filming in a sensitive area, shot a warning to send a strong message to the pilot 
to stay away, but not to shoot down the helicopter and kill those inside.
46
 
                                                          
45[online], available at:< http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/crisiswatch/crisiswatch-
database.aspx?CountryIDs={B88F968D-7344-46FF-B440-9B24224EB6ED>, [Accessed March 2011] 
46NOW Lebanon, “"Hezbollah" fighters fired at the army helicopter  to warn  not to kill",[online],available at: 
< http://www.nowlebanon.com/Arabic/NewsArchiveDetails.aspx?ID=56689>[Accessed April  2011]. 
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However, this leads us to believe that such military activity carried out by Hezbollah, in 
addition to threatening the authority of the state and preventing it from carrying out its 
role properly, also threatens Lebanese sovereignty at its heart by carrying out 
illegal activity on land governed by a present and active Lebanese state, regardless of 
whether it is fully effective or semi-effective.  Perhaps it might be helpful to go through 
some definitions of sovereignty which will help us to strengthen the above point of 
view. 
Alain de Benoist, the French academic, philosopher and the head of the French think 
tank GRECE, gives sovereignty a dual definition. He considers the first definition to 
apply to supreme public power, which has the right and, normally, the ability to impose 
its decisions in the last instance. The second applies to the holder of legitimate power 
who is seen to be in authority. The first definition is used in discussions of a nation’s 
sovereignty, referring particularly to a state of independence, meaning the freedom of a 
collective body to act. The second definition applies to discussions of popular 
sovereignty, and this is linked to power and legitimacy (De Benois). 
Sir Francis Harry Hinsley , the late English historian and cryptanalyst, demonstrates the  
classic definition of sovereignty by identifying it as “the idea that there is a ﬁnal and 
absolute political authority in the political community [. . .] and no final and absolute 
authority exists elsewhere” (Hinsley 1986:26).  This idea of final authority that Hinsley 
refers to is, according to Oisín Tansey, often further associated with ideas of both 
internal and external sovereignty. OISÍN argues that internal sovereignty, which we are 
mainly concerned with here, describes the state’s domestic authority, and suggests that 
there is no higher authority than the state at the domestic level. External authority, on 
the other hand, describes relations on the international scene and the absence there of 
any higher authority than the sovereign state, which requires that the state be 
independent from outside intervention (Tansey 2010). 
Regarding domestic sovereignty, Tansey considers it to describe the capacity of the 
state to provide its own political system and structures. He suggests that this is much 
more important than international recognition for the prospects for democratic rule, or 
than international legal sovereignty, since democracy requires that the state is able to 
assert its own jurisdiction and authority on the domestic scene (Tansey 2010). 
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Nevertheless, some scholars argue that there is not a distinctly and sharply defined and 
outlined relationship between sovereignty and democracy, since sovereignty is a 
complex concept that is made up of several important, distinct, and yet constituent 
elements. Others, however, argue that the state’s sovereignty is of considerable 
importance here, and should be seen as a necessary prerequisite for democratic rule. 
Among those who discuss the latter are the Spanish sociologist and political scientist 
Juan José Linz and the  comparative political scientist and Professor of Government 
Alfred C. Stepan, who demonstrates that democracy requires sovereignty and that 
official statehood is a prerequisite to democracy (Tansey 2010). 
Stepan and Linz argue that, as democracy is a form of governance for a modern state, no 
democracy is possible without a state. They assert that these arguments hold true both 
empirically and theoretically (Linz & Stepan 1996:17). As an illustration, they analyse 
some basic definitions of the state, starting with Max Weber, who discusses the key 
features of the state in modern societies in the following terms: 
 “The primary formal characteristics of the modern state are as follows: it possesses 
an administrative and legal order subject to change by legislation, to which the 
organized corporate activity of the administrative staff, which is also regulated by 
legislation, is oriented. This system of order claims binding authority, not only over 
the members of the state, the citizens, most of whom have obtained membership by 
birth, but also to a very large extent, over all action taking place in the area of its 
jurisdiction. It is thus a compulsory association with a territorial basis. Furthermore, 
today the use of force is regarded as legitimate only so far as it either permitted by the 
state or prescribed by it ... The claim of the modern state to monopolize the use of 
force is as essential to it as its character to compulsory jurisdiction and of continuous 
organization” (Weber 1964:156 cited in Linz &Stepan 1996:17).   
    
According to Linz and Stepan, Charles Tilly provides a more recent formulation, which 
also covers the state’s ability to control the population in its territory (Linz & Stepan 
1996:17). He argues that “An organization which controls the population occupying a 
definite territory is a state in so far as (1) it is differentiated from other organizations 
operating in the same territory; (2) it is autonomous [and] (3) its divisions are formally 
coordinated with one another” (Tilly 1975: 70 cited in Linz & Stepan 1996:17). 
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These theories and arguments lead Linz and Stepan to suggest that, without an 
organisation conforming to these state-like characteristics in a particular territory, a 
government, whether democratically elected or not, would not be able to enforce its 
monopoly on the legitimate use of force in the territory, nor would it be able to collect 
taxes or run a judicial system (Linz & Stepan 1996:18). In other words, their argument 
relies on the idea that a democracy requires the features of a modern sovereign state, 
including an administration capable of raising taxes, providing public services 
according to the needs of the electorate and monopolise the legitimate use of force 
(Tansey 2010). 
Regarding this, Tansey suggests that domestic sovereignty is important to democracy in 
that it includes the state’s capability, and willingness, to maintain the rule of law and 
uphold political rights throughout its territory (Tansey 2010). Guillermo O'Donnell, the 
Argentine political scientist, demonstrates that the idea of domestic sovereignty is 
similar to the idea of state capacity, which has been specified in comparative political 
literature as an essential prerequisite for democratic rule (O’Donnell 1999 cited in 
Tansey 2010). Similarly, Francisco E. Gonzalez and Desmond King put forward that the 
state’s authority and reach affect how effectively democratic freedoms and rights can be 
maintained throughout its territory (Gonzalez & King 2004 cited in Tansey 2010). 
In summary, the above analysis demonstrates that achieving democracy and the 
presence of a sovereign state are interlinked. In other words, a sovereign state is 
required for a democracy, and the challenges of providing a democracy cannot be 
overcome “unless the territorial entity is recognized as a sovereign state” (Linz & 
Stepan 1996 cited in Tansey 2010). This argument relies on the idea that a democracy as 
a type of political governance needs the features of a modern sovereign state, including 
an administration capable of raising taxes, providing public services according to the 
needs of the electorate, and monopolising the legitimate use of force (Tansey 2010). 
Some of these conditions do not exist in Lebanon, which has become clear in the 
discussion at the beginning of this section, which if we refer back to we will find that 
the power of Hezbollah and its military on the ground are incompatible with the 
conditions relating to the right of the state to maintain a monopoly on the legitimate use 
of force, as the government and its military forces are  banned and  prohibited from 
exercising their duties in preserving security and public order in a large part of the  
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Lebanese territory. This is added to the fact that the state cannot collect taxes from 
people who live in areas controlled by Hezbollah, as this party, as people are convinced, 
holds more power than the state, and therefore cannot be pursued or prosecuted in any 
way by the state. These issues are related to domestic sovereignty and are revealed most 
clearly in the limitations on the government’s authority over its territory. 
 
4.2.3 Palestinians in Lebanon: Arms and Refugees  
           4.2.3.1 Arms: The Violation of Lebanese Sovereignty  
 
Following the declaration of the State of Israel in May 1948, a few tens of thousands of 
Palestinians fled to neighbouring states to escape the armed conflicts or were 
compulsorily ousted from their homes by the Israeli Defence Force (Kapitan 2004).  
Initially, 100,000 Palestinians, mainly from Galilee and the coastal areas, fled to 
Lebanon (Suleiman 2006). 
 
 
In 1949, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency was founded by the United 
Nations with the aim of providing for the basic needs of the Palestinian Refugees. Its 
goal was to support the Palestinians until they were able to return home. While the 
founding of Israel by the UN provided a Jewish ‘homeland’ for victimized Jews in 
Europe, it caused the dispersal of the Palestinian population away from their homeland 
and resulted in what Robin Cohen calls ‘Victim Diaspora’ (Cohen 1977: 31,51 cited in 
Suleiman 2006). This ‘Victim Diaspora’ that Cohen spoke of negatively affected 
Lebanon, as it became a strain on Lebanese political life, and was later a major cause in 
triggering the civil war of 1975.  
 
However, the Palestinians who fled to Lebanon did not act on the basis of being guests 
that have a duty of respecting the privacy of Lebanon and its political, social and 
religious complex. Instead, among other things, they dreamt of liberating Palestine 
through the use of Lebanese territory as a starting point for their military operations. 
The “Fatah” movement began operating in Lebanon in 1965, and actively started 
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seeking to establish its infrastructure, attract supporters and set up the movement of 
"Fatah support". In the late sixties the premature expansion has come, as well as the 
time to modify the nature of the Palestinian political and military existence in Lebanon. 
Hence it was decided to hold a big demonstration in Beirut and for this purpose a 
"Committee for supporting Fatah" was formed, which had the task of planning the 
demonstration. The demonstration took place on April 23 1969 and led to unrest in 
Beirut, and violent confrontations between demonstrators and the internal security 
forces. The Prime Minister at that time, Rashid Karami, resigned because of the 
demonstration which resulted in disturbances and the loss of lives. This resignation sank 
the country into a ministerial crisis lasting as long as seven months. Of course, this 
laxity and chaos, as well as the ambitions and dreams of the Palestinians to liberate 
Palestine from the land of Lebanon, were due to the inability and weakness of the state. 
Therefore, every problem that occurred before, during and after the demonstration, 
followed by the expansion of the Palestinians, was inevitably the result of the failure of 
the state, and the state bears responsibility. 
Skirmishes continued in Lebanon, and Palestinians continued to use Lebanese 
territory as a platform for their military activities. This kept happening because the 
armed Palestinian militias had large public support in Lebanon, guaranteed under left-
wing, nationalist and communist parties. However, this led to Palestinian armed factions 
taking control of all the Palestinian refugee camps, which became a refuge for fugitives 
from justice and the gateway to the riots and attacks on the army and security forces. 
These actions and others were the building blocks which forced the Lebanese state to 
sign an agreement which detracted from the sovereignty of Lebanon. In November 
1969, President Charles Helou sent the then Prime Minister, Rashid Karami, to 
discussions with Arafat, and under the supervision of the Egyptian Defence Minister 
Mohammed Fawzi Lebanon signed the "Cairo Agreement" with the PLO. Harik reports 
that “the newly founded PLO headed by Yasser Arafat had been given the green light to 
conduct these [military] operations from Lebanese soil” (Harik 2005: 34). In addition, 
that the Lebanese army had been prevented from entering the Palestinian refugee 
camps. 
This agreement, if examined closely, requires the concession of Lebanon's sovereignty 
in some areas on the southern border to the Palestinian resistance, and gives freedom of 
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movement for "guerrilla action" against Israel. Judith Palmer Harik reports that it was 
impossible for the Lebanese government to deny the fighters access without both 
exacerbating the already large Muslim-Christian divide in the country and damaging 
relations with other Arab states(Harik 2005: 34). She suggests that Assad’s Syria was in 
favour of the PLO being in South Lebanon and applying pressure on the Israelis. 
However, it was not long before Israel decided to respond to the "Cairo Agreement" by 
unilaterally declaring the abandonment of the "Armistice Agreement" of 1949, which 
was a formula setting out the relationship between Lebanon and Israel. In other words, 
the "Cairo Agreement" of 1969, which was a pretext that Israel used to topple the 
Armistice Agreement, has left Lebanon exposed to Israeli attacks and Israeli incursions 
and open occupations.  
The resistance movement in Palestine, which was a direct challenge to the power held 
by Lebanon’s elites, was also a challenge to the lives of the Lebanese citizens.  With the 
growing strength of armed Palestinian groups in West Beirut and the south, and their 
direct control over the daily lives of some of the Lebanese in the south, restlessness 
began to prevail in their hearts. They rejected the extensive powers which the 
Palestinian armed factions gave themselves or which were granted to them by the Cairo 
Agreement. For their part, the Israelis looked to solve their problem with the PLO by 
turning to the Christians and Shiites living in the south. These people had chosen to 
remain rather than flee north to join the forces forming there, but they felt a great deal of 
resentment towards the Palestinian presence (Harik 2005:34). In 1978, Israel decided to 
invade Lebanon in an attempt to drive Palestinian guerrilla groups, especially the 
Palestine Liberation Organization, away from the border with Israel, and to strengthen 
Israel's then ally, the South Lebanon Army.  
 
In response to the invasion, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolutions 425 
and 426 calling for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon. A separate UN force 
in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was formed to enforce this mandate, and restore peace and 
sovereignty to Lebanon. UNIFIL forces arrived in Lebanon on 23 March 1978, setting 
up headquarters in Naqoura. Israeli forces withdrew later in 1978, handing over 
positions inside Lebanon to their allied militia, the South Lebanon Army. Again, in 
1982, Israel launched a full-scale invasion of Lebanon to stop attacks by Palestinian 
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guerrillas. However, as Israel moved to invade, something close to a ceasefire was 
taking shape along Lebanon’s border. Israel nevertheless continued with the invasion. It 
claimed it was a justifiable way to put an end to terrorism there, crush the enduring 
resistance from Syria and the PLO, and impose a unilateral Pax Israeli on the region 
(Harik 2005:35). The ‘peace for Galilee’ operation, directed by Defence Minister Ariel 
Sharon, saw Israeli forces move into Beirut with the intention of crushing the 
Palestinians and their Muslim-leftist allies and reaching an agreement with Israel’s 
Christian allies, which would result in an Israeli-Lebanese peace treaty (Harik 2005:35). 
The Israeli invasion of 1982 forced the PLO to leave Lebanon and transfer its military 
to Tunisia. 
Of course, the Lebanese and Palestinian crisis did not end with the PLO’s withdrawal 
from Lebanon, nor did it end the Lebanese civil war of 1975, which the PLO was 
instrumental in triggering. Palestinian refugees remained in Lebanon, and Palestinian 
refugee camps remained full of illegal weapons, while remaining ‘off-limits’ to the 
Lebanese state, i.e. its security forces. Until this moment the state is still banned from 
entering and enforcing laws in these areas, noting that the Taif Accord called for the 
withdrawal of armed militia, as well as the decisions of the national dialogue in 2006. In 
other words, these camps, which are located in Lebanese territory, remain outside the 
sovereignty of Lebanon, and the Palestinian arms remain outside the circle of Lebanese 
legitimacy, as the Palestinians refused and still extraditing the arms, in addition to the 
fact of state’s inability to impose by force on the Palestinians to surrender these illegal 
weapons, due to internal and external factors.  
However, before moving forward to talk about the Palestinian refugees and their impact 
on  Lebanese democracy, we must first pause for an overview of the historical progress, 
and to try to understand the effects of the Palestinian weapons on Lebanese sovereignty, 
Lebanon’s political system and consequently on Lebanese democracy. 
We should draw attention to a number of issues relating to the Cairo agreement and the 
PLO’s military activities and those of other Palestinian militias. The “Armistice 
Agreement” was abandoned by Israel on the pretext of the Cairo Agreement. This 
cannot be seen as an internal Lebanese measure intended to avoid or contain internal 
crises. If examined closely, we find that it was used to announce the distribution of 
sovereignty between the PLO and the Lebanese state over Lebanese territory. In 
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addition to that, the Cairo Agreement represented a change not only in Lebanon but at 
the level of the position of Lebanon in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and also in terms of its 
relationship with international resolutions, since the agreement forced Lebanon to cede 
its sovereignty over its territory due to external pressure. Therefore, Lebanese 
sovereignty was no longer determined by a sovereign Lebanese decision, but a decision 
imposed from outside the country. 
Some might claim that the Cairo Agreement was cancelled, and therefore that it is 
useless to debate its effects. This claim, or the debate, from our point of view, is false. 
The Cairo Agreement formed the beginning of the breach of sovereignty, or the starting 
point of waiving it in favour of foreign forces and armed militias. Moreover, the Cairo 
Agreement, with our recognition that it was in fact rescinded, has effects still visible on 
the ground, in the sense that the Palestinian weapons still exist in the camps and that 
training camps still exist on the border with Syria which provide them political coverage 
and protection. Additionally, the leaders of the Palestinian factions still refuse 
disarmament of Palestinian weapons outside and inside the camps, because these 
weapons, they argue, are not linked to internal Lebanese issues but to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, which is still standing.
47
 
Of course, the breach of sovereignty, which resulted from the Cairo Agreement, was no 
more than the first episode in a series of breaches of Lebanese sovereignty. The 
Palestinian weapons held by the Palestinian factions can be placed in the same category 
as the arms of Hezbollah that we mentioned in the previous section, which also 
constitutes a loss and violation of Lebanese sovereignty. The consequences of 
Hezbollah's weapons are the same as those of the Palestinian weapons in Lebanon and, 
therefore, the rift caused by this massive armament in the body of the Lebanese political 
system and the Lebanese democracy is the same as that caused by Hezbollah. 
 
To sum up, the failure of the state to exercise its sovereignty, or continuing willingly or 
forcibly to waive, cut or distributes its domestic and external sovereignty, represents a 
                                                          
47 NOW LEBANON, “Abu Musa: We reject the disarmament of weapons outside the camps”, [online], available at:< 
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setback and a failure in the ability of the state to administrate its affairs, and therefore, 
represents an obstacle to the development and maintenance of the political system. 
Moreover, and as discussed in the previous section, democracy and sovereign statehood 
are interconnected, and sovereignty is a prerequisite for democracy, that is a central 
state administration capable of collecting taxes, providing public services in response to 
the needs of the electorate, and maintaining a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. 
 
        4.2.3.2    The Refugees:  Human Rights Violated  
 
As mentioned above, following the declaration of the State of Israel in May 1948, a few 
tens of thousands of Palestinians fled into the neighbouring states, including Lebanon. 
However, the Palestinians who migrated to Lebanon remained displaced since their 
arrival without any alteration or improvement of their situation. The fortunes of the c. 4 
million UN-registered Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora – in Syria, Jordan and the 
Israeli-controlled areas – has not been great, but their treatment in Lebanon has been 
particularly harsh
48, as they are treated as if “refugees at one instance, a special category 
of residents, on the other hand, and often, foreigners, and at best, Arab residents, in 
moments of rising national feelings, but always and forever, outlaws” (Mihri 1998 cited 
in Baraka 2008). 
The debate in this section does not address the political problem of the Palestinians in 
Lebanon, but it concentrates purely on the humanitarian issue and sphere. This is 
because for any democratic system to be functioning properly it must take into 
consideration the aspect of guaranteeing the right for humans to live in dignity and 
without any coercion, oppression or persecution. Here, when we speak about humans 
and their rights, we do not distinguish or differentiate between whether this human is an 
authentic first class citizen or a refugee, as humans in general, regardless of their race, 
identity, state of law, colour or social class, are guaranteed by law the right to live in 
dignity, have a proper education, express their thoughts and work within their fields of 
expertise, etc. In this context, Robert Dahl argues: 
                                                          
48 The Economist, “A history of the hapless”, [online], available at: < 
http://www.economist.com/node/9265914?story_id=E1_JNGVJTQ>, [Accessed April  2011] 
134 
 
“For one thing, extensive political rights and liberties are integral to democracy:  
they are necessary to the functioning of the institutions that distinguishes democracy 
from other kinds of political orders. The rights and liberties are therefore an element 
in what we often mean today by democracy or the democratic process or a democratic 
country” (Dhal 1999:166). 
Dahl’s above argument supports the point of view we have raised, which argue that 
the standards adopted in the classification of the state and its democratic political 
system depend on how the citizen is treated in the land within the jurisdiction of the 
rule of that system. In other words, any injustice, discrimination and mistreatment 
those citizens suffer, in general, including the displaced and migrants, of course, 
leads to the full absence of democracy, and it is therefore not valid in any way to 
describe any political system that does not respect human rights as a democracy. 
 
The 1951 convention relating the status of refugees provides in its Article 1 a general 
definition of the term "refugee". The term applies to any person who: 
 
 “as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded 
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality 
and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling, to avail himself of the protection of 
that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his 
former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, 
is unwilling to return to it".
49
 
 
Furthermore, the minimum standards for treating refugees and their basic rights were set 
out by the convention. It also gave them a juridical status and contained clauses on their 
rights to gainful employment and welfare, their right to transfer their assets to their new 
country, as well as addressing the issue of travel documents and identity papers, and the 
applicability of fiscal charges.
50
 In addition to guaranteeing the refugee the right of self-
employment, liberal professions, access to public education, freedom of movement 
                                                          
49 United Nations Human Rights, “Fact Sheet No.20, Human Rights and Refugees”,[online], available at:< 
www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet20en.pdf >, [Accessed April 30 2011] 
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including the right to travel outside the country, the convection requires that its 
provisions are applied without discrimination as to race, religion or country of origin 
and also calls for the protection of the refugee which must be seen in the broader 
context of the protection of human rights.
51
The above gives us an overview of the rights 
of refugees in any country that hosts them. These rights, if analysed closely, almost do 
not differ in substance from the rights given to indigenous citizens. In all cases, it gives 
the refugee the natural rights to live a decent and non-discriminatory life.  
Even though the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon do not fall under the convention of 
1951, but rather under the UNRWA’s area of operations, it is palpable that they do not 
enjoy the minimum rights according to which they can live without humiliation or 
insult
52
. They are banned from access to basic rights like work, freedom of movement, 
travel, medical care and more. In other words, they are “deprived of almost all civil 
rights and subjected to various forms of marginalization -- spatial, institutional and 
economic -- and this marginalization is often linked to exclusion and violence” 
(Suleiman 2006). Palestinians are treated as a special category of foreigners in Lebanese 
law, where they are denied the basic rights granted to Lebanese nationals while also not 
being guaranteed the rights laid out for refugees in international agreements. Said 
observes that “the distinction between International Law norms for refugees and those 
stipulated in Lebanese law is striking. There is no provision granting any sort of 
preferred status to foreigners who have resided in Lebanon for more than three 
years...Lebanese Law does not afford a separate legal status to them or even define the 
term “refugee”” (Wadi’a 2001 cited in Suleiman 2006). In this context, it is argued that 
it is mistaken to consider that enhancing the Palestinians civil rights will somehow 
impinge on their rights as refugees. Like everyone, citizens and non-citizens alike, 
Palestinians have basic human rights; they have both rights as both refugees and as 
human beings, and they are able to enjoy both at the same time. However, the Taif 
Agreement of 1989, which constitutes a ban against the naturalization of Palestinians 
and the Palestinian militia groups, leads, intentionally or unintentionally, to a deviation 
from the path in the proper treatment of the Palestinians. The Lebanese state, which is 
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52 Palestinians falling under the UNRWA’s area of operation and residing elsewhere like Jordan, are granted their basic and 
fundamental rights i.e. work, travel, education etc.   
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not interested in the resettlement of Palestinians in Lebanon, forgets that the 
Palestinians are people who must be dealt with humanely and properly until a just 
solution is found to their cause and thus they are able to return to their homeland.  
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are subject to discrimination when it comes to the 
exercise of their right to work, as they are banned from exercising quite a large number 
of jobs. Lebanese born Palestinians registered as refugees were prevented from working 
in c. 40-45 jobs by ministerial decision no. 621/1 of the 1964 law (Wadi’a 2001 cited in 
Suleiman 2006). This was changed by ministerial decree 67/1, but the amendments still 
left Palestinians unable to work in syndicated jobs or some professions of the private 
sector which prefer to employ nationals. In all this includes about 50 fifty private sector 
jobs, trades and professions: both manual and clerical jobs in administration and 
banking, laboratories and pharmacies, electronics, mechanics and maintenance, 
teaching, concierge, guard dyer, cook, butler and hairdresser, as well as other 
independent professions in the private sector such as trade business (all categories), 
engineering (all categories), patisserie, printing and publishing and car maintenance 
(Suleiman 2006). Thus in practice Palestinians are still unable to work in the most 
important jobs (Hoda 2008). Since they are excluded from the labour market, refugee 
households, and particularly young refugee men, are in a unique position compared to 
refugees in other parts of the diaspora (Ibid). 
 
The Lebanese Law which violates Lebanon's obligations under Article 5 of the 
International 
Covenant on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) prevents 
Palestinians from acquiring or inheriting property, or registering real estate which they 
had bought or were buying in instalments (Suleiman 2006). A report of Amnesty 
International describes the discrimination against Palestinians with regard to their rights 
to own property. In combination with the poor conditions of the refugee camps, this 
“creates a situation whereby Palestinian refugees are discriminated against in their 
enjoyment of the right to adequate housing”, which violates Article 11(1) of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Suleiman 2006). 
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Palestinian refugees that are not allowed to have access to Lebanese government 
hospitals or other related health services (Suleiman 2006) are also forbidden the right to 
travel and the right of freedom of movement. The three different categories of 
Palestinian refugees mentioned above are distinguished by the different documents they 
are issued: (a) permanent residency cards and a renewable travel document valid for 
five years are issued to refugees who are registered with both UNRWA and DAPR; (b) 
those registered with the latter, but not the former, are issued the same residency card 
but a different travel document (Laissez Passer) valid for one year and renewable three 
times; (c) those registered with neither are issued no document and are designated as 
Non-ID refugees (Suleiman 2006). 
 
In conclusion, it is clear that most of the basic rights of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon 
are violated and wasted, and that they live in a state of repression. Additionally, 
Palestinians who live in completely closed camps, surrounded by troops belonging to 
the Lebanese army and lacking the minimum of services and infrastructure, are subject 
to the most types of racial discrimination, both from the state and the Lebanese citizens. 
It is argued that when democracies exist and when democratic systems are functioning 
properly, “it is generally expected that the authority’s willingness and capacity to 
violate human rights would be diminished” (Davenport & Armstrong 2004). However, 
in Lebanon, it does not happen this way, as is demonstrated in the above discussion 
which shows that Lebanon represses and violates the human rights of the Palestinians, 
while “theorists, policy makers, NGOs, revolutionaries and everyday citizens have long 
heralded political democracy as “a,” and perhaps even “the,” resolution to the problem 
of state repression” (Davenport & Armstrong 2004). 
 
4.2.4 Elections and Electoral Laws in Lebanon: The Downward Path 
 
Elections at all different levels are thought of as an essential cornerstone of democracy 
as well as one of democracy’s most important institutions. The Austrian-American 
economist and political scientist, Joseph Schumpeter, when defining democracy, 
highlights the existence of competitive elections. He argues that democracy “means 
only that the people have the opportunity of accepting or refusing the men who are to 
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rule them” (Schumpeter 1942: 284-285). Schumpeter’s definition shows the importance 
of elections in promoting democratic life and fostering any democratic system, but this 
does not necessarily mean that all elections will lead to the same outcome. For example, 
if a parliamentary election takes place, but is affected by fraud and bribery, the results 
will not lead to the strengthening of democracy; on the contrary, it will lead to the death 
of democracy. 
 However, the slogans of free and fair elections are not a new experience for the citizens 
of Lebanon. As in all elections they have experienced previously, such slogans 
manipulate the scene. In reality, these slogans do not exist, as elections are almost 
controlled, manipulated or, at best, are not genuinely competitive. In other words, in the 
context of democratic transition, free and fair elections are often the first institution of 
democratic governance that the public should experience, but this experience seems, to 
some extent, elusive in Lebanon, as the obstacles to having free and fair elections are 
enormous, beginning with foreign intervention and the influence of armed militias, and 
also including bribery and unrepresentative electoral laws.   
The influence of some armed militias inside Lebanon has often and still continues to 
intersect with the interests of some regional powers. Where interest coincided, these 
bodies used to get together in order to resolve the results of the parliamentary and 
presidential elections. Sometimes foreign interventions, and sometimes the narrow 
political calculations of some leaders associated with overseas powers, played an 
essential role in impeding access to an electoral law which represents the will of the 
Lebanese citizens, and thus impeded free and fair elections. For example, Syria, after 
the Taif Agreement, managed to play an important role in shaping the course of the 
electoral process, beginning with the electoral law and ending with the electoral process 
itself. So, the Taif Agreement did not succeed in stopping Syria from interfering, as the 
agreement which stipulated the withdrawal of Syrian troops stationed in Lebanon by 
1992 could not manage to have the pullout enforced. On the contrary, Safa argues that 
Lebanese laws, elections and key appointments were overseen and manipulated by 
Syrian intelligence officer for 15 years after the war ended in order to protect Syria’s 
interests (Safa 2010). 
It was stipulated by the 1989 Taif Agreement that elections to the Parliament shoulde 
organised around the muhafazat, the six large administrative districts covering Lebanon: 
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North Lebanon, Beirut, Mount Lebanon, Beqaa, Nabatiyya and South Lebanon. These 
large electoral districts were created so that candidates were required to appeal to a 
broad multi-sectarian constituency, which should help to foster and preserve national 
unity and discourage sectarian extremism. However, before the 1992 parliamentary 
elections, Syrian officials had concerns that some of their important allies might fail to 
win support amongst a broader base and therefore lose the election.
53
 Here, for the sake 
of safeguarding the interests of its allies, Syria intervened in re-shaping the electoral law 
in a way to ensure successful elections for its allies.
54
In 1996, elections in Mount 
Lebanon were carried out in the same way as in 1992, in violation of the Taif Accord.
55
 
The electoral districts were changed entirely for the 2000 elections. A meeting was held 
in November and December of 1999 between General Ghazi Kanaan, the head of Syrian 
military intelligence in Lebanon who later committed suicide in Syria, Bashar Assad 
and Salim al-Hoss, the Prime Minister of Lebanon, and other pro-Syrian politicians. The 
purpose was to finalise the details of a new electoral law, which saw the muhafazat 
divided into a total of 14 electoral districts.
56
 Once again, the House of Representatives 
approved an electoral law which was commensurate with Syria and its interests, and 
also the interests of its allies in Lebanon. 
Syria’s interference was not limited to shaping electoral laws, but extended to 
manipulating electoral lists and determining who can vote and who cannot. This was an 
important means whereby Syria could manipulate the electoral process. Some political 
elites in Lebanon have little else in common other than their obedience to Damascus. 
Syrian officials want to bridge these differences, whether they are political, sectarian or 
ideological, amongst their allies, which could be exploited by their opponents, and so 
they put pressure on their Lebanese protégés to run joint electoral lists, which are only 
composed with the involvement of Damascus.
57
 With regards to the manipulation of 
those eligible to vote, after the Taif Agreement some parliamentary elections were 
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influenced by attempts to both disenfranchise those who might vote against Syrian 
interests, or to extend citizenship to those who could be easily influenced to vote as 
required. Lebanese citizens abroad, including those with valid passports who owned 
property in Lebanon and returned regularly, were not allowed to vote by absentee ballot. 
This was not a surprising decision. It was not likely that the hundreds of thousands of 
Lebanese who fled Beirut during the 1989-90 siege by Syrian forces would vote for 
candidates approved by Damascus.
58
 
However, the external interference in Lebanon's parliamentary election does not include 
Syria alone, but also other countries such as Iran and the United States of America. 
Lebanon’s June national election of 2009, according to a Lebanese academic, was a box 
office success. It had: “shady politicians, foreign intrigue, bribes, meddling religious 
figures, beautiful women, sectarian allegations, recently exposed spy rings, 
fundamentalists collaborating with capitalists, the poor and oppressed voting for the rich 
and privileged” (Makdisi 2009) .  Because elections have seen all these events, they 
have also seen an unprecedented foreign interference. The Iranian President, Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad, said a week prior to the Lebanese 2009 elections that “the outcomes of 
the Lebanese elections will change the features of the region, hinting to a stronger 
Syrian-Iranian influence over Saudi-Egyptian influence”. 59  The US has also been 
accused of interference, particularly after visits by both Joe Biden and Hillary Clinton 
where is made clear that the US would not be pleased if the March 8
th
 Alliance, a broad 
coalition of Islamist, Maronite, leftist, nationalist, and pan-Arabist parties, was most 
successful in the forthcoming elections (Zunes 2009). 
The Lebanese elections, in addition to suffering from foreign interference, also suffer 
from the existence of illegal weapons, which have an impact on the attitudes of voters 
and candidates. In areas where Hezbollah exists, there is an absence of real competition 
among candidates, since you can only find a few candidates who dare to stand for 
election, and if they do, they will not be able to get the freedom of movement and meet 
people because of Hezbollah’s control of villages, towns and cities where they are 
present. As for voters, they are afraid of voting against Hezbollah, as they feel that there 
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59 Lebanese opposition claim election victory, while majority claim staying in power: , [online], available: 
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is nothing that lets them sense a real and immediate return of the power of the state that 
would protects them and their interests, jobs and rights. Therefore, they prefer to vote 
for Hezbollah, as voting for Hezbollah will not put their interests at risk. Moreover, 
Hezbollah, due to its military power, managed to prevent the parliamentary majority 
from ruling following the results of two consecutive elections in 2005 and 2009. In 
other words, if elections are meant to help determine which political party assumes 
power, then in Lebanon this definition does not apply. Hezbollah’s weapons have 
allowed it to impose its authority and prestige in spite of what was produced by the 
ballot boxes and, therefore, prevented the parliamentary majority from rule effectively. 
 
In addition, before each parliamentary election, the bribery market flourishes in 
Lebanon. For example, in 2009, the parliamentary elections shaped up to be “among the 
most expensive ever held anywhere, with hundreds of millions of dollars streaming into 
this small country from around the world” (Worth 2009). Lebanon has long been seen as 
a battleground for regional influence between Saudi Arabia, Iran and other countries in 
the region and the world, and these “arm their allies with campaign money in place of 
weapons” (Worth 2009). The 2009 election was “widely seen as the freest and most 
competitive to be held here in decades, with a record number of candidates taking part. 
But it may also be the most corrupt” (Worth 2009). Regarding this,  Transparency-
Lebanon reported in a press release published the day following the elections of 2009, 
“that several candidates gave money to some voters in exchange for their vote: a vote is 
worth 800 dollars in Zahle (Bekaa province), between 60 and 100 dollars in Saida 
(south) and can reach 3000 dollars in Zghorta (north).”60  
In addition to the above discussion, Lebanon suffers from several electoral problems: 
1. The absence of an individual commissions (independent of the Ministry of 
Interior) to oversee elections.  
2. The lack of proportional representation. 
3. Voting age (currently 21). 
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corruption-made-lebanon-michel-murr-akary> 
142 
 
4. A strict law that controls the election spending money.  
5.  A strict law that controls the output of party propaganda on TV and radio 
stations.  
To sum up, however, as noted and discussed in an earlier chapter, elections, as a key 
precondition for accessing democracy, sometimes become a key ingredient for the 
encryption of the truth and, therefore, are no longer in themselves sufficient evidence of 
a true and efficient democracy. In Lebanon, based on the above discussion, elections do 
not seem to be a source of promoting democratic life and fostering the so-called 
democratic system. Moreover, for democracy to be functioning properly, competitive 
elections should take place. In addition, if democracy “means only that the people have 
the opportunity of accepting or refusing the men who are to rule them” (Schumpeter 
1942:284-285), Lebanon’s democracy is some distance from this definition, as the 
people do not play a key role in accepting or refusing candidates, due to the influences 
they are exposed to. In other words, if a parliamentary election takes place, and for 
example is overwhelmed by fraud and bribery, the results will not lead to the 
strengthening of democracy; on the contrary, they will lead to the death of democracy.
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5. Chapter Five : Lebanese Democracy and the External 
Hegemony 
 
5.1 Introduction  
Discussions of sovereignty always associate the idea with the emergence of the modern 
nation state in Europe after the treaty of Westphalia of 1648, which ended the religious 
Thirty Years War. This treaty recognised the principle of nation-state sovereignty as a 
supreme and absolute authority of the state over its territory. In other words, it is the 
state’s right to function and exercise its power within the national territory without any 
interference from any other country. Thus, Westphalian sovereignty shaped the concept 
of non-intervention in the affairs of other states, meaning that the internal power 
structure of a state should be autonomous and free from external interference and 
controlled by those within that state. Put simply, it refers to the absence of powerful 
external influences and the autonomy of internal power structures (Krasner 2001:2). 
In spite of being a nation state that achieved its independence in 1943, Lebanon has not 
been able, voluntarily or forcibly, to achieve full sovereignty over its territory, and has 
also not been able to prevent many countries from interfering in its internal affairs and 
foreign policy-making, as imposed by the Westphalia treaty. Moreover, Lebanese 
leaders have facilitated the involvement of foreign actors in their domestic affairs, 
allowing domestic political structures to be easily influenced, altered and transformed 
by external powers, like Israel, Syria, Iran and other countries.  
5.2 Israel’s Occupation  
The Palestinian resistance has challenged Lebanon’s government, its independence and 
sovereignty by using its territory as a launching pad for attacking Israel. Thereafter, 
Israel became more concerned in becoming an active part of the Lebanese political 
equilibrium. In other words, it can be suggested that the Palestinian resistance which 
was led by Yasser Arafat instigated Israel to occupy Lebanon. However, this does not 
mean that Israel did not have ambitions in Lebanon, but Yasser Arafat and his armed 
groups were the alleged reason for Israel to implement its plans. A clear and explicit 
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quote from the first Prime Minister of Israel, David Ben-Gurion, confirms Israel’s 
ambitions in Lebanon:     
“… We should prepare to go over to the offensive with the aim of smashing Lebanon, 
Transjordan and Syria … The weak point of the Arab coalition is Lebanon [for] the 
Moslem regime is artificial and easy to undermine. A Christian state should be 
established, with its southern border on the Litani River. We will make an alliance 
with it” (Mowles 1986:1351).    
The above Ben-Gurion quote was made before the establishment of the PLO, and thus, 
before the starting of any kind of military activity against Israel. Therefore, this quote 
reveals that Israel’s plans are prior to any military activity which used Lebanon as a 
launching pad to attack Israel. However, after the PLO was established and began 
infiltration and raids into Israel, Israeli officials were swayed towards implementing 
Ben-Gurion’s strategy (Habib 2009:88).  
Israel, after the PLO’s regular attacks, started thinking of a solution to their problem 
with the PLO. Their strategy was based on “approaching Christian and Shiite 
inhabitants of the South who strongly resented the Palestinians’ presence among 
them…” (Harik 2005:34). It was in 1976 when a local militia was formed with the 
support of Israel. This militia which “would help to repulse the PLO, thereby protecting 
Israel’s northern frontier” (Harik 2005:34), consisted of locals from the southern 
villages and renegade units of the Lebanese army, and was led by Saad Haddad, “a 
Christian who had been officer in the Lebanese army” (Harik 2005:34). However, raids 
continued across the border continued to be targeted at Israel’s northern settlements in 
spite of this defensive strategy. With this failure, Israel found itself compelled to follow 
a single option: intervene militarily. In 1978, the Israel Defensive Forces invaded south 
Lebanon in order to destroy the PLO and establish a zone of occupation. Later, after the 
invasion had met its goal, Israel gave 23 strategic strongpoints to Haddad and his militia 
in the south before withdrawing its troops (Habib 2009:89). This was the start of what 
Tel Aviv called its “security belt”, or the “State of Free Lebanon” as proclaimed by 
Haddad on 18 April 1979 (Habib 2009:89).  
Soon after, and revealing that Israel had not succeeded completely, but temporarily, in 
its invasion of 1978, Ariel Sharon, the Defense Minister of Israel from 1981 to 1983, 
announced that “we have to establish a buffer zone in Lebanon as it is clear that the 
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Lebanese government will do nothing to stop terrorism. The establishment of such a 
zone will obviously mean the annexation of part of Lebanese territory” (Mowles 
1986:1351). Ariel Sharon’s announcement took effect in 1982. In practice it meant a 
large Israeli invasion of Lebanon on 6 June 1982. Tel Aviv justified this by claiming 
they were combating terrorism in the region (Harik 2005:35). That argument is disputed 
by Israeli authors Zeev Schiff and Ehud Yaari, who suggest that the real motive was a 
desire on the part of the right-wing Likud Part to destroy any remaining resistance from 
the PLO and Syria and establish a unilateral Pax Israeli in the region (Harik 2005:35). 
The operation, codenamed ‘Peace of Galilee’, involved the Israeli army advancing all 
the way to Beirut in order to break the power of the Palestinians and their Muslim-leftist 
allies, and also to form an agreement with Israel’s Christian allies in the hope of making 
a treaty between the two countries (Harik 2005:35). The Israelis’ intention was clear, 
they argued: “If that could be done then Syria would be the odd man out” (Harik 
2005:35).  In 1983, Lebanon signed a peace agreement with Israel under American 
auspices, despite Syria’s opposition. Later, the strategy’s aims were not fulfilled due to 
firm opposition from pro-Syrian groups and the assassination of the late President 
Bachir Gemayel, who was the “militiaman Israel has counted on to swing the peace 
treaty” (Harik 2005:35). Gemayel’s aim was to sweep every inch of Lebanon clean of 
Palestinians and to radically alter the political system in favour of the Christians (Harik 
2005:35). 
Israel’s occupation lasted for more than 20 years, but during the occupation the political 
and military institutions in Israel did not seek only to expel Yasser Arafat and his militia 
from Lebanon but also to impose a peace which would lead to Lebanon becoming an 
independent state that would coexist peacefully with Israel and be an integral part of the 
free world (Schiff, Yaari & Friedman 1984). Ghassan Tueni, the Lebanese thinker, 
diplomat and politician and the father of the assassinated MP Gibran Tueni, raises 
questions about Israel’s objectives, which, according to their claims, aim to impose 
peace and help in establishing an independent state. Tueni asks:  
“What better proof of this can there be than the very name given to the Israeli 
invasion: "Peace for Galilee"? To occupy almost half of a country, destroy its capital, 
disrupt its economy, ferociously kill its civilian population by the thousands-for the 
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sake of “Peace for Galilee"-is indeed a very strange notion of peace” (Tuéni 1982: 
85). 
The horror of Israeli actions during the occupation did not leave room to doubt that Israel’s 
goals had nothing to do with imposing peace, but rather were the imposition of the Israeli will 
and political vision on Lebanon for the sake of Israel’s national and economic security. In The 
Battle of Beirut, Jansen suggests that if the IDF were to occupy Lebanon for a long time, this 
would give Israel the opportunity to achieve a degree of socio-economic development in the 
nearby region, which, geographically and historically, is an integral part of Eretz Yisrael (Jansen 
1982:121). While occupying the region, Israel tried to take control of the water resources of the 
Litani River as well as establish a new political order (Habib 2009:92). Tueni, with regard to 
this, argues that “Zionist literature has consistently maintained that the Jewish National Home, 
and later Israel, needed the water of the Litani and the land south of it” (Tuéni 1982:93). 
In sum, the results of the Israeli occupation of Lebanon were disastrous, as in addition 
to the violation of Lebanese sovereignty and the destruction of Lebanese institutions 
and cities, the occupation led to deepening divisions within Lebanese society. Chris 
Mowles argues that “the most lasting effect of the episode is the contribution it has 
made to the process of confessionalism and cantonisation which has rapidly accelerated 
in Lebanon as a whole since the Israeli invasion” (Mowles 1986:1364). Of course, Israel 
was not to succeed in its plans without the help of local political and armed forces in 
Lebanon. However, the greatest responsibility lies with Israel, in addition to other 
external powers, in violating Lebanese sovereignty, influencing, altering and 
transforming domestic political structures, and weakening the Lebanese institutions, 
thus preventing and sabotaging the democratic system from functioning and developing.   
 
5.3 Syria’s Tutelage over Lebanon: Occupation?   
In the previous section, it was argued that the presence of Israeli troops in Lebanon was 
that of an occupying force which invaded Lebanon to achieve a set of political and 
economic objectives. Syria, the other neighboring country to Lebanon, had an active 
role in Lebanese political life. Against the will of a significant number of the Lebanese 
people, and contrary to the Taif agreement, the Syrian army stayed in Lebanon for more 
than thirty years, before its withdrawal in 2005, in addition to its military intelligence 
apparatus, which had the right to report and decide on every arcane detail. During that 
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period, there was division in Lebanon over the description of the Syrian forces 
operating in the country. Syria’s Lebanese allies used to strongly reject describing Syria 
as an occupying force, while others who were at odds with Syria, used to describe it as 
an occupying force. To reach a solution for this controversy, international law should be 
taken into consideration as providing the resolution to this problematic issue.  
Eric V. Thompson argues that two primary routes exist for establishing a legitimate 
conduct of affairs between states under international law, including the conduct of 
military intervention (Thompson 2002:73). The first route involves conforming to the 
letter and spirit of the written law, including treaties, charters, covenants and other open 
agreements between sovereign states.  The Charter and Resolutions of the UN is the 
most widely recognised written corpus of international law in the post-war period, and 
therefore actions that seek to uphold and enforce UN resolutions are seen as most 
legitimate. The second route, as outlined by Thompson, involves following the norms of 
traditional international law, which have evolved from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 
as a means to regulate international relations and discourage openly aggressive 
behaviour. This tradition included the principle of non-intervention by the early 
twentieth century. Thompson concludes unequivocally that, by either route, the Syrian 
intervention in Lebanon was not permitted under international law. 
On the one hand, it is true that the Syrian Intervention in Lebanon took place at the 
request of the Lebanese President and the Lebanese Front, to support them in holding 
back the Lebanese National Movement and Palestinian armed forces (Krayem 1997), 
but on the other, this intervention did not take place according to a formal treaty 
between two sovereign states. Here, a question arises: Should this intervention be 
regarded as legitimate since it was called for by the President, supported by a certain 
armed political group, and since it took place during compelling circumstances, and was 
based on prior Syrian political terms related to political concessions which are in favour 
of Syria itself? The Syrian military intervention in Lebanon was purely a Syrian 
strategic interest and not a peacekeeping force seeking to stop the civil war: How can an 
outside force intervene to stop a civil war at a time when it becomes a part of the on-
going conflict, and thus a warring party? To the Syrian Government, infighting in 
Lebanon weakens Syria and facilitates the penetration of Syrian security. As a Syrian 
official put it: “it is difficult to distinguish between the security of the Lebanon in the 
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wider sense of the word, and the security of Syria” (Habib 2009:102) Moreover, if we 
take into consideration how the deal was struck, we can infer that the intervention did 
not take place to save Lebanese interests, and thus help the government regain its role, 
authority and prestige. Eric V. Thompson explains how things happened: 
“Syria, frustrated by the Palestinian assertiveness in Lebanon and concerned that the 
breakdown of the Lebanese Army would lead to chaos, agreed to protect Franjiyih on 
the condition that he calls early elections for his successor. Franjiyih agreed, and 
Syrian troops, disguised as members of Sa’iqah, a Syrian-backed Palestinian 
organization, fended off the attack on the Presidential Palace. Subsequently, 
Franjiyih did call for early elections. A candidate favoured by Syria, Elias Sarkis, 
was elected president by the parliament in May 1976. As the spring of 1976 
progressed, Palestinian forces strengthened their hold on much of Lebanon, laying 
siege to a number of Christian areas. Faced with an emerging de facto partition of 
Lebanon, and a potentially chaotic breakdown of its south-western neighbour, Syria 
sent armoured columns into Lebanon on the night of May 31. Syrian forces, 
although at times facing stiff resistance, quickly broke the siege of Christian 
territories in northern Lebanon and advanced to Beirut, giving Christians the upper 
hand, and putting Palestinian forces on the defensive .Virtually overnight, the Syrian 
Army became a dominating force in the Lebanese milieu” (Thompson 2002:73-74). 
Consequently, from the moment of the Syrian military intervention, a new phase began 
in Lebanon, while Hafez al-Assad, the late Syrian President, started to look for a 
legitimate reason for the existence of his 40,000 troops in Lebanon. Assad could find 
little support or acceptance for his intervention in the international community, and was 
challenged with either making the Syrian action seem legitimate or being the target of 
international pressure to call back his troops from Lebanon (Thompson 2002:73-74). He 
chose the former option, and from 1976 onwards Assad’s government vigorously 
attempted to establish a de facto legitimacy for its actions. It gave its policies the 
appearance, retroactively, of compliance with international law, and tried to assert that 
they would result in outcomes that were perceived as “beneficial” on the international 
stage (Thompson 2002:73-74). 
The Syrian government was therefore later able to find legitimate reasons for the 
presence of its soldiers in Lebanon. Meeting in Cairo on June 8, the Council of the Arab 
League issued a resolution calling for national reconciliation and unity in Lebanon. 
They also demanded that a “symbolic Arab security force” be sent out in order to 
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replace the Syrian soldiers and maintain order and stability (Thompson 2002:75). While 
Syria did support the resolution soon after Syrian officials began to move away from 
following its guidelines. On June 13, a statement was issued by Syria’s Information 
Minister arguing that Syria had entered Lebanon to foster “a climate favourable to 
political dialogue” and maintain its security, and that it was therefore to continue its 
presence until this task had been completed (Thompson 2002:75).
 
 The Arab League 
met again to discuss the Lebanese issue in Cairo and Riyadh in October 1978. This 
resulted in a resolution being adopted on October 18 which transformed the Arab 
Security Force of 2,500 soldiers into a 30,000 strong body called the Arab Deterrent 
Force (ADF). Its mandate included helping the Lebanese authorities to re-assert their 
control over public utilities and institutions, to impose and maintain a cease-fire, and to 
oversee the withdrawal of all armed groups to the positions that they had occupied 
before April 13 1975. Although this may have been intended to damage Syria’s 
influence in the region, and certainly appeared to do so, the resolution actually worked 
in their favour. No consensus was reached among the Arab States and no firm plan was 
drawn up for how the 30,000 troops would be allotted from each state. The decision was 
rather left to the Lebanese president, Sarkis, who had been put in his position with the 
support of Syria. He therefore decided that most of the ADF, up to 25,000 men, should 
be comprised of Syrian soldiers (Thompson 2002:75). Syria, operating under the guise 
of legitimacy from the Arab Deterrent Force, and thus “under the auspices of a 
multilateral organization” (Thompson 2002:75) managed to create a cloak of legitimacy 
for its operations. This, along with time, made Syria a de facto authority which could 
not be overcome, and thus made the Syrian government an integral part of any political 
solution for the Lebanese crisis.  
In 1989, as discussed in an earlier chapter, and after certain regional and international 
circumstances, the warring forces and Lebanese politicians went to the city of Taif in 
Saudi Arabia to discuss a solution to the Lebanese crisis. 
The Syrian government, due to its position as a strong partner in resolving the crisis of 
Lebanon, managed during the discussions of the Taif agreement to impose what was 
seen as a Syrian interest. Albert Mansur, the Lebanese politician who participated in the 
drafting of the Taif agreement, argues in his book “The Coup against Taif”, that the 
agreement organised a gradual withdrawal of the Syrian military from Lebanon 
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according to a phased plan (Mansur 1993:93). The first phase, according to Mansur, 
required a full withdrawal of Syrian troops and security forces from all regions into 
Bekaa region and the entrances to western Bekaa. After the withdrawal, the legitimate 
forces of the Lebanese army and security forces were to be deployed. This Phase, as 
Mansur reports, ended two years after the adoption of constitutional reforms. Phase 
Two started after the gathering of Syrian troops in new locations and according to an 
agreement between the Lebanese and Syrian governments, in which both of them 
decided for how long the Syrian army would stay in Bekaa.  
However, the formula mentioned in Mansur’s book, which talks about linking the 
fulfilment of the two phases with constitutional reforms, was actually a deception that 
Syria was able to pass off during the Taif negotiations. In other words, Syria linked the 
accomplishment and completion of Lebanese sovereignty and independence to 
constitutional reforms that had to be realised under the supervision of the Syrian army. 
Of course, as discussed in an earlier chapter, none of these reforms called for by Taif 
agreement were implemented due to the pressure brought to bear by Syria on the 
Lebanese government, as, if the reforms had been implemented, then the Syrian 
government would have lost all of the excuses it had for keeping its army in Lebanon.  
What supports this argument is a statement published in the Al-Nahar Lebanese 
newspaper by the Syrian Vice-President at that time. In this statement he said in that he 
hoped that everybody would read the Taif agreement correctly. No one could impose on 
the Syrian government any explanations or concepts that were not contained in the text. 
Syria, according to the Vice-President, would guarantee the adoption of the political 
reforms in a constitutional way, and there were primary and fundamental parts of these 
reforms that has not been discussed or implemented yet, some of which were related to 
the abolition of the political sectarianism (Mansur 1993:216).  
Syria has often considered Lebanon a key part of its territory (Habib 2009:103) and has 
always refused to acknowledge Lebanese legitimacy (Slomich 1998-1999). It therefore 
interpreted the Taif agreement based on the measurement of its strategic interests. 
Moreover, Syria dealt with Lebanese affairs as Syrian internal affairs, which caused a 
split within Lebanon. In his book, Albert Mansur, the official who had, and still has, 
strong ties with the Syrian regime, refers to the aspects that prove the “luring” of Syrian 
officials, after Taif, to intervene in Lebanon’s internal affairs. Of course, Mansur does 
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not mention that Syrian officials intervened because of their own desire and an interest, 
but rather he states they were persuaded by certain Lebanese officials to do so. In fact, 
Mansur’s argument does not negate the desire of the Syrian officials to intervene but 
rather confirms it, since a powerful force like the Syrian government and its officials 
could not be pulled to intervene if they did not have a vested interest or need to do so. 
Moreover, using the term “lure” legitimised the intervention and provoked a state of 
illusion, which showed that the intervention was requested by Lebanese officials. 
Mansur argues that “luring” the Syrian officials to intervene directly and on daily basis 
in internal Lebanese affairs, and the constant bullying of some Lebanese politicians and 
officials for some Syrian officials, and thus, heeding this bulling by the latter , turned 
the “brothers in Syria” into actual parties in the internal conflicts and part of it (Mansur 
1993:93). Mansur continues by stating that the daily interventions for some Syrian 
officials created a gap and consisted in a contradiction between the stated policy of “our 
sister Syria” and the reality.  
     
In his book, which was written shortly after Taif agreement, Mansur surmised that this 
kind of relationship, i.e. “luring” Syrians to become involved in each and every case, 
whether essential or not, is embodied by four risks (Mansur 1993:93): 
 
 
       1. The prolonged diminishing of national sovereignty and the persistent 
confiscation of the national decision. 
 
      2. Public freedoms suffer a blow and the media freedom gets phased out. 
 
3. More economic abandonment and backwardness.  
 
4. Serious threat to destabilize Lebanon, its unique co-existence, freedom, 
distinctive democracy and final independent entity.  
 
These risks mentioned by Mansur became facts, since the Syrian officials did not stop, 
following the Taif agreement until the date of their withdrawal, interfering in the details 
of Lebanese political life. As Mansur suggested at the time, and which subsequently 
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proved true, this threatened the religious co-existence between different sects, which is 
based on a composite democracy, to the point of loss.  
Marwan Hamadeh, a strong ally of Syria before 2000 and who later became one of 
Syria’s bitter enemies, believes that the civil war was the beginning of a trend that 
moved toward the abolition of Lebanese democratization. He argues that Syria and 
Israel both took advantage of unrest among the Lebanese people to gain more power in 
Lebanon and launch proxy wars (Hamadeh 2009). Hamadeh, who survived an 
assassination attempt on the 1
st
 of October 2004, revealed to the researcher during an 
interview  a part of his experience with the Syrian government during the post Taif era, 
particularly after 2000. He reported that when he was back at the ministry of the 
displaced and the ministry of economy and trade, he and his political allies still had 
contacts amongst Syrians, but that their relationships were becoming increasingly tense. 
He went on to say that this was particularly because they could not accept the fact that 
the negotiations they usually engaged in with the Syrians, a kind of political negotiation 
with Damascus involving the Vice President, Foreign Minister and the Chief of Staff, 
had changed: their negotiations had become limited to dialogue with the Chief of 
Intelligence in Anjar, who was, at that time, leading the Syrian forces operating in 
Lebanon.  Hamadeh argues that by shifting their channels of negotiations to dialogue 
with a military commander, “they” meant to downgrade “us” and try to expand their 
influence from the spheres of politics and security to other areas -, “administration, 
culture, finance, economy, everything”. The result was that Lebanon began to move 
towards a time where it would merely be a copy of the Syrian regime. 
 
Referring to the transformation of a system which was committed to functioning 
through democratic means into a militarized political system in Lebanon, in the hands 
of the military Syrian governor with a military mentality, Hamadeh talked of how the 
Lebanese officers, under the tutelage of the Syrian army, became more important than 
ministers; the intelligence became more important than higher civil service, and the 
whole system of the public administration was turned upside down. He spoke of how if 
you wanted to be promoted, then you would have to go to Anjar (where the commander 
of Syrian Forces operating in Lebanon, was based), not to the public service office. 
According to Hamadeh the system was turning ugly, corrupting everything – the 
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President, the Speaker of the House, who was already their man – and increasingly 
interfering with the government (Hamadeh 2009). 
  
Hamadeh reported that, referring to the corruption in which the Syrian army was 
involved, no contract in Lebanon could be signed without the Syrians having their 
share. He felt that the whole country was becoming a subdued western province of the 
Syrian regime. He argued that back in 1991, Lebanon signed a convention with Syria, 
which, according to him, left so much space for interpretation that in every field there 
would be a bilateral agreement that would fill the framework called the Treaty of 
Brotherhood and coordination. In fact, according to Hamadeh, what happened was that 
in all fields there were normal agreements, like between any other friendly countries, 
except on foreign policy and security, where they went without the agreement of the 
parliament. This made Lebanese foreign policy totally dependent on Syria and it was 
called “The unit tracks”. In the field of security everything was linked and everything 
would go through channels: up to Syria with information, down from Syria with 
instructions, to the army, internal security forces, state security forces, etc. The result 
can, therefore, be described as a kind of web that prevented Lebanon from doing 
anything. The internal coup d’état that bubbled up because of this situation had 
gradually been eating the Lebanese constitution from the inside. If by any chance the 
parliament or the government took any decision that the Syrian regime would not like, 
even on detailed things. Hamadeh gave an example about the extent of the violation and 
Syria’s interference in Lebanese affairs. He said: 
 
“At one time we had a law on the procedures in the tribunal; we took a few measures 
to relieve the system and make it more democratic, move towards a kind of 
democratization. The majority voted, then, a week later, Mr Berri, the Speaker, was 
forced to revoke the law. He was even threatened with losing his position as Speaker 
of the House if he did not go along with it” (Hamadeh 2009). 
 
Nouhad el Machnouk, a media man and an MP, revealed in an interview with the Al-
Mustaqbal newspaper on 30 July 2011 a number of events which show the absolute 
authority that the Syrian government had over Lebanon and its interference in every 
detail of political life, from appointing loyal staff, to fabricating charges against those 
who did not surrender to its commands. He said that in 1995, during a meeting with the 
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Lebanese Army Commander, Emile Lahoud, who later became the President of 
Lebanon, he was told about how the latter had heard he was being appointed to 
Commander while sitting at home. When Machnouk asked how he got this position, 
Lahoud answered: “President Assad wants a person who can feel comfortable within 
Lebanon, and Assad, will hand over power to his son later, and the only one that relaxes 
his son, is me” (El Machnouk 2011). Another incident exposed by Machnouk was when 
the assassinated former Prime Minister, Rafic Hariri, met with Bashar Assad, the 
President of Syria, on 2 December 2003. In that meeting, which took place in Syria and 
was attended by three Syrian intelligence commanders, Assad asked Hariri to sell his 
shares in Annahar, the Lebanese daily newspaper. This request, according to Machnouk, 
was to remove the political cover that the newspaper enjoyed. The third incident 
happened when Machnouk himself was charged, by the Syrian intelligence operating in 
Lebanon, of dealing with Israel. The settlement that was later reached in order that 
ensure that the charges he was facing were dropped, was his shying away from Rafic 
Hariri’s circle of advisers, and then leaving Lebanon.  
 
These kinds of daily and constant interventions, which served to completely disable the 
official institutions, left the Lebanese state without any matters to deal with it. It simply 
implemented orders from the Syrian government and its military representative in 
Lebanon. In a personal interview conducted by the researcher in 2008, Saad Hariri, the 
former Prime Minister of Lebanon used these facts to argue that the democratic system 
of Lebanon is in danger because of this kind of interference (Hariri 2008). He believes 
that the democratic political system in Lebanon constitutes a threat to Syria, which is 
why Lebanon has witnessed, and is still witnessing, such a level of intervention. On the 
other hand, this kind of intervention did not constitute any embarrassment to a group of 
officials and political parties, as their relationships and association with the Syrian 
regime was governed by special and strategic interests that deprived them of viewing 
such interventions as unacceptable or as sabotaging and disrupting the Lebanese State 
and its institutions. In other words, this group of politicians, officials and political 
parties accepted that Syria enjoyed a full mandate over Lebanon, as long as it 
guaranteed their achieving their private and strategic interests. For example, the 
Secretary General of Hezbollah, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah’s “historical” speech given in 
2005 during a ceremony to thank Syria, which had been organized by the March 8 
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political coalition, did not mention any negative aspects of the thirty years during which 
Syrian troops were present in Lebanon. Nasrallah, who addressed the masses in the 
name, and as the leader, of a pro-Syria political coalition, summarized a long history of 
relationships with the Syrian regime and the era of its presence in Lebanon. Nasrallah 
stated in his speech that “we would like to offer our thanks to the resisting Syrian army, 
which stood at our side during all the years of defence and resistance” (Noe & Blanford 
2007:321)
.
 Nasrallah, who also extended his thanks to the Syrian President Bashar 
Assad, said: “Your presence in Lebanon is not material or military; you are present in 
our hearts and souls, and in our past, present and future” (Nasr Allah, Noe & Blanford 
2007:321). Moreover, Nasrallah showed full loyalty, and the loyalty of those political 
parties on whose behalf he was speaking, to the Syrian regime when he said: 
 
“To Syria- to which the will of God, history, geography, kinship, and the common 
fate has bound us- we reiterate today our gratitude and solidarity, and wish for it a 
life of dignity and pride, and a head held high. We want Syria to remain the den of 
lions it always was, and want to proclaim: Long live al-Assad’s Syria! The den of 
lions in Damascus will always be a den for all the lions in Lebanon!” (Noe & 
Blanford 2007:321)
.
    
 
  This speech, in this sense, should be enough to demonstrate the links between the 
Syrian regime and this political coalition. Moreover, it reveals the close correlation 
between the Syrian regime and this political coalition, led by Nasrallah. This speech, if 
looked at deeply, shows the blind subordination of certain Lebanese political parties and 
leaders to the politics of Syria. We should ask ourselves: what does it mean for a 
Lebanese leader to include in his speech words of praise to a foreign army, a foreign 
country, and the head of a foreign state?  It means, of course, that the presence of the 
Syrian army in Lebanon and the Syrian regime’s intervention was of great importance 
to this political group. Moreover, accepting the actions of the Syrian government and its 
army in Lebanon, or turning a blind eye to it, means that this political group preferred 
their own private interest over the national interest. For example, Hezbollah had the 
ambition of keeping its weapons, regardless of the cost at the national level, and even if 
this cost was breaching Lebanese sovereignty, corruption, suppression of freedoms, 
interference in appointing employees, ministers, army commanders and even the head 
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of the Lebanese state. Thus, Hezbollah, with all that it represents, was covering the 
excesses of the Syrian regime in Lebanon in order to achieve its own interests.  
Unlike some, who argue that the Syrian regime intervened in Lebanon to restore peace, 
it appears to the researcher, following the argument above, that the Syrian army did not 
enter Lebanon to restore peace, as how can a military force which intervenes to bring 
peace become a party involved in war? Is it not the duty of peace forces to create and 
establish a buffer zone between warring parties? Furthermore, how does a foreign army 
which aims to establish peace become an essential partner in the agreement that aims at 
stopping the war? Is it not logical that the parties involved in signing the peace 
agreement are those who were fighting during the war? These questions may lead to the 
conclusion that Syria, the partner which became involved in the Taif agreement, was a 
partner in the events that lead to the Taif agreement, that is to say the Lebanese civil war. 
Thereafter, Syria did not contribute in the reconciliation process between the disputing 
parties, but was rather amongst the rival groups.  
To sum up, one of the parties which contributed to igniting the Lebanese crisis and 
resolving it, according to Syria’s terms, was Syria itself. However, Syria was not to 
succeed in its political project without the help of the Lebanese ruling class, some of 
which have governed for Syria and some of which have opposed it. If, therefore, the 
Lebanese powers worked together to build a stronger, democratic Lebanon, outside 
interference, i.e. from Syria, would not have occurred. Nevertheless, Syria is not 
blameless in this affair: in the pursuit of its own interests it infringed on Lebanon’s 
sovereignty. In doing so, Syria played a key role in undermining Lebanon’s political 
institutions, sometimes removing them altogether, and weakened democracy in the 
country. In short, Syria’s actions stopped Lebanon progressing towards democratization 
and development. 
In, short, since before the Lebanese civil war, which broke out in 1975, until after 
the Taif agreement of 1989, Lebanon remained a place of conflict, strife, intervention 
of, and competition between, different external forces. Apparently, these interventions 
resulted in huge violations of Lebanese sovereignty. As argued in the introduction of 
this chapter, “Westphalian sovereignty refers to the autonomy of domestic authority 
structures—that is, the absence of authoritative external influences” (Krasner 2001:2). 
But, what appears from the above discussion, and the context of the facts that were 
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discussed, show the inapplicability of the definition on Lebanon.  In other words, what 
appears is that the external influences and interventions were authoritative enough to 
decide in domestic politics and to control the state institutions.  
Moreover, if democracy means “rule of the people”, then, does external intervention 
retain any role for the people to play? The “rule of the people” cannot go in parallel 
with foreign interference and occupation, and thus is no longer valid under these two 
conditions. For example, even if elections were held, they remain subject to the terms 
imposed by the foreign intervener and intervening power, and thus the role of the people 
means nothing more than contributing to a sham electoral process, which in no sense 
reflects their aspirations or helps them to achieve their ambitions.    
In the next chapter, firstly the Iranian role in Lebanon will be discussed. Iran, as a 
regional power and as an external key player in Lebanese domestic politics, had to be 
discussed here. But, the organic correlation between Iran and Hezbollah makes us 
incapable of separating the two topics. In other words, studying Hezbollah since its 
foundation will show the extent of the Iranian role, and will clarify the extent of this 
correlation and the impossibility of separation.  
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6. Chapter Six: Hezbollah State vs. March 14 State: Whose Political 
Agenda is more conducive to Democratic Lebanon?  
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In 2003 Thomas Friedman reported that when speaking with an Egyptian friend in Cairo 
she jested: ''President Bush: Take Syria -- get Lebanon for free’’ (Friedman 2003). This 
joke demonstrates how Lebanon became, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, 
equivalent to a hostage without any jurisdictions. Of course, the situation in Lebanon 
did not reach this point without cause or justification. Many factors lead to this: State 
weakness, the dependence of most officials and Lebanese parties on external forces, in 
addition to certain countries using Lebanon as an arena in order to settle scores with 
other countries. 
By the year 2000, the year when the Israeli forces withdrew from South Lebanon, the 
armed Hezbollah, which was leading the resistance against the Israeli occupation for 
nearly fifteen years, decided to act internally with the intention of becoming an active 
partner in domestic politics. But Hezbollah, which was supposed to hand over its 
weapons to the Lebanese state after the absence of reasons, kept its weapons. This led to 
the imbalance of power in Lebanon: on one side, an armed party partaking in support 
from Iran and Syria, which many agree is more powerful than the Lebanese state itself, 
and on the other, political parties, most of who had handed over their weapons to the 
Lebanese army after the civil war. 
It can be argued that at some point after 2000, two key players were in command of 
political power in Lebanon; Hezbollah and its allies, against the other political parties, 
which after 2005 put themselves under the banner of the March 14
th
 political coalition. 
This phase carried significant risks to Lebanon which had witnessed extraordinary 
divisions, assassinations and bombings. This period also saw an extraordinary weakness 
of the state's role in controlling the rhythm of political life in Lebanon. It revealed the 
extent of the state’s diminishment, the fragility of its institutions and its vulnerability to 
political parties, some of which are not registered yet. This raises some questions: Who 
is Hezbollah? And how did it grow up? What is the role of Iran? And how is it that this 
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armed party was able to reach the stage where it has become more powerful than the 
state and its army? In addition, who are the other political parties that are opposed to 
and are indeed still opposing Hezbollah? And finally how has Lebanon become divided 
into two rival factions, each with its own political agenda? 
This chapter will try to answer the above questions, in addition it will analyze two 
possible scenarios of state governance; the first, Hezbollah, and the second, the March 
14
th
 coalition, due to the fact that these two forces are the most important and influential 
parties in the country. Moreover, this chapter will seek to answer the following 
questions: what would happen to the Lebanese democratic system if Hezbollah came to 
power and the same question applied to the March 14
th
 coalition. Thus this chapter can 
be divided into three sections, the first will consider the history and development of 
Hezbollah, and the second will regard the equivalent factors for the March 14
th
 coalition, 
while the third section will discuss the possible scenarios if either of them were to rule 
the country.   
 
6.2 Lebanon: Iran’s Battlefront Anteriority 
 
“How many Shiites live in the southern part of Lebanon? Half a million? One Million? 
Let them be a scapegoat for the Islamic Revolution in Iran” (El Amine 2008) : Thus 
declared an Iranian senior politician who was visiting Lebanon in the late 1980’s. This 
provocative statement reveals with clarity the Iranian intentions. It explains the 
ambitions and the bulk of the Iranian intervention in Lebanon. However, this statement 
alone may not be sufficient to prove the presence of such an interference, as the 
intervention of any state in the affairs of another state requires more solid and consistent 
evidence that shows the causes of such an intervention, its extent and the intervention 
methods. 
In 1979, (as is termed in Iran), the “just” Islamic State was established, and with it, a 
religious legal mandate took place: This Islamic state should be defended, on the basis 
that if the “just” state has been established, then necessarily it should be defended; and 
if it necessarily should be defended then the tools and means of defense should be found 
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and established (El Amine 2009). The party that believes in exporting the Islamic 
revolution as a means of protecting it, started considering the methods that would lead 
to the protection of the revolution, and consequently the Islamic regime. Thus they 
began utilizing two parallel strategies:   
1- Finding already established Sunni or Shiite political parties that become subject 
to the Iranian Supreme Leader. 
2- Establishing armed Shiite organizations that have sincere and absolute loyalty to 
the Iranian Islamic regime. The role of these organizations is to protect the 
regime externally by distracting the surrounding enemies i.e. Israel. 
 
The Supreme Leader at that time, Sayyed Khomeini, who believed that he had an 
absolute mandate on the Muslim people and their money (El Amine 2007), supported 
this theory. He argued that there is a global role for the Iranian revolution, to lead the 
oppressed in the world (El Amine 2009). Khomeini felt that the Islamic revolution in 
Iran is the only revolutionary Islamic model, and thus exporting it is a religious duty 
that reflects political and military objectives. These political objectives, according to 
Khomeini, drive “us” to support Islamic movements by providing financial and military 
assistance, and not just relying on the sufficiency of external propaganda (El Amine 
2009). 
The religious authority, Sayyed Ali El-Amine, who during the early 1980’s was a 
Lecturer in Jurisprudence in Qom, Iran, as well as was the teacher of the top Leaders of 
the later established Hezbollah of Lebanon, testifies that after the Islamic revolution in 
Iran, he “started to feel that something is happening at the level of exporting the 
revolution” (El Amine 2008). However, during that period, El-Amine, as he argues, was 
somewhat uncertain. In the mid 1980’s, after his return to Lebanon, El-Amine started to 
witness the occurrence of what he used to fear about. He said: 
 
“After my return to Lebanon, I started to notice the emergence of some features 
related to the Iranian religious character. Iranian officials started looking forward to 
see Iran’s logo everywhere: religious schools, Mosques and other places. Moreover, I 
noted that a number of my students and colleagues, started to become influenced by 
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the Iranian cultural ties, as well as the ideologies of the Iranian regime. I tried to 
realign what was going wrong by arguing that it is not in the interest of the Shiites of 
Lebanon to be attached and mere followers to Iran, and therefore, to be a replica of 
the Iranians, and also, it is not in our interest to endorse any Iranian political state  
in Lebanon. After months of debate, I failed to convince some of them. I left Beirut, 
refusing to teach a group of people who had become clearly influenced and 
submissive to Iran, and thus, were no longer controlling their decisions” (El Amine 
2008). 
 
The statements of several Lebanese Shiite clerics, who were at the time (and still are) 
loyal to Iran, support El-Amine’s point of view. For example: “All the Iranian 
authorities,  from those of the seminaries of Qom, to the Revolutionary Guards, to the 
Ministry of Interior, are considering the Lebanese issue and giving their opinions about 
it" (Sharara 1998). 
 
Likewise, the following statement, given by the Deputy Secretary General, Sheikh 
Naim Qassem, demonstrates that the Supreme leader in Iran has the ultimate authority 
in deciding what those believing in his political project should do, including those who 
founded Hezbollah (later): “The extent of the power conferred to the Supreme Leader is 
very clear. He is faithful to the application of the Islamic provisions and political 
decision-making related to the major interests of the nation. Indeed he has the authority 
to make decisions concerning whether to go to war or keep peace” (Qassem 2002:74) 
Additionally, Sheikh Azari Qomi, a theorist of the Islamic regime, states: “For the 
Supreme religious Leader there is no responsibility other than the establishment of the 
Islamic regime, even if that required him to give orders to temporarily stop the nation 
from praying, fasting, partaking in pilgrimage, or even believing in 
monotheism"(Bakhsh 48). Moreover, an Iranian official proclaimed that: “In Lebanon, 
the fundamental issue for us is that Lebanon remains the playground and the location of 
the conflict with Israel; Islam requires that Lebanon attains this role” (Katzman 
1996:104). This acts as evidence of Iran's intention to lay hands on Lebanon and use it 
as an arena for conflict with Israel. 
 
The above argument not only reveals the intention of the Iranian regime but also 
clarifies it. The regime proposes the extension of Iran’s authority to Lebanon 
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consequently creating an outpost on the Mediterranean as well as on the border with 
Israel. It also demonstrates Iran’s desire to find the means by which political and 
military activity can be generated in Lebanon using domestic Lebanese tools. But before 
defining these domestic tools, the regime in Iran started interfering directly through the 
help of the Syrian regime. Judith Palmer Harik considers the beginning aspects of the 
Iranian’s regime activity in Lebanon in her book. She reports that in 1982 Syria and Iran 
came to an agreement concerning the mujahidin training camps (Harik 2005:39). Harik 
reveals the story as follows: 
 
“[The deal endorsed that the] Syrian troops stationed in the Bekaa would provide the 
security necessary for the training camps set up [of mujahidin] and help with logistics. 
For its part of the arrangement, Iran would provide the fighters with training and 
monthly salaries and take care of benefits for their families. Weapons sent from Iran 
for the mujahidin would be forwarded over land in Syrian trucks to the Bekaa and 
other locations in Lebanon.” 
 
Furthermore, Harik suspected that several bombings, including those which targeted the 
American Embassy in Beirut in 1983, in addition to the kidnappings of Americans and 
some other westerns, including British citizens, which started in 1982, suggested that 
the Iranian ‘s were responsible for these deeds. A discussion held with a senior 
Lebanese official at that time, strengthens her argument, he states: “it was thought that 
fundamentalist groups or even a few individuals recruited by Iran and/or Syria had set 
up these operations and found martyrs willing to carry them out” (Harik 2005:36). 
Moreover, to further her argument, concerning the kidnapping operations, Harik 
provides information extrapolated from a renowned terror expert, Magnus Ranstorp: 
 
“Ranstorp claims that the kidnappings occurred in stages as a result of several 
different motivations on the part of the perpetrators and their Iranian backers and 
that five of the victims died or were executed by Hezbollah, including Army Lt 
Colonel William Higgins and William Buckley, the chief of CIA’s Lebanese 
operations” (Harik 2005:37).  
 
These events indicate that the Iranian regime progressed from the stage of having an 
agreement with the Syrian regime, to the post-agreement stage. In other words, the 
Iranian regime was in a position that if any activity were to be carried out, it should 
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happen directly without the need of the Syrian regime, or at least, without the need to 
coordinate with the latter. It also marks, in practice, the start of Hezbollah’s phase in 
Lebanon, as an armed organization working to implement the Iranian political project. 
This view is supported by the statement of Nabih Berri, the Amal movement Leader and 
the current Speaker of the Parliament, spoken in 1990, accusing Iran of having its army 
in Lebanon: 
 
“In the Lebanese context, there is no party named Hezbollah, or a resistance named 
as Islamic resistance, but there is on the Lebanese land an Iranian party called 
Hezbollah and an Iranian resistance called the Islamic resistance. We congratulate 
you [Iran] for the Withdrawal of Saddam Hussein’s troops from your country, with 
the hope that you will withdraw Ali Mohtashami
61
 and his troops from our land” (El 
Amine 2009). 
 
In sum, the Lebanese government, being aware of almost all the incidents mentioned 
above, including the deal between the Syrian and the Iranian government and its 
undertakings, was wholly ineffective and too weak to be able to deal with it effectively 
(Harik 2005). What can be deduced from this thus is that the inability of the Lebanese 
government, in conjunction with the help of the Syrian regime, and of course the 
determination of Iran, facilitated the Iranian regime to establish a foothold in Lebanon. 
This foothold began to take its place with direct cooperation with Syria, and resulted in 
becoming an indirect activity, through a Lebanese proxy, called Hezbollah. In the next 
section, Hezbollah as a whole will be discussed, starting with its foundation, up to its 
institutions, armed activities and political project. 
 
6.3 Hezbollah’s Foundation 
 
As discussed in an earlier chapter, Hezbollah, the Iranian backed militia, which defines 
its identity as an Islamic jihadi movement, and “whose emergence is based on an 
                                                          
61 According to several resources, Mohtashami is a cleric who was active in the 1979 Iranian Revolution and later became 
interior minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran. As written in Ranstorp book, Hezbollah in Lebanon, page 126, 103, He is 
"seen as a founder of the Hezbollah movement in Lebanon and one of the "radical elements, advocating the export of the 
revolution," in the Iranian clerical hierarchy. 
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ideological, social, political and economical mixture in a special Lebanese, Arab and 
Islamic context,” (Cobban 1986:13) started its military activity in Lebanon in the early 
1980s engaging in acts that “constitute terrorism in its more precise and generally 
understood sense.”(Norton 2009:77). Augustus Richard Norton, professor of 
international relations and anthropology at Boston University, justifies the latter 
description by arguing that “by definition, any act of violence that it commits or seeks 
to commit is an act of terrorism, and so there are no gray [sic] areas of justifiable 
behaviour in which terrorists may lurk. Whether for law enforcement officials, spies, or 
soldiers, the issue is assumed to be settled” (Norton 2009:78). 
 
Before discussing this further, it is important to consider in some depth several of the 
conditions that were behind the establishment of Hezbollah. After the Islamic revolution 
in Iran, the Iranian regime decided to launch a plan which would link the Shia 
minorities in the Arab and Islamic world with the regime itself (El Amine 2009). Norton 
argues that “for Iran, the creation of Hezbollah was a realization of the revolutionary 
state’s zealous campaign to spread the message of self-styled “Islamic revolution”” 
(Norton 2009:24). The first location which the regime in Iran decided to start with, was 
the republic of Lebanon. Lebanon was chosen on account of several factors: 
 
1- The weakness of the Lebanese state. This made it easy for the regime in Iran to 
start its political and military activity without major obstacles. 
 
2-  The presence of a significant number of Shi'ites in Lebanon. 
 
3- The presence of leaders and clerics that are absolutely loyal to the Islamic 
regime in Iran and to its revolution and its principles. 
  
4- Lebanon’s strategic location on the border with Israel, the strongest ally to the 
United States of America in the Middle East.  
 
 
On this basis, in 1982 the regime in Iran began its mission by entrusting the task of 
initiating activity in Lebanon to some of its officials, Iranian and Lebanese Shiite clerics 
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who used the Iranian embassy in Beirut as their headquarters (El Amine 2009). This 
group focused on trying to link the Shiites of Lebanon in a sheer Iranian political 
structure. The plan was first revolved around an attempt to penetrate the regulatory body 
of the Amal movement, which used to dominate the Shiite areas, mainly in the southern 
part of Lebanon, and in the southern  
 
 
suburb of Beirut. The plan succeeded in making a rift in the Amal’s movement 
regulatory body through the cooperation of some of its officials, for example, Hussein 
Moussawi
62
, who took it upon himself to create this rift through the withdrawal of a 
small number of his supporters. Moussawi managed to establish the Islamic Amal 
Organization. But soon after it was discovered that Moussawi’s mission had failed as 
his organization couldn’t achieve the task required, which was creating an attractive 
state to the Shia in general, and thus controlling the Shia areas. After this failure an 
alternative plan was sought, to establish a military organization which would stand in 
contrast to Amal. Therefore, the so-called Party of God was established and guaranteed 
all the requirements of revolutionary and Jihad mission, it relied on several right wing 
clerics with revolutionary ideologies alongside many intellectuals who had resigned 
from Amal in addition to the direct supervision and direct screening from the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard (El Amine 2009). Judith Palmer Harik states in a similar vein: 
 
“As we know, Lebanese Shiite fundamentalists were looking for a role in the struggle 
against Israel and some had split from the Shiite Amal movement to find one. These 
men, and others like them, suited Iran’s foreign policy requirements in terms of their 
ideological commitments and willingness to act upon them, as some had already 
demonstrated in the terrorist allegedly sponsored by the Islamic republic in West 
Beirut.  These men and other committed Shiite fundamentalists who, after 1979, were 
swept up by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards to form an organizational structure 
and to cohere around a local leadership that would be able to exploit the opportunity 
for militant jihad being offered. Potential mujahidin were plentiful in the Bekaa 
where Hussein Moussawi, the leader of the breakaway group Islamic Amal, resided 
and other young Shiite men from the dahiyeh, Beirut’s suburb, and the South could 
also be encouraged to commit themselves  to the holy struggle against the ‘usurpers 
                                                          
62 In 2009, Moussawi became one of Hezbollah’s representatives in the Lebanese parliament. 
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of Palestine’. Iran’s support for this group, which would eventually become 
Hezbollah, could deliver two important foreign policy goals: the capacity to fight 
Israel through a proxy, which allowed it direct entrance into the influence into the 
Middle East war/peace equation and the expansion of Shiite Islam’s influence in 
Lebanon through Hezbollah’s developing role there”(Harik 2005:39-40). 
 
 
 
Consequently, the above discussion provides proof for the theory that Hezbollah is an 
Iranian product, and also that this Armed party was not a Lebanese born invention that 
aims to participate for the good of the country, but conversely, to satisfy the Iranian 
ambitions that cannot be achieved without expanding into the Mediterranean, and thus, 
without finding a solid ground in Lebanon.    
 
In the meantime Hezbollah, the strongest and most complicated political party in 
Lebanon in was founded but with a complex organizational structure (see figure 1) 
(Hamzeh 2004:46). The figure below, which was taken from the book “In the path of 
Hizbullah”, portrays the organizational structure of the armed Hezbollah. Hamzeh, in 
his book, explains clearly each and every unit of this structure. However, it is worth 
noting that in the early years after Hezbollah’s establishment, this organizational 
structure was not clear and declared, but only became clear after the election of the first 
Secretary General of Hezbollah in 1989. 
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Figure 1: Hezbollah Organizational Structure (Adopted from HAMZEH, A. N. (2004). In the path 
of Hizbullah. Syracuse, N.Y., Syracuse University Press. p. 46) 
 
 
In short, before the official announcement, Hezbollah with the support of the Iranian 
regime, as discussed in earlier part of this chapter and in chapter four, managed to 
conduct several kidnapping and bombing operations. Additionally, Hezbollah were able 
to “spearhead the struggle against Israel in South Lebanon” (Hamzeh 2004:46), by 
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conducting several attacks on its occupying troops.  Officially Hezbollah didn’t 
announce its manifesto until 1986. In that manifesto, Hezbollah highlighted its ideology 
and proclaimed its mission in Lebanon, and its vision to both the Arab world and the 
whole World.  
 
6.3.1 Hezbollah: The political manifesto  
 
In 1986, on the first anniversary of the death of one of Hezbollah’s senior leaders, 
Sheikh Ragheb Harb, Hezbollah announced its manifesto. The manifesto explained the 
political project of Hezbollah, and also showed its organic association with the Iranian 
regime. In addition, the manifesto demonstrated that Hezbollah, as a political and armed 
organization, does not receive its orders from Lebanese local leader, but from an Iranian 
leader. The following are sections taken from the political manifesto of Hezbollah 
announced in 1986:  
 
"Dear free vulnerable people, we are the sons of the Hezbollah nation in Lebanon, 
we greet you and we address through you the whole world: known figures and 
institutions, political parties, organizations and political, humanitarian, and media 
bodies, with no exclusion of anyone; because we are keen to let our voice be heard by 
all, so you can understand what we are saying, come to grips with our proposal, and 
study our project. We are the sons of the Hezbollah nation that God granted victory to 
in Iran, and we have managed to find the core of a new central state of Islam in the 
world. We announce that we are committed to the orders of the current wise and just 
long-lasting leadership of Ayatollah Ruhollah Musawi Khomeini, the founder of the 
Muslim’s Revolution and the cause for their glorious renaissance. And on this basis, 
we in Lebanon are not an organizationally closed party, and we are not a political 
tight framework, but we are a nation that is associated with Muslims in all parts of 
the world, bound with them in a strong ideological and political tie, which is the 
Islam of God, perfected its message by the seal of His Prophet, Muhammad. Hence, 
what happens to the Muslims in Afghanistan or Iraq or the Philippines or other parts 
of the world affects the body of our Islamic nation that we are part of it, and if any 
harm happens we move to face it out according to the legitimate religious duty, and 
in light of a general political vision determined by the mandate of the spiritual leader 
of Iran. As for our military capabilities, they are such that nobody can imagine their 
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efficiency and size. Also, we do not have a separate military apparatus, but each and 
every one of us is a combat soldier when Jihad is called for, and every one of us takes 
his mission in the battle, according to the mandate of the legitimate framework of the 
spiritual leader in Iran ... We are now in an uphill struggle with the forces of 
arrogance until we achieve the following objectives:  
1- Throwing Israel completely out of Lebanon as a prelude to remove them 
permanently from existence. 
2-  Freeing Jerusalem from the clutches of the occupation. 
3- Allowing our people to decide their fate and decide it freely and to choose the 
governing system that they want.  
 
But, to be frank, we do not hide our commitment to the rule of Islam and we call on 
everyone to choose the Islamic system, which guarantees unity, justice and dignity for 
all, and prevents any attempt by new colonies to sneak into our country again ... and 
we declare that we aspire to make Lebanon an integral part of the political map 
which is ruled by Islam and it’s just leadership, and which is an enemy to America, 
global arrogance and international Zionism. This ambition is the ambition of a 
nation and not the ambition of the party, and the choice of the people and not the 
choice of a gang. 
In Lebanon, why do we face the existing system? This is our vision and our 
perception of what we want and in the light of this vision and perception; we face the 
current system on account of two basic considerations: 
1- For being a creature of the global arrogance and part of the political map of 
anti-Islam. 
2-  Because it is essentially an unjust combination which cannot be repaired 
and get grafted, but must be changed from the root” (El Amine 2009). 
 
Democracy, as is commonly argued, “Needs strong and sustainable political parties with 
the capacity to represent citizens and provide policy choices that demonstrate their 
ability to govern for the public good” (Norris 2005:1). Some might postulate that in the 
year that Hezbollah’s manifesto was announced Lebanon was seriously divided on 
account of both the civil war and the lack of a properly functioning government. 
Supposing that this argument is true, political parties, whether established in a 
democracy or not, are supposed to serve multiple functions. Pippa Norris, the McGuire 
Lecturer in Comparative Politics at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at 
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Harvard University, argues that  political parties are necessary in order to build and 
accumulate support among vast coalitions of citizens’ organizations and interest groups; 
to enable many conflicting demands to be incorporated into rational policy programs; to 
effectively choose and instruct legislative candidates and political leaders; to supply 
voters with options to choose from among the governing teams and policies; and, if 
elected to office, to effectively manage the process of government and stand collectively 
responsible for their actions in successive governmental contests (Norris 2005:3-4). She 
summarizes the long list of the potential functions of political parties under five key 
headings:  
1- The integration and mobilization of citizens. 
2- The articulation and aggregation of interests. 
3- The formulation of public policy. 
4- The recruitment of political leaders. 
5- The organization of parliament and government. 
 
Of course, these responsibilities and duties, which determine the functionality of any 
political party, impose on that party a requirement to comply with them before engaging 
in political activity. They must also act within the Laws imposed by the applicable law 
within any state. The political manifesto of Hezbollah, if analyzed, does not mention 
any of these responsibilities and it does not identify any local task that should be 
achieved.  Furthermore, the manifesto not only does not recognize the domestic rule of 
law, but also it calls to overthrow the infidel and arrogant political system and replace it 
with an Islamic regime which is an affiliate of the parent system in Iran.  As regards to 
making a regime change, the manifesto does not take into account the existing religious 
diversity in Lebanese society, but instead it tries to impose the point of view of a certain 
group on the other groups. In other words, on one side, yes, the manifesto gives the 
right for the people to choose the kind of the governing system they want, but on the 
other side, it calls for a regime change, and prefers the replaced regime to be an Islamic 
one, without considering the opinions of the people, and without taking a referendum on 
it. Furthermore, the manifesto does not address the Lebanese as being Lebanese, but as 
an integral part of a nation; a nation that is committed to the orders of the religious 
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leader in Iran. Besides, the manifesto does not seek any integration or mobilization of 
citizens.  
The manifesto which reveals the presence of a genetic relation between Hezbollah and 
Iran, the dependency on its government and its leader, and the submission to the 
religious and political agenda of the latter, seeks to embroil Lebanon, the government 
and the people, in foreign conflicts not decided by the State. In addition, it does not by 
any mean express either the public mood or their opinion. Of course, on one side, the 
manifesto refers to an important issue, that of resisting the occupation, which some 
argue complies with the right to self-determination, thus giving peoples living under 
foreign military occupation an absolute right to resist against the occupying power, but 
on the other side, it calls for removing permanently a present state which is recognized 
by the United Nation. Yes, if a state, any state, was an occupying power, it may be a 
legal right to resist until reaching an end for such an occupation, but it does not give any 
the right to work on removing a state from presence. This begs the question of whether 
political parties are allowed to have ambitions which go outside the borders of the 
country in which they reside. And, thus, are political parties when are not the legal 
governing power that rules the state, allowed to act on behalf of the foreign ministry 
which regulates the relations with other countries?  Additionally, the manifesto seeks to 
sabotage Lebanon’s relations with several countries, for it refers to Hezbollah’s 
relations with other Muslims in their homelands, and it offers a helping hand in case 
they suffer any harm.  
Hezbollah in the manifesto did not present itself as a political party seeking change 
using peaceful and democratic means, but instead presented itself as an international 
armed organization, seeking to achieve its political ambitions through the use of 
illegitimate force. Hezbollah, which in the words of its current Secretary-General, 
Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, stresses that, the “current leadership, our will and mandate, 
and the decision of war and peace, are in the hands of the supreme leader of Iran” (El 
Amine 2009), through several years has managed to apply some of what was introduced 
in its manifesto: 
1- Kept upholding close ties with the Iranian regime. 
2- Kept its arms. 
3- Abducted foreign nationals.  
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4- Prearranged bombings which targeted foreign interests. 
5- Triggered proxy wars with Israel. 
6- Established cells, some regulatory and some armed.  i.e. Egypt, Azerbaijan and 
South America.  
7- Helped political organization in different countries i.e. Bahrain and assisted 
armed organization’s in Gaza and West Bank territories.63 
8- Imposed a policy on the Lebanese state which is compatible with its interests. 
9- Organized armed Parades and used its weapons in domestic conflicts in order to 
makes changes to particular political certainties.    
 
In short, these activities and this kind of policy, which will be discussed in further depth 
later in this chapter, are contrary to international and domestic laws. Additionally, they 
go beyond the role of political parties which was discussed earlier in this section and in 
a previous chapter. Besides, the manifesto which proposed these policies and activities, 
and on which Hezbollah’s current policy is still based, suggests in a sense that 
Hezbollah as an armed party, is a compelling power and authority that equals that of the 
state. In addition to being an armed party that “worships its arms” (Mitri 2009), 
Hezbollah undermines any possible sovereignty of the existing national state. In the 
words of the former minister, Professor Mitri, “Hezbollah is a hindrance to the 
Lebanese sovereignty and also a hindrance to the state being able to exercise its 
authority on the Lebanese territory” (Mitri 2009).  
 
6.3.2 Hezbollah’s Strategic Wings 
 
Hezbollah, the armed organization which until now neither applied nor obtained a 
license from the Ministry of Interior, depends, to ensure the success of its project, on 
many factors, mainly those of a political, social and military nature. In the next section, 
                                                          
63 In an Interview with a Kuwaiti daily newspaper, Sayyed Nasrallah said that “we are committed, in principle, to 
supporting this intifada and standing side by side with the Palestinian people; but we would rather not talk about the quality 
and quantity of our assistance to them. One of the best ways we can lend our support to the intifada is by not mentioning 
how we ought to conduct it.”   
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the sociopolitical aspect will be considered, followed by a discussion about the military 
arms that Hezbollah relies on mainly as a means of power. 
 
 
6.3.2.1 Socio-political Wing 
     a. Political discourse 
  
Hezbollah, as discussed earlier, announced its political project through a public 
manifesto in 1986. This manifesto highlighted and explained its point of view to 
Lebanon, Muslims and the World. Augustus Richard Norton argues that this remarkable 
programmatic manifesto bears a strong made-in-Tehran coloration (Norton 2009:35). 
He debates that this manifesto “emphasized that the 1987-79 revolution in Iran served 
as an inspiration to action, a proof of what can be accomplished when the faithful gather 
under the banner of Islam” (Norton 2009:35). Of course, pledging loyalty to Iran 
requires a declaration of commitment to its policy, and committing to this policy 
requires the application of its methodology including those which are revolutionary. For 
example, making a revolution on “all the western ideas concerning man’s origin and 
nature” in addition to the western style of governance. Such conditions must be upheld 
for governing as part of the Islamic state obligates Hezbollah to believe in all its 
subdivisions, and to reject all other parallel forms of governance.  
For Hezbollah political discourse must be divided in two phases. The pre-Taif 
agreement phase and the post-Taif agreement phase. In the pre-Taif agreement phase, 
the political discourse of Hezbollah was built on an aggressive strategy, which assaulted 
all those bearing contrary thoughts, whether they were countries, domestic political 
parties, groups or individuals. Concerning the political discourse directed to the outside 
world, Hezbollah attacked, in addition to Israel, the Soviet Union, United States of 
America and France. Regarding the Soviets, Hezbollah proclaimed that: 
 
“The Soviets are not one iota different from the Americans in terms of political 
danger, indeed are more dangerous than them in terms of ideological considerations 
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as well, and this requires that light be shed on this fact and that the Soviets be 
assigned their proper place in the forces striving to strike at the interests of the 
Muslim people and arrogate their political present and future” (Norton 2009:36-
37). 
Concerning the United States of America, Hezbollah made accusations about its role in 
inflicting the suffering of the Muslims in Lebanon (Norton 2009). They used the words 
of the Spiritual Leader in Iran, Sayyed Khomeini, to attack the United States by arguing 
that “Imam Khomeini, the leader, has repeatedly stressed that America is the reason for 
all our catastrophes and the source of all malice. By fighting it, we are only exercising 
our legitimate right to defend our Islam and the dignity of our nation” (Norton 2009:37). 
Norton argues that the French were attacked, mainly because of their long-standing 
backing of the Maronites in Lebanon, and also on account of their arms sales to Iraq 
during the Iranian-Iraqi war. In 1989, Norton reports, the Hezbollah radio station noted 
that the “French should be taught a lesson because of their scorn for other people and 
lack of respect for Lebanese Muslims” (Norton 2009:37). 
Even the Lebanese political parties were not safe from criticism. Indeed, the Amal 
movement, the competing Shiite party which used to control the Shiite areas, faced a 
broad political attack ending in a Shiite-Shiite war which lasted for years. This war 
between the Amal movement and Hezbollah, forced Nabih Berri, the Amal leader and 
the current Speaker of the Parliament, to say that “Hezbollah killed from our leaders 
more than Israel did” (El Amine 2009). In addition, the Communist party in Lebanon 
suffered from an aggressive political discourse, with the result that “Dozens, if not 
hundreds, of party members were killed in a brutal, bloody campaign of suppression and 
assassination in 1984 and 1985” (Norton 2009:37). Hezbollah also showed hostility to 
the Christian parties. Considering these parties as Israel’s agents in Lebanon, Sayyed 
Nasrallah, the Secretary General of Hezbollah, refused to negotiate with them. He said:  
“We are ready to start a dialogue with the weak Christians who have been taken for 
granted, and who desire coexistence and who did not commit crimes against the 
people. However, dialoging with Israel’s agents is like dialoging with Israel itself; it is 
as absolute a condition as it is regarding Israel” (Noe, N., & Blanford, N.  2007: 
31)  
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In the post-Taif agreement phase and after gaining military control in the areas that were 
previously under the Amal movement, political discourse of Hezbollah started to 
change in line with the state of stability Lebanon started to enjoy, and the subsequent 
requirements of this. At that time a debate took place within Hezbollah, this debate 
focused on a very central point, that of playing a part in the non-Islamic government. 
Several questions were raised: 
“From the stand point of Islamic law, was participation in a “non-Islamic” 
government legitimate? Should ideology bend to practical interests? And would 
Hezbollah, by its participation, be co-opted into a secular political system, thereby 
deserting its principles and Islamic vision?” (Noe, N., & Blanford, N.  2007: 
100) 
Because of the organic relation between Hezbollah and the Iranian regime, answering 
these questions, and thus getting answers on whether participating is legitimate or not, 
was the mission of Iran’s supreme spiritual leader and legal authority. According to 
Norton, Sayyed Khamenei who succeeded the late Sayyed Khomeini “gave his blessing 
to the possibility of Hezbollah’s participation in Lebanese elections” ( Noe, N., & 
Blanford, N.  2007: 31). Hezbollah, wanting to gain both official and public support and 
hoping to outline political dialogue to its benefit, publicized through the Secretary 
General, Sayyed Nasrallah, on July 3
rd
, 1992, that the party would participate in that 
summer’s parliamentary elections(NOE, N., & Blanford, N.  2007: 101).  Having made 
this decision, Hezbollah began to apply less aggressive political discourse inside 
Lebanon. In contrast, when concerning the outside world, Israel and America remained 
on the list of those places that should be attacked, Israel on account of its occupation in 
south Lebanon, and America on account of the reasons discussed earlier.    
Hezbollah, under the new formula which ruled Lebanon after the Taif Agreement, 
managed to keep the Lebanese state absent from the southern part of Lebanon. Through 
a strategic relationship with Syria, and under the excuse of resisting Israel, Hezbollah 
was able to absorb the military decision in southern Lebanon. As a result of this, the 
Southern part of Lebanon remained away from any semblance of legitimacy, as the 
Lebanese army was not allowed to be present, and other security forces were not 
permitted to be effective in a way that would safeguard the prestige of the state. Due to 
these reasons, Hezbollah managed to control a large number of southern public opinion 
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through the adoption of a directed partisan discourse, with the result that the discourse 
of Hezbollah was accepted and heard, but not that of the legitimate state.    
In other words, Hezbollah managed, on account of its absolute control of the south, 
politically, militarily and culturally, to regulate the moral compass of the people, and 
thus create a gap between them and the State. This resulted in the people starting to see 
that their salvation and their interests are not accomplished through the state, but 
through Hezbollah. Even those who opposed Hezbollah politically, were not able to 
express their opinions freely, as expressing their opinions would lead them to lose their 
interests, particularly since the government was not there to protect them. In the ten 
years between 1990 and 2000, Hezbollah fought two wars with Israel. These wars, 
although they occurred without the consent of the Lebanese government, did not change 
the southern public mood, and thus did not change the state of sympathy Hezbollah 
enjoyed. Of course, this reveals the impact of the political and mobilization discourse 
which Hezbollah applied, and which succeeded in firmly controlling the public opinion. 
After 2000, the year that marked the withdrawal of Israel’s troops from Lebanon, 
Hezbollah’s political discourse continued to praise the party’s arms. Hezbollah, not 
introducing any new strategy regarding its political and military activity, stuck to its 
previous position which supported the retention of their activities in southern Lebanon, 
under the command of their forces, and not under the command of the state. Addressing 
his followers, Sayyed Nasrallah, attempting to influence people’s emotions, and to give 
the battle of existence with Israel a religious and ideological meaning and aspect, said: 
 
 “We should preserve in our jihad, our struggle, and our resistance; we should be 
present on the field, never submit, and spread hope and optimism in the people’s 
hearts. We have to redirect the battle’s path towards that place where they [Israelis] 
will be the ones who scream in pain; these murderers are the killers of prophets, of 
messengers, of the innocent, and the poor, and therefore should be the ones to 
scream and retreat. This day will come, without a doubt.” (Noe, N., & Blanford, 
N.  2007: 276-277).  
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In July 2006, a devastating war took place between Hezbollah and Israel which led to 
thousands of deaths and injuries, huge losses that brutally damaged the Lebanese 
economy, and caused vast destruction to the Lebanese infrastructure. This war, in 
addition to the fact that it was neither authorized by the Lebanese state through its 
legitimate institutions nor by the people of Lebanon through a referendum, according to 
many happened at a time that best served the interests of Iran, which at the time was 
facing a UN Security Council discussion on proposed sanctions against it. One of the 
results of this war was that it dramatically increased the serious division in Lebanon that 
had already started to take shape in 2005 after the assassination of the former prime 
minister Rafic Hariri. Again, Hezbollah’s political discourse which adhere the arms, did 
not change, but rather increased. Nasrallah, in his first public appearance after the July 
2006 war with Israel, refused to disarm by stating that “"No army in the world will be 
able to make us drop the weapons from our hands".
64
 In this statement Nasrallah was 
referring both to the UNIFIL forces and the Lebanese army which for the first time 
since the 1960’s was allowed to deploy forces in south Lebanon. Moreover, in the same 
speech, Nasrallah who claimed a “divine victory” over Israel went as far as suggesting 
that some of the Lebanese politicians “might be guilty of treason, in reference to Israeli 
media reports claiming that Lebanese “governmental parties” had contacted Israeli 
officials asking them not to stop the military campaign against Hezbollah”(Leenders 
2006). Treason discourse never stopped but became more direct. Later, Nasrallah and 
Hezbollah officials “accused the governing majority led by Prime Minister Fouad 
Siniora of failing to back it during the July war with Israel and of supporting U.S. and 
Israeli demands for its disarmament.”65 
This political discourse adopted by Hezbollah, divided the Lebanese society into two 
opposite camps, helped in spreading hatred and led to a few small doctrinal clashes. In 
May 2008, after the Lebanese government decision to dismantle Hezbollah’s private 
communications network, Hezbollah decided to act decisively. Its militia militants were 
ordered to take over Beirut in an attempt to force the government to reverse its decision. 
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After Hezbollah militants succeeded in their mission, Nasrallah in one of his 2009 
speeches “declared May 7th, 2008, which saw deadly clashes in Beirut, a "glorious day" 
for the Resistance” (Sfeir 2009). He stressed that "we do not want the Lebanese to 
forget the May 7
th
 events, because we do not want the foolish decisions made by the 
Cabinet on May 5
th
 to be repeated."
66
 Insisting on keeping his militia arms, Nasrallah 
argued that there was “"no contradiction between the existence of a powerful state and a 
strong resistance"(Sfeir 2009).
67
 He continued: “The May 7th events safeguarded 
Lebanon's institutions and forced all Lebanese parties to go back to the [national] 
dialogue, which led to the election of President Michel Sleiman"(Sfeir 2009).
68
 This 
discourse, when analyzed, implies a clear threat to the Lebanese, whether citizens or 
politicians or political parties. For it indicates that any decision to violate the public 
policy of Hezbollah will be faced by an armed attack. Moreover, the greatest 
clarification was given to the Lebanese government, that whenever it decides to extend 
its sovereignty it would be likely to be dropped.  
In 2009 parliamentary elections took place in Lebanon. Before the elections Hezbollah, 
through its Secretary General, presented its vision for the post-election era and declared 
its readiness to rule Lebanon. Nasrallah criticized those who doubted their ability to run 
the affairs of the country saying: “The Resistance [Hezbollah] that defeated Israel can 
govern a country that is 100 times larger than Lebanon” (Sfeir 2009). He stated that “if 
we [Hezbollah] win the majority in the elections, and they [March 14
th
 Forces] do not 
want to share power with us, we won't beg them"(Sfeir 2009). However, Hezbollah, 
having announced its readiness to govern Lebanon and to share power if they won the 
elections refused, after the results appeared not to be in their favour, to let the March 
14
th
 forces govern the country. Hezbollah insisted on the resulting national unity 
government which was called in Lebanon the “blocking third.” Therefore, Hezbollah 
prevented others from taking action which it used to deem legitimate for itself. But most 
significantly the result was that Hezbollah disrupted the democratic process in Lebanon. 
In other words, Hezbollah prevented the majority from ruling, and also prevented the 
opposition from opposing, and thus, the democratic process in Lebanon became 
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sabotaged. Of course, the reason for this is Hezbollah’s lack of trust in the majority, 
which can be inferred from its political discourse mentioned earlier in the chapter.  
Since 2009, Hezbollah began to impose its terms on the successive governments. Thus 
no government has had the chance to run the country in a way that is contrary to that of 
Hezbollah’s perception and its political discourse. In 2011, When the Lebanese 
government decided not to stop dealing with the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, and thus 
did not commit itself to Hezbollah’s demands; the latter decided to flex its muscles 
again. Prior to the party minister’s resignation from the government, Hezbollah 
deployed its soldiers in Beirut in an attempt to pressurise the government. Since the 
government did not back down under this pressure, Hezbollah decided to overthrow the 
government through the resignation of its ministers. Nasrallah, after the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) handed Lebanon’s prosecutor arrest warrants for four 
members of his Party in connection with the February 14
th
 bombing in 2005 that killed 
Mr. Hariri and 22 others in Beirut, said that “No Lebanese government will be able to 
carry out any arrests whether in 30 days, 30 years or even 300 years.”69Earlier in 2010, 
He had stated that “Mistaken is the one who thinks that we will allow the arrest or 
detainment of any of our mujahideen [fighters]. We will cut off the hand that tries to get 
to them.”70 
In sum, Hezbollah’s political discourse since its formation utilised two types of 
discourse. The first clearly lacked any recognition of the state, and the second 
conditionally recognized the state according to a policy whereby the armed organization 
plans it itself. This leads us to conclude that Lebanon after Taif was allowed to be stable 
as far as the Lebanese successive governments’ were committed to Hezbollah’s political 
discourse. In other words, the stability of Lebanon, even with weak institutions, limited 
the role and functionality of the army and the then inadequate sovereignty was subject 
to the acceptance of Hezbollah’s political project, which required that Hezbollah remain 
a military force totally independent from the state and its institutions and one which is 
not subject to the law that regulates the role of any other political party in Lebanon. 
Moreover, Hezbollah’s political discourse since its formation, implies a clear threat to 
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all those who reject it, whether the violator is the state, or the Lebanese citizens. In 
democracies, citizens have an obligation to be informed about public issues, to watch 
prudently how their elected political leaders and representatives practice their powers, 
and to express their own opinions and interests. In the case of Hezbollah, this role is not 
recognized and non-viable. Hezbollah’s political discourse is equivalent to ultimate 
orders that cannot be discussed or criticized by the people. Therefore, citizens in this 
case become powerless and marginalized, and this evidently can never be the case in 
any functioning democracy. Of course, the growing strength of Hezbollah, which 
affirms not just the absence of any kind of democratic governance in Lebanon, but also 
the weakness of the state and its inability to fully exercise its duties and responsibilities, 
is not the blame of Hezbollah alone, but the defeatist and the complicit Lebanese state 
can also be considered to hold some responsibility. Several Lebanese leaders, who led 
the country after Taif Agreement, managed to turn attention away from Hezbollah's 
violation of the Lebanese laws, in order to guarantee that they stayed in power, and this 
makes them accountable also. 
 
  
 b. Social institutions and services 
 
As argued earlier, the Lebanese state institutions were almost absent in south Lebanon, 
and particularly in the areas that were under the control of Hezbollah.  The absence of 
the state institutions on a domestic level, in addition to the failure of the state on a 
national level to deliver jobs, social services, and education, enabled Hezbollah in 
particular, and other political parties in general, to appear to be the most effective 
alternative state institutions.  
In their journal essay, Hezbollah's Social Jihad: Nonprofits as Resistance Organizations, 
Shawn Teresa Flanigan, Mounah Abdel-Samad argue that “One factor that helped 
Hezbollah to play a stronger political role in society and transform itself from a military 
actor into a political party was its provisions of healthcare and social services” 
(Flanigan S.T., & Abdel-samad M. 2009:123). 
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Hezbollah, the strongest and most complicated political party in Lebanon, managed to 
build a very well systematized social service sector (see figure 2). The sector consists of 
the Social Unit, the Education Unit and the Islamic Health Unit, which together make 
up an intricate network of service providers that Hezbollah’s supporters mainly benefit 
from (Flanigan S.T., & Abdel-samad M. 2009). Unlike Hezbollah the political and 
military organization which is not legally registered yet, “many of Hezbollah’s service 
organizations are legally registered with the Lebanese government as NGOs, a status 
that provides certain legal protections and eases collaboration with other organizations 
that may be wary of the “Hezbollah” name” (Flanigan S.T., & Abdel-samad M. 2009). 
The Social Unit, according to Flanigan and Abdel-Samad, covers four organizations: 
1- The Jihad Construction Foundation. This foundation, which is responsible for 
infrastructure construction, became over time and due to organized and solid 
effort, one of the most important NGOs in the country. Through this 
organization, Hezbollah pays reconstruction compensation to residents of 
southern Lebanon and Beirut’s southern suburb for each and every war that 
takes place with Israel. 
2- The Martyrs’ Foundation. This foundation offers financial assistance, health and 
social support to the families of “martyrs” who have been killed in any combat 
whether with Israel or not, or in any military task. 
3-  The Foundation for the Wounded. This Foundation offers aid and assistance to 
those civilians who have been injured during Israeli attacks. 
4-  The Khomeini Support Committee. “Modeled after an institution in Iran” 
(Cammett 2011), this committee deals with orphans and people with special 
needs. 
 
Hezbollah which started providing health services to its community since 1983 (Harik 
2005:83) has also established a very sophisticated Health sector. The Islamic Health 
Unit is the unit that meets Hezbollah’s public health needs. “It operates three hospitals, 
twelve health centers, twenty infirmaries, twenty dental clinics, and ten defense 
departments” (Flanigan S.T., & Abdel-samad M. 2009). In addition to providing health 
service to Hezbollah’s members and supporters, it provides health care to “low-income 
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Shiites and other low-income populations at little or no cost” (Flanigan S.T., & Abdel-
samad M. 2009).  
The third sector that Hezbollah managed to invest in is the educational sector. 
Hezbollah operates a number of primary and secondary schools that accommodate 
approximately 14,000 students (Flanigan S.T., & Abdel-samad M. 2009). Hezbollah’s 
focus on the education sector is not a coincidence. The schools Hezbollah operates 
enable new generations to become educated in accordance with its plan. In other words, 
it is a forum for Hezbollah to spread its ideology on the young generation in order to 
make them believe solely in its political agenda. In addition, Hezbollah’s unique and 
conservative religious sciences are taught in these schools. These sciences are not 
subject to state control at all. If the religious books that Hezbollah uses are looked at in 
depth, it will be revealed that a huge effort has been put in at the level of authoring and 
output, in addition at the level of the adoption of modern educational methods, 
demonstrated in the concentration and diversification of the content and the multiplicity 
of methods and means of education. Moreover, certain psychological factors can also be 
noted, ones which clearly aim to influence the student and raise his desire to learn, all in 
order to reproduce a supporting community that backs the ideology, approach and the 
life style  Hezbollah tries to implement within the Shiite community. In addition to 
education, “Hezbollah provides low-income students with scholarships, financial 
assistance and books, buying in bulk and selling at reduced prices” (Flanigan S.T., & 
Abdel-samad M. 2009). 
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Figure 2 Social Service Sector 
 
 
Hezbollah pours an enormous amount of money into these sectors. According to 
Flanigan and Abdel-Samad, Hezbollah, by September 2006, Hezbollah “had spent $281 
million for rehabilitation and compensation following the 2006 Israeli bombardment of 
Lebanon, with reports that the party was prepared to spend $300-400 million in 
compensation to the victims” (Flanigan S.T., & Abdel-samad M. 2009). These amounts 
of money are vast enough to verify that Hezbollah’s budget is not the type of budget 
that any political party can afford. In other words, such a budget is one that can only be 
afforded and allocated by states. 
In short, the absence of the State’s institutions in the southern part of Lebanon and the 
southern suburb of Beirut was in favour to Hezbollah. The latter, in a publication from 
its NGO, portrays the armed organization services “as a gift to the loyal as well, 
although in this case the “loyal” being rewarded were not necessarily voters, but 
resisters” (Flanigan S.T., & Abdel-samad M. 2009). According to the aforementioned 
statement, it can be postulated that Hezbollah does not provide services to the Lebanese 
citizens who are loyal to their homeland, but to those citizens whom are considered as 
party members and thus are loyal to both the Party and its ideology and its political 
project. Health and social services which are usually the responsibility of the state 
became no longer part of its duties. At best, if the state is allowed to provide any service, 
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this service should happen through Hezbollah or any other political party. For example, 
if a citizen requires any care in a governmental hospital, he or she would need to 
approach his or her legislator or a party local official; not following this route is likely 
to result in not receiving any service that he or she requires. As Flanigan and Abdel-
Samad reports, “This favor would be repaid with political loyalty from the sick 
individual and the extended family at election time” (Flanigan S.T., & Abdel-samad M. 
2009). In sum, it can be argued that Hezbollah’s social and health institutions function 
as fringes to those of the state, but are even more effective and successful that those of 
the latter. Hezbollah, aware of the importance of these services, has been able to 
account for the loyalty of his supporters through the provision of these services. 
However, on the one hand, it may be argued that the failure of the State in this area is 
inevitable, but on the other, Hezbollah was able either to prevent the State from 
communicating directly with its citizens, or to position mechanisms that force the state 
to communicate with them but through Hezbollah’s local officials, so that the service if 
received by the citizen will not be considered as a state service but as a Hezbollah one.  
This, however, does excuse the ineffectiveness of the State in this area, for it did not 
adopt any mechanism to impose rules that would have prevented Hezbollah control. In 
other words, the State surrendered to the inevitable and chose not to weaken 
Hezbollah’s services. The fact that these services were undertaken by a political party 
and financed by a foreign country, Iran, rather by the government’s responsible 
ministries, certainly “removes all doubt about the state’s capacity or desire to undercut 
the Party of God’s services in order to reduce its political appeal” (Harik 2005:85). 
The next section will discuss the Military wing of Hezbollah, with particular reference 
to two points. The first part will focus on Hezbollah’s arms involvement in deadly 
operations on foreign forces that used to operate in Lebanon during the 1980’s, 
including the occupying forces of Israel. In addition, Hezbollah’s role in the civil war 
will be discussed. The second part will move on to consider the military role of 
Hezbollah after year 2000 which marked the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from 
Lebanon. Following this the section will discuss several points that are related to 
Military wing of Hezbollah. All these factors will lead to the conclusion of this section 
by regarding the organizational structure of Hezbollah and how its military wing 
operates.    
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6.3.2.2 Military Wing 
 
(a). A Historical Review 
 
Iranian funds and training led to the rapid growth of Hezbollah's military wing (Gambill 
& Abdelnour 2002). In the primary years of its establishment in the early 1980’s this 
wing was committed principally to the removal of the American and European multi-
national force in Beirut. Following several brutal Hezbollah operations against MNF 
forces, perhaps most significantly the twin suicide bombings of October 1983 which 
resulted in the death of approximately 300 American and French servicemen, in 1984 
MNF forces withdrew (Gambill & Abdelnour 2002). In addition to the violence against 
the American and French servicemen, Hezbollah also attacked the occupying Israeli 
forces which, on account of serious resistance, were forced to withdraw from central 
Lebanon in 1985. 
 
Hezbollah, as discussed earlier, started its military activity in Lebanon in the early 
eighties engaging in acts that “constitute terrorism in its more precise and generally 
understood sense” (Norton 2009:77). In addition to the deadly operations, terrorist acts 
conducted by Hezbollah included the 1985 skyjacking of TWA flight 847 en route from 
Athens to Rome, and the 1988 kidnapping of the unarmed UN observer Colonel 
Higgins of the U.S. Marines, who was tortured and murdered (Norton 2009). Moreover, 
Hezbollah managed to conduct several kidnapping operations. The BBC reports it as 
follows: 
 
 “As Hezbollah escalated its guerrilla attacks on Israeli targets in southern Lebanon, 
its military aid from Iran increased. The movement also adopted the tactic of taking 
Western hostages, through a number of freelance hostage taking cells: The 
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Revolutionary Justice Organization and the Organization of the Oppressed Earth, 
which seized Terry Waite.”71 
  
As well as the names mentioned previously in Chapter four, Hezbollah also kidnapped 
the Irish writer Brian Keenan. According to the Daily Mail newspaper, Keenan “was 
held in the Lebanese capital by Hezbollah terrorists during the country's civil war. For 
1,574 days, he was kept in windowless cells, chained, beaten and blindfolded.”72 John 
McCarthy, a British journalist, writer and broadcaster was also kidnapped by Hezbollah. 
According to the Independent, “McCarthy was released after spending 1,193 days as a 
prisoner of Hezbollah.”73 Outside Lebanon, Hezbollah, according to The Council on 
Foreign Relations (CFR) think tank, was accused of “two major 1990s attacks on 
Jewish targets in Argentina--the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy (killing twenty-
nine) and the 1994 bombing of a Jewish community centre (killing ninety-five).”74  
Furthermore, Hezbollah managed to be active in other areas of combat. The armed 
organization, according to Norton, “proved to be especially intolerant of the communist 
party. Dozens, if not hundreds, of party members were killed in a brutal, bloody 
campaign of suppression and assassination in 1984 and 1985” (Norton 2009:37). In 
addition to the Communist party, bloody battles took place between Hezbollah and the 
Amal movement. The battles aimed to extract the political and military decision in both 
the Southern suburb of Beirut and the South part of Lebanon. In these battles which led 
to thousands of casualties, the Amal movement, according to Norton, was badly 
defeated and Hezbollah’s attempts to roll back Amal influence succeeded in eroding 
Amal’s position (Norton 2009:44). In the southern suburb of Beirut, the violence 
resulted in defeating Amal utterly, which aided Hezbollah in becoming embroiled in a 
unique partisan model in the area; unlike in the Sothern part of Lebanon where it took 
Hezbollah years to branch out to all towns and villages and impose its presence strongly.  
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Hezbollah, after wresting the military decision in the Shiite areas, and after making sure 
that the Amal movement no longer represented a threat, directed its military activity 
entirely to fighting Israel. In 2000 Israel, on account of tremendous pressure from 
Hezbollah, withdrew from the Southern part of Lebanon after more than twenty years of 
occupation. The withdrawal of the Israeli troops did not convince Hezbollah to hand 
over its weapons. Hezbollah, however, insisted on keeping on the alert in order to repel 
any possible Israeli aggression. Indeed, Hezbollah who never trusted the Government, 
its institutions nor any of the political parties in Lebanon, once again, went to a war 
with Israel in 2006, after kidnapping two of its soldiers in South Lebanon. It was 
believed that the timing of the war served to corner Iran which at that time was facing a 
UN Security Council discussion on proposed sanctions against it. Lebanon suffered 
irreparable damage as a result of the war, with a great deal of lives lost and a break 
down in both its infrastructure and economy, but perhaps most significantly it also 
suffered a serious split in its society. Nasrallah recognizing the problem, “addressed the 
anger directed against his movement over the destruction and suffering” 75  that was 
caused by the July 12
th
 war. He, trying to silencing the Lebanese, declared victory 
against Israel and promised to rebuild what was destroyed.  
 
On May 7
th
 2008, Hezbollah “attacked west Beirut after the government announced the 
discovery of the Shiite party's surveillance network at Beirut's airport”76, in addition to a 
land-line telephone network that Hezbollah had installed in many parts of the country. 
The government, prior to Hezbollah’s attacks, took decisions to abort these surveillance 
and telecommunication networks. Nasrallah declared those government decisions as “an 
act of war” (Worth & Bakri 2008). During the attacks, the Lebanese army was no more 
than a spectator for its troops did not intervene to prevent Hezbollah from imposing its 
policy using the force of arms. After the attack, the government retreated and reversed 
the decisions taken. Following that, all parties went to Doha to discuss the problems and 
find solutions it. Professor Tarik Metri argues that what happened in Doha “had little to 
do with the norms of democracy” (Metri 2009). In fact, what happened was that an 
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agreement was reached based on the effects of the events of the 7
th
 May. This 
agreement produced a clear winner and a clear loser. The winner was evidently 
Hezbollah, who had pushed for the agreement to its satisfaction, and not the satisfaction 
of the Lebanese state and the legitimate ruling government. Thus, it is perhaps more 
accurate to say that the agreement was imposed by force and thus did not take into 
account any norms of democracy.  
 
In the same year, Hezbollah used its weapons again domestically, shooting a Lebanese 
army helicopter. In that assault, the pilot, an army officer was shot and died.  Hezbollah 
justified the accident by arguing that the helicopter was flying in the geographic scope 
of the resistance and thus the Hezbollah fighters thought that it was an Israeli helicopter. 
During the incident Hezbollah sent an indirect message to the Lebanese Army, which 
states that there are areas still under their arms influence and control, and thus, the 
Lebanese legitimate army is forbidden any access to it, and in the case the army does 
then they will be treated as an enemy. The Fighters who dropped the helicopter and 
killed the officer faced a mock trial, and were released weeks later. 
 
 
These activities summarize most of Hezbollah’s history and their armed activities since 
its origination. But, how does this armed organization operate? According to the 
London-based, well-known daily newspaper, Asharq Al-Awsat, Hezbollah has a 
military wing with a dynamic hierarchy which allows smaller subdivisions to take 
decisions at crucial moments regardless of the size of the resolution.
77
 The importance 
of this organization, according to the same newspaper, lies in the fact that it is the first 
armed organization that uses traditional military capabilities in the context of guerrilla 
warfare. Moreover, Elias Hanna, the strategic expert, argues that it is the first irregular 
armed faction that owns strategic weapons,. While Timur Goksel, the professor of 
political science at the American University of Beirut, and the former spokesperson on 
behalf of the UN forces in Lebanon, proclaimed to the same newspaper, that “Hezbollah 
fighters operate in groups of no more than 20 people that can hide their guns, but you 
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cannot destroy their military organization”.78 The military wing of Hezbollah, according 
to Asharq Al-Awsat, consists of several units. Each unit has its own specific task (see 
figure 3).  
 
 
 
 
 
Furthermore, Hezbollah fighters, according to The Guardian, form a series of 
components – these components are created based on particular specialties, for example, 
heavy weapons experts, rocket teams, scouts, infantry and those that work on a part-
time basis (See figure 4).  
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Figure 3: Military Wing 
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The Guardian reports that “Some units will be sent for training or operations for one, 
even two, years. Others continue to work or go to school. But even if you work your life 
is still Hezbollah…They call and that's it - you go. Maybe you tell your boss or 
professors you're going to Qatar or something for family reasons. But you never tell 
anyone what you're really doing.”79 
 
 
 
 
 
In addition to the above, Hezbollah created a War Information Unit. Its armed wing has 
formed the basis for parallel structures whose role it is to publicize Hezbollah’s actions. 
As early as 1984, Hezbollah has acknowledged the fact that it has and utilizes a War 
Information Unit, and that the principle role of this unit is to wage information of 
warfare which can be used directly against Israel. It does this by documenting every 
activity that Hezbollah militants conduct, in addition to recording their final testaments 
prior to “martyrdom” (Osipova 2011). During the last few years, especially between 
2005 and 2009, this unit was responsible for partaking in a propaganda war against 
opposing political parties and leaders in the country.  
The telecommunication private network discovered in 2008, that Hezbollah rolled out in 
most of Lebanon (see figure 5), represents a strategic arm of Hezbollah in its war with 
Israel in particular. Moreover, the network guarantees that Hezbollah’s leaders and 
fighters can contact each other without the risk of being monitored by the Lebanese 
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Figure 4: Hezbollah Fighters Specialities 
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authorities.  Hezbollah, declaring the importance of this network, stated in 2008 through 
its Secretary General, that the declaration of the Lebanese state to stop the network from 
functioning is a declaration of war on Hezbollah, and that the hand that extends to the 
network will be cut down. In 2008, the Minister of telecommunication in Lebanon 
argued that Iran’s telecommunication company controls Lebanon.80 Hamadeh stated that 
the network connects the southern suburb of Beirut with the Southern part of Lebanon 
down to the area of South Bekaa. The map below shows in which areas Hezbollah’s 
network was installed. This network, until now, has not been dismantled; indeed some 
information suggests that Hezbollah has started again the process of extending it to 
other Lebanese regions.
81
 
 
 
                                                          
80 http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11772 
81 http://www.nowlebanon.com/Arabic/NewsArchiveDetails.aspx?ID=306615 
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Figure 3 : Hezbollah Private Telecommunication Network (Adopted from www.geopolitique.com) 
 
 
 
In short, the Military Wing of Hezbollah, in addition to its Sociopolitical Wing, shows 
that Hezbollah since its formation started gradually building the infrastructure of its 
own state. The militant activities that Hezbollah conducted over the years, before and 
after Taif agreement, demonstrate that they were no more than destabilizing activities 
which aim to weaken the Lebanese state, as weakening the Lebanese state offers 
Hezbollah the opportunity to strengthen its own presence. In other words, Hezbollah as 
a political and military force cannot reach its goals when the state itself is strong. 
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Otherwise, what is the meaning of establishing fringe institutions similar to those run by 
the state, like hospitals, schools, a telecommunication network and an army? And what 
is the significance of establishing these institutions in the light of a clear political 
conception which did not recognize the state in the beginning and later did not trust its 
governments and its political components?  
The next section will shed the light on an important stage in recent history of Lebanon, 
which led to the establishment of a new political coalition that opposes Hezbollah. This 
broad political coalition adopted a political discourse and project that opposed the 
policies of Hezbollah, while supporting that which calls for the rebuilding of a strong 
Lebanese state. It called for disarming Hezbollah and restoring the prestige of the state 
and its institutions.  However, this coalition which enjoyed a wide public support in 
Lebanon, was prevented from implementing its political plan, and thus failed miserably.  
 
6.4 The March 14 Political Coalition  
 
The March 14
th
 coalition is a political coalition that was not found through a mere twist 
of fate, but in fact there were several factors that contributed and led to its foundation. 
However, this political coalition did not only consist of newly established political 
parties (i.e. After Taif), but also of political parties that participated, like Hezbollah, in 
the Lebanese civil war of 1975. Moreover, this coalition, in addition to the political 
parties that have flocked in, is composed of civil society representatives, which are 
rarely allowed to be a part in the development of any political decision in Lebanon.  
 
In the next section, this Coalition will be discussed, both the circumstances that led to 
its establishment, and the role that it played in the Lebanese political life after 2004. It is 
worth mentioning that Hezbollah was extensively discussed through many chapters in 
this research because of the fact that its establishment precedes in many years the 
establishment of the March 14
th
 coalition as a whole. Moreover, the political 
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confrontation that occurred in the last few years occurred between the March 14
th
 
Coalition as an interconnected unit with Hezbollah. 
 
6.4.1 The road map that led to its Establishment  
 
In 2000 the Israeli occupying troops left Lebanon after more than 30 years of 
occupation. But these troops withdrew beyond the Lebanese border only after an intense 
Lebanese national resistance that lasted for decades. However, the earlier mentioned 
circumstances,
82
 that lead to a phase in which resistance operations in south Lebanon 
were seized by Hezbollah in the 1990’s, resulted in giving gratitude to Hezbollah solely. 
After the Israeli troops withdrew, anxiety against the unending “presence” of the Syrian 
troops in Lebanon started to take place. In the same year, it was the Christian religious 
authority that was first to raise the voice against the continued Syrian “presence” in 
Lebanon. In his book David Hirst, Beware of Small states reports it as follows:  
 
 “[After the Israeli withdrawn from South Lebanon], agitation against the continuing 
presence of the other intruder, Syria, began to make itself felt, the Maronites led it. 
Their Patriarch, Archbishop Nasrallah Sfeir, called on Syria to fulfill its long 
overdue obligation, under the Taif accord, to pull back its troops to the Beqa’a valley; 
then, more boldly, a conclave of Maronite Bishops lamented Lebanon’s ‘loss of 
sovereignty’ and the ‘hegemony imposed on all its institutions’.” (Hirst 2011:298)  
 
After the Maronite Patriarch’s several addresses, followed by the Christian Maronite 
bishops’ call, the Druze leader, Walid Junblatt, who was close to the Syrian regime, also 
voiced the same demand. Later on, senior and junior politicians and journalists joined 
the same campaign and started expressing similar sentiments.  Hirst mentioned it as 
follows:  
“More significant was the very similar position taken by Druze chieftain Walid 
Jumblatt, an official ‘ally’ of Syria, who in due course emerged as the opposition’s 
                                                          
82 See Chapter 6 section 6.3 and  6.3.2.1 
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effective leader. Even more remarkable still than this coming together of the Two 
oldest and most rooted, but perhaps most reciprocally hostile, of Lebanese 
communities, were the Muslim voices, [some of which are Shi’a elites] mainly Sunni, 
now being raised in favor of a more balanced and equitable relationship with Syria” 
(Hirst 2011:298). 
At that period of time, a group of opinion leaders used to routinely meet with Bishop 
Joseph Bishara to discuss the era after the bishops’ call and to foresee ideas for the next 
stage. Shortly after these constant meetings, the announcement of The Qornet Shehwan 
Gathering on the 30
th
 of April 2001 occurred, from under the cloak of Patriarch Sfeir. 
This Gathering included politicians, intellectuals, and businessmen, mostly Christian 
ranging in ideology from the Centre-right to the center-left. The Gathering, which was 
looked at as the Political wing of Patriarch Sfeir, succeeded in becoming the principle 
moral compass of the Christians. The main points that the Gathering called for were as 
follows:
83
 
1- Encouraging the Lebanese Authorities, who guard the constitution, to 
work on implementing its provisions. In addition, encouraging the 
authorities to restore the national sovereignty of Lebanon through 
applying the Taif Accord, particularly the term related to the 
redeployment of Syrian troops in preparation for a full withdrawal from 
Lebanon in accordance with a clear timetable. 
2- Protecting democracy and setting it in motion on the basis that people are 
the source of all authorities. This could happen by securing the 
independence of the judiciary; respecting human rights and applying a 
new electoral law that provides a rightful representation. In addition, 
preserving public and individual freedom and the reducing the 
intervention of security agencies in all areas. 
3- Moving forward to complete the comprehensive national reconciliation, 
ensuring the return of the exiled, releasing political prisoners and 
opening a new phase in the life of the Lebanese. 
 
                                                          
83 http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&article=37760&issueno=8190 
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The security agencies in Lebanon tried many times to confront the Gathering through an 
intensive campaign which aimed to intimidate it. The campaign reached its peak on 
August 7
th
, 2001, when the security agencies lunched a number of raids and arrested 
hundreds of the supporters of the Gathering. The Gathering, despite all the pressure, 
continued at the same level of effectiveness and kept demanding the restoration of full 
sovereignty, including sending the Lebanese army to the Sothern part of Lebanon.  
From 2005 to 2011, Lebanon witnessed a number of significant successive events, 
including the issuing of the UN resolution 1559, which called for the withdrawal of the 
Syrian troops from Lebanon, a democratic election for a new president and the 
disarming of all Lebanese militias. Moreover, that era witnessed the establishment of a 
wide Islamic-Christian opposition against Syria and Hezbollah. It also saw the 
beginning of the assassinations era which started with Marwan Hamadeh, the former 
Minister of Telecommunication. Hamadeh, in an interview conducted by the Researcher, 
explains a lot of what happened during that phase: 
 
“I thought at that time in addition to [Rafic] Hariri and [Walid] Jumbaltt, and others, 
- Of course Aoun and Geagea were still one in exile and the other in prison -, that the 
election of 2004 would be the chance to make a democratic change of the president 
and to remove some of this mandate (Syrian mandate) on Lebanon which had 
become very heavy. It was no more a friendly coverage of security in Lebanon. This 
mandate was getting into everything, no contract could be singed without the Syrians 
having their share, nothing, and the whole country was becoming a subdued western 
province of the Syrian regime. We started working on changing the president. We 
even thought that by getting a president friendly to Syria, but with other 
specifications than the ones of Emille Lahoud, we could save at least the essentials 
and basics of this Lebanese folktale democracy which is unique in the region, and 
also stop the intelligence and military control over the political and economic life. 
Parallel to that, we had an intensive pressure from the Europeans with whom we 
have signed the corporation agreement in Brussels. Both from the French because of 
Mr. Chirac’s policy and from the Americans to obtain the implementation of the Taif 
agreement, which calls for the redeployment of the Syrian troops and then negotiate 
with the Lebanese government to agree on a withdrawal schedule under the pretext of 
a defence political agreement. So, they had put in place all the agreements but not the 
implementation of a withdrawal schedule.  Anyway, what came into parallel with all 
the aforementioned factors was the slow burse at the security council of a resolution 
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asking Syria to redeploy out of Lebanon and the election of new president. 
Apparently, the Syrians reacted brutally to both issues. They didn’t want to hear 
about the redeployment, nor about changing Emille Lahoud. So, in other words, they 
were planning to resist the resolution 1559, which wasn’t yet adopted. . At that time, 
they [the Syrian regime] threatened [Rafic] Hariri, [Walid] Jumbaltt and even [Nabih] 
Berri – in their own way, but the others brutally, saying, ‘we will destroy Lebanon 
upon your head if you don’t elect Lahoud, Lahoud is us.’ Later on, we went to the 
parliament, we voted against Lahoud, we got out of the government, I and my block 
resigned, and then we started creating gradually a real opposition movement, and it 
was limited at the beginning to the twenty-nine MPS’ that have voted against the re-
elections, Hariri wasn’t a part of them, two or three of his block voted with us.  It was 
what Annahar daily newspaper described, the honour list of twenty-nine MPS’ who 
voted against the re-elections. On the 15 of September we published the first 
declaration. I and Basem Al Sabea [Former Shiite Minister] wrote it, asking for the 
immediate redeployment of Syrian troops. The pro-Syrian camp at once accused us 
saying that we were the creators of the resolution 1559, and then, on the 1st of 
October, as I was going out of my house, an explosion targeted me. I escaped by 
miracle but my bodyguard was killed.  It was obvious for me, Hariri and Jumbaltt 
that the explosion was a direct message to Rafic Al Hariri and Walid Jumbaltt 
because I was their common friend and the bridge that links them with each other. 
But this explosion didn’t push us to stop. We continued developing the opposition as 
we were approaching the election’s deadline in May and June 2005. At that time we 
developed the first cell of the opposition into what we called the Bristol Gathering.  In 
every meeting of the Bristol Gathering, more MPS and more political figures were 
joining us all over the country. Progressively, I remember personally, I was 
recovering from the explosion, fourteen surgeries, and Hariri got convinced that he 
should play it through the elections. It was obvious he had left the government, and 
the Syrians with the re-elected Lahoud constituted a pro-Syrian government, and they 
started to impose on us pro-Syrian candidates for the elections. Hariri refused and 
said no, we will head to the elections with no pro-Syria candidates among us.  And 
you know, at the time there was no 14th of March yet, nor 14th of February yet, it 
was the Bristol gathering widening.  Then, at one moment, as a preventive drastic 
action against the opposition, and when it became clear for them that the opposition 
will win the elections, Rafic Hariri was assassinated and killed. The goal was to let 
everybody in Lebanon panic about it and collapse. Moreover, everybody will be afraid 
and as a result nobody will go to the elections, and the Bristol gathering will 
disappear. They, they wanted to gather the government that should have resigned 
after such an assassination, to call on the parliament to adopt their electoral law. 
Business as usual, Rafic is killed. The reaction of the Lebanese people was different; 
it was the Cedar revolution, between February 14
th
 and March 14
th
 of 2005, when 
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people started increasing in their gatherings. On the 28
th
 of February, we had a very 
strong confrontation in the Parliament with the Government of Mr. Omar Karami.  
Our speeches were very harsh, mine particularly. In the afternoon Karami resigned 
and then after that the fall down of the Syrian hegemony over the country started. 
The decision to speed up the withdrawal was taken. We never thought they will 
withdraw, we thought they will make a redeployment only, but in fact, they withdrew 
later to the border and then outside Lebanon.”(Hamadeh 2009) 
 
Marwan Hamadeh in his argument summarizes an entire period that he witnessed 
himself.  He was a prominent member of the opposition at that time and on the top of 
the list that was targeted. That phase was the one that chronicled the start of the era of 
political assassinations in post-Taif period. Moreover, it was the era that divided the 
country into two opposing camps, Hezbollah and its allies, March 8
th
 on one side and 
the March 14
th
 on the other.  
The March 14
th
 coalition was named after the mass anti-Syrian demonstration “on that 
date in 2005 in which over one million Lebanese converged on central Beirut to demand 
a withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon and an end to Syrian meddling in Lebanese 
political affairs.” 84  This demonstration was held as a reaction to the pro-Syrian 
demonstration on March 8
th
 2005. David Hirst describes the March 14
th
 demonstration 
as follows:  
 
 “This time, fully a million converged on Martyrs’ Square. That represented 
something between a quarter and a third of the entire population, ‘equivalent’, 
remarked Nadim Shehadi, a Lebanese Scholar at Chatham House, ‘to twenty million 
British demonstrators showing up at Trafalgar Square’. The day on which this took 
place, 14 March, became the name of the political coalition to which the Intifada 
gave birth, just as ‘8 March’ furnished the label by which Hizbullah and its friends 
identified themselves.”(Hirst 2011:309) 
 
 
                                                          
84Key Issues - March 14 
http://www.nowlebanon.com/Sub.aspx?ID=165&MID=31&PID=25&FParentID=23&FFParentID=3 
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These demonstrations which were triggered by the assassination of the former Prime 
Minister Rafic Hariri caused Lebanon to progress from one stage to another. The anger 
of the one million people that gathered in 2005 fuelled the desire to move forward 
towards a free Lebanon. In due course, Saad Hariri, the former Prime Minster and the 
head of the parliamentary majority of 2005 and 2009, in an interview with the 
Researcher, claimed that “on the 14th of March 2005, this huge demonstration that 
happened, the Cedar Revolution, was the day where the people said what they wanted, 
while the politicians didn’t understand what the people wanted” (Hariri 2008). It can be 
argued that Hariri’s criticism of the coalition to which he belongs held certain truths. 
After the parliamentary elections of 2005, “the first parliamentary elections since before 
Lebanon's civil war without overt and overbearing Syrian control” (Yacoubian   2009), 
the March 14
th
 coalition started to drop many of the ‘peoples’ slogans on the table for 
negotiations.  
Having spoken of the demonstrations and the reasons that agitated them, as well as the 
March 14
th
 coalition that, according to Hariri, didn’t meet people’s needs, it becomes 
pertinent to enter into a debate concerning the March 14
th
 governance experience. Its 
political manifesto must also be discussed, especially regarding whether the manifesto 
has been successfully adopted or dropped, and also, whether the governance experience 
the March 14
th
 coalition have practiced has lived up to the level of the expectations 
found in their slogans.  
 
6.4.2 The March 14
th
 Governance Experience:  Failures and Successes 
 
After its establishment, the March 14
th
 coalition adopted the demands of the Lebanese 
citizens demands which, thereafter, shaped the philosophy of its political manifesto. 
Through the years this political coalition raised a number of slogans, some of which 
were short term while the rest were perpetual and strategic. Having divided the March 
14
th
 slogans into two parts, one should discuss the strategic goals that the March 14
th
 
coalition raised and stuck to. 
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As for the permanent slogans and goals that the March 14
th
 raised, they could be 
summarized as follows:  
1- Implementing the Taif agreement provisions which are related to 
disarming militias, including those inside and outside the Palestinian 
camps.  
2- Disarming Hezbollah. 
3- Building a just, sovereign, democratic and modern state. 
 
The March 14
th
 coalition managed, through international support from the United 
Nations and local wide popular support gained – and increased with time- after the 
assassination of Rafic Hariri, to embrace the accomplishment of forcing Syria to 
withdraw its troops from Lebanon in April 2005. The 1559 resolution
85
 of 2004 was the 
first UN resolution that explicitly asked Syria to withdraw its army from Lebanon. 
Moreover, it stressed in its content those factors that were mentioned in the Taif 
agreement. In other words, it was a complementary and supportive resolution to the 
provisions of the Taif agreement. However, the resolution remained a matter of intense 
debate in Lebanon and Syria, until the moment of Hariri’s assassination. It can be 
argued that Hariri's assassination, gave the impetus for this resolution to be 
implemented. Moreover, on the one hand the credit goes to the 1559 resolution that 
called upon Syria to withdraw and leave Lebanon to establish its sovereignty over all of 
its land.  On the other hand, the credit also goes to the Lebanese who engaged in 
demonstrations after the assassination of Rafic Hariri.  
 
After the Syrian withdrawal, the March 14
th
 coalition started to sense the ecstasy of 
victory and began to act accordingly even with the people who had given that coalition 
the popular legitimacy of its political project. The rebelling people's mood in 2005, and 
                                                          
85 The 1559 UN resolution that was adopted on September 2, 2004, called upon Lebanon to establish its sovereignty over all 
of its land and called upon "foreign forces", i.e. Israel and Syria, to withdraw from Lebanon and stop their intervention in 
the internal politics of Lebanon. The resolution also called on all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias i.e. Palestinian 
Militias, to disband. The resolution also declared support for a "free and fair electoral process".  
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thus their moral compass, were focusing on one goal: building a Lebanese sovereign 
and independent state that would end all the effects of the thirty years of Syrian 
“presence” in Lebanon, and thus, isolate all political agendas, including that one of 
Hezbollah, that are contrary to building the sovereign and independent state. However, 
the coalition decided not to listen to the voice of the rebelling people, and went, 
abandoning one of its founders, the Free Patriotic Movement, to an electoral agreement, 
in some constituencies, with Hezbollah and its allies, called the quadruple alliance. 
Following the decision to ignore the views of the rebelling people, several months 
passed before the March 14
th
 coalition reached an electoral agreement with Hezbollah. 
At this time, Samir Kassir, a member of the Lebanese opposition at the time, noticed 
and consequently mentioned, before his assassination on the 2
nd
 of June 2005, the 
downward path in how the opposition was conducting its supporters. After the March 
14
th
 demonstration of 2005, the demonstration which led to the name of that opposition, 
Kassir wrote in his column in An-Nahar, the leading Arabic-language daily newspaper: 
 
 
“The demonstration - the event, nobody has said enough about it, or what should be 
said about it. It is the largest opposition demonstration in Arab modern history. In 
relative measurements, i.e., compared with the number of the population, it may be 
one of the largest demonstrations in the world history, and only can be compared 
with the French Revolution in the summer of 1789, also with the days of March and 
November 1917 during the two Russian revolutions, and with the Iranian revolution 
when people marched the streets in fall 1978 and winter 1979… This in itself 
requires a moment of meditation, and also requires a moment of modesty from all. 
What a third of the Lebanese did in that day was a confirmation that the 
independence state which the country is living in at the moment is greater than all 
those who contributed in assembling it and greater than those who sought to lead it… 
It is anomalous that the opposition waits more than two weeks to hold a public 
meeting in order to appreciate what happened on March 14
th
 and deliver a tribute to 
the people who made this day. And it is anomalous to leave the mobilization of this 
day fade away, as if it is being said to the people: Well done, go back to your homes 
now, we will contact you if we need you again” (Kassir 2005). 
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Kassir’s words reveal how the campaigning people and millions of protestors were 
viewed as means to achieve a political victory by the opposition leaders, without any 
regard to their feelings, ambitions and efforts. In the same article, Kassir wrote about 
the power lust he started to see among the opposition members, asking for a new 
Intifada within the Intifada which establishes a modern state, a state of citizens.  
Regarding the electoral deal which the March 14
th
 coalition made with Hezbollah in 
2005 in some constituencies; one can see that this was when the March 14 launched its 
first strike on democracy and the democratic system it was hoping to build. Firstly, 
regardless of the fact that the March 14
th
 coalition colluded with an armed organization 
that violates Lebanon’s sovereignty and Laws, and thus contradicted its own political 
slogans which call for freedom, independence and sovereignty and the building of a 
strong and just state, it entered a majority’s sectarian coalition which marginalized 
minorities, and denied them any opportunity to be represented in the parliament.  For 
example, the March 14
th
 coalition accepted and helped Hezbollah in monopolizing the 
representation of the Shiite community, at the time the Shi’a weren’t, as a whole, 
supporting Hezbollah, but a reasonable percentage of them were supporting the March 
14
th
 coalition. Moreover, this electoral deal, according to Hussein el-Husseini, the 
former speaker of the Lebanese parliament, was “a major blow to the Lebanese national 
composition, because it made the Christians feel that they were not partners in the 
decision.”86 This feeling, according to Husseini, had its implications in terms of political 
structure, and consequently led to a sharp political division among the Lebanese. In 
addition, it can be argued that the deal was one that took place between status quo 
forces, those forces who had chosen to replace the constitution and use the agreement as 
their organizational reference to regulate power-sharing.  
 
After being granted the parliamentary majority in the elections of 2005, the March 14
th
 
coalition broke its temporary electoral alliance with Hezbollah, and swept to power on a 
wave of both popular anger and hope. The March 14
th
 coalition which represented at the 
time the parliamentary majority formed and “dominated the cabinet,” (Hirst 2011:313) 
                                                          
86 http://annaharkw.com/annahar/Article.aspx?id=283886&date=15042010 
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but instead of starting to apply the new values and principles it called for, were 
equivalent to a second strike against democracy and democratic values. The March 14
th
 
coalition, as a parliamentary majority, decided not to act as a majority, and thus, decided 
not to go for a majority rule, a rule which is often listed as a characteristic of democracy. 
However, the coalition went back to the same old Lebanese style: applying the 
confessional system in its worst form, through asking the minority to participate in the 
cabinet as the legal representatives of their sects. In other words, it contributed in 
bringing into being a government which looked like a board of party members’ 
delegates that represent their sects.  
Accordingly, that cabinet of 2005 marked the era of Hezbollah’s direct participation in 
the Lebanese government, and thus, marked the era of its direct involvement in the 
Lebanese politics through a cabinet. The Syrian troops’ “presence” in Lebanon was 
used to exempt Hezbollah from this involvement, but after its withdrawal, Hezbollah 
found the need to participate directly and “insert itself more strongly into the Lebanese 
power structure” (Hirst 2011:313). Naim Qasim, the deputy secretary-general of 
Hezbollah, comments on this need to change by arguing that Syria’s withdrawal “made 
us directly responsible for providing the domestic protection in a better way than 
before” (Hirst 2011:313). Presumably, if it is argued that the March 14th coalition did 
the right thing in containing Hezbollah in the cabinet, then, Qasim’s statement reveals 
otherwise. It reveals that the March 14
th
 coalition did not accept Hezbollah’s 
participation in the cabinet on a basis that corresponds to the slogans it raised and stated 
which, as mentioned earlier, call for the building of a democratic, sovereign and 
independent state. But rather it demonstrates that Hezbollah’s participation occurred 
according to Hezbollah’s own conditions, and thus, did not occur in accordance with the 
parliamentary majority’s conditions. It also suggests that Hezbollah’s participation was 
not aiming for the development of the state, but its intention, according to Qasim, was 
to protect Hezbollah as an armed organization. The agreement between Hezbollah and 
the March 14
th
 coalition, whose pompous manifestation appeared in the cabinet’s 
opening policy statement, a statement which “praised the ‘resistance’ as a ‘natural, 
honest expression of the Lebanese people’s national right to liberate their land’,” (Hirst 
2011:313) confirms this argument. As was discussed earlier in this chapter, Hezbollah, 
starting from the early 1990’s, managed to seize resistance operations, with the result 
that a strong bond occurred between Hezbollah and the resistance. In other words, 
204 
 
Hezbollah, in the Lebanese political literature, became the resistance, and the resistance 
became Hezbollah. Accordingly, this means that the cabinet of 2005, when in its 
opening policy praised the resistance, then, automatically, it praised Hezbollah.  
The step carried out by the March 14
th
 coalition, which legitimized the participation of 
both the majority and the opposition together in one government, had a disabling effect 
on the role of the parliament, where the government is held accountable for its decisions. 
In other words, when a cabinet is formed, it does so on the basis that it is a collective 
decision-making body, and its members, when making major decisions, do so 
collectively, and are therefore, collectively responsible for the consequences of these 
decisions. The opposition which takes place in the parliament, in this case fails the task 
of keeping the cabinet accountable through the means of monitoring, examining and 
criticizing the cabinet’s policies and decisions. In the case of the 2005 cabinet, this 
theory was abolished, as the majority and the opposition where in the same cabinet 
taking decisions collectively, therefore, the role of the opposition in monitoring, 
examining and criticizing the cabinet’s policies and decisions  in the parliament was 
eliminated. However, the “unnatural marriage” (Hirst 2011:313) between the majority 
and the opposition did not last for long. A few months after the cabinet's formation, 
particularly on the 12
th
 of December 2005, a car bomb killed the plain-spoken Lebanese 
journalist MP Gibran Tueni. This issue sparked a controversy in the cabinet and resulted 
on the cabinet no longer being a collective decision-making body. Consequently, a 
crisis in the cabinet loomed after Hezbollah ministers, “protesting a violation of the 
consensus rule, staged a walked out from the cabinet” (Hirst 2011:314). In doing this 
Hezbollah visibly demonstrated its disapproval at the decision of the Lebanese cabinet 
to officially request that the UN form a quasi-international court which would convene 
both inside and outside Lebanon, in order to try those who had been accused in the 
assassination of former premier Rafik Hariri, in addition to the request that the UN 
probe be expanded so that it might incorporate all the murder attempts and 
assassinations in Lebanon.
87
After this step, a war of words broke out between the March 
14
th
 coalition on the one side, and Hezbollah and its allies on the other. The March 14
th
 
coalition returned to ‘state’ speeches, arguing that the Hezbollah ‘state-within-the-state’ 
                                                          
87 http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/Dec/13/Cabinet-agrees-to-international-court-as-Amal-and-Hizbullah-stage-
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should stop, while Hezbollah, insisting on sticking to its arms, refused the March 14
th
 
coalition’s speech . For example, Walid Jumblat, the Druze leader, and the ‘shadow 
leader’ of the March 14th coalition at the time, expressed the majority’s desire to see a 
one central State that hasn’t got any other state within it.  David Hirst puts it as follows:  
 
 “[After Hezbollah’s ministers walk-out from the Cabinet], among the ’14 March 
majority’ it was Jumblat, the great ‘prestidigitator’ of Lebanese politics, who now 
turned most strongly against the organization he had hitherto sought to accommodate. 
The ‘war of liberation’ was over, he said, Nasrallah should turn in his weapons and 
dismantle his ‘state-within-a-state’, for ‘no country in the world allows an irregular 
militia to take law and order duties along with its regular forces’. But Hizbullah 
would have none of it. Had not Narallah, in a rousing speech with this self-same 
Jumblat at his side, already warned: ‘If anyone tries to disarm the resistance, we will 
fight him the way martyrs fought in Karbala’ and ‘consider any hand that tries to 
seize our weapons an Israeli hand, and cut it off’?” (Hirst 2011:314) 
 
This discourse, inevitably, did not persuade Hezbollah that handing over its arms was a 
necessity was being submissive to the state’s rule of law. However, in 2006, it led to the 
conviction of all parties to sit around a dialogue table to resolve the outstanding issues. 
Through the acceptance of a dialogue outside the state’s institutional framework, the 
March 14
th
 coalition, again, embarked a new institutional decline. In other words, any 
political dialogue, in any country, which aims to resolve outstanding issues, usually 
takes place in democratically elected institutions .i.e. the Parliament, while in the case 
of Lebanon, the ‘national dialogue’ by-passed the elected institutions, and happened 
between litigants political leaders. The March 14
th
 coalition, whether forced or not, 
erred in accepting this form of dialogue, because by doing so, it accepted laying a new 
political norm which says that any political problem, that cannot be solved according to 
the Lebanese laws within the democratically elected institutions, can be carried over to 
outside these institutions in order to reach a settlement. Moreover, the March 14
th
 
coalition, which was by then heading the cabinet, bucked the slogans it raised, which 
called for the building of a sovereign, independent and democratic state, as building a 
sovereign state requires enforcing the law and not going for a dialogue with an armed 
organization that is violating the state’s sovereignty.  
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The ‘national dialogue’ of 2006, which indicated and confirmed the absence of the 
poorly operating democratic institutions, did not lead to a result which upheld the 
state’s rule of law, nor indeed what the Taif agreement and the 1559 resolution had 
called for. However, it led to Hezbollah sticking once again to its argument. David 
Hirst puts it as follows:  
 
 “During a so-called ‘national dialogue’ between the country’s major leaders, about 
a ‘national defense’ strategy and other contentious issues that were threatening to 
tear the country apart, it argued that Hizbullah itself, not the national army, should 
assume the principle burden of defense, since it, and it alone, had the capacity to 
‘deter’ Israeli aggression.” (Hirst 2011:315) 
 
The promise of stability on the border with Israel, which was popular at the time that 
Nasrallah gave one of the dialogue sessions, did not last for long. In the same year, 
particularly on the 12
th
 of July 2006, Hezbollah “guerillas captured two Israeli soldiers 
in a cross-border raid, triggering the first Israeli land incursion into the country since 
2000.”88 This capturing operation, which Hezbollah conducted without any coordination 
with the Lebanese government and the national security forces, ignited a thirty-three 
day war between Hezbollah and Israel. Narallah, showing regret after the war, said in a 
TV interview “that he would not have ordered the capture of two Israeli soldiers if he 
had known it would lead to such a war.”89  Nasrallah’s argument came after some 
observers thought that the war was to benefit the cornered Iranian regime. They 
understood that the war of 2006 was a proxy war and that “Hizbollah’s missiles were to 
deter Israel, the United States or anyone else from attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities” 
(Nakhleh 2007). According to Hany T. Nakhleh, the Lieutenant Colonel in the Lebanese 
Army, the war between Hezbollah and Israel was an indirect Iranian “show of force” 
(Nakhleh 2007).He continued that the Iranian regime would try to benefit from this 
show of force to “influence western interests and move forward in its nuclear program” 
                                                          
88 Hezbollah seizes Israel soldiers – BBC - Wednesday, 12 July 2006  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/5171616.stm 
89Nasrallah: "If I Had Known ..." - 8/27/2006 – cbs news  
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(Nakhleh 2007). The position of the March 14
th
  Coalition, which was leading the 
Lebanese government at that time, was not far away from adopting the argument which 
said that Lebanon became a mere hostage of Iranian politics, and that the war of 2006 
happened according to the desire of the Iranian regime. Moreover, “they had long 
charged that of all the rights of a sovereign state which Hezbollah has effectively 
usurped the most fundamental, and dangerous, was the right to decide on matters of war 
and peace” (Hirst 2011:339). According to the Economist which reported at that time 
the March 14
th
 coalition’s point of view from the war: 
 
 “[The] “March 14th movement”, blames Hizbullah for having started a war that 
killed 1,200 Lebanese, scorched dozens of villages and shattered much of the 
country's infrastructure. Rather than deterring Israel, said a March 14th statement, 
the Shia party's weapons had turned Lebanon into “a battleground used by Iran to 
improve its bargaining position with the international community and by the Syrian 
regime to exercise its hegemony over Lebanon.”90 
This position that the March 14
th
 coalition took made Hezbollah sharpen its mistrust 
discourse against the Lebanese government, accusing the latter of conspiring against the 
resistance. However, the March 14
th
 coalition, and thus, the Lebanese government, 
achieved a partial success, for the benefit of the Lebanese state. The success was 
achieved through the 1701
91
UN resolution which stopped the war. The importance of 
the resolution lies in its emphasis on several factors, including the one related to the 
deployment of the Lebanese Army Forces in southern Lebanon. Additionally, it 
reiterated what the Taif agreement and the 1559 resolution called for regarding the 
disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon. Moreover, it called upon the Lebanese 
government to exercise its full sovereignty on all Lebanon’s territory. In some of its 
provisions, the resolution called for:  
 
 “[The resolution] calls for a full cessation of hostilities based upon, in particular, 
the immediate cessation by Hizbollah of all attacks and the immediate cessation by 
                                                          
90 Lebanon after the war - Hizbullah's new offensive. The Economist- 2006 - http://www.economist.com/node/7912789 
91 The 1701 was unanimously approved by the United Nations Security Council on 11 August 2006. 
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Israel of all offensive military operations. [The resolution] emphasizes the 
importance of the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all 
Lebanese territory in accordance with the provisions of resolution 1559 (2004) and 
resolution 1680 (2006), and of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, for it to 
exercise its full sovereignty, so that there will be no weapons without the consent of 
the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government of 
Lebanon … [The resolution calls for the] Full implementation of the relevant 
provisions of the Taif Accords, and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), that 
require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so that, pursuant to the 
Lebanese cabinet decision of 27 July 2006, there will be no weapons or authority in 
Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese State … no foreign forces in Lebanon 
without the consent of its Government … no sales or supply of arms and related 
materiel to Lebanon except as authorized by its Government”92  
In addition to the fact that the resolution was released to protect Lebanon from Israel 
through stopping its military operations, the resolution was clear in showing that it was 
also released to satisfy another job: protecting Lebanon from Hezbollah. It is clear that 
the resolution requested directly that Hezbollah, not the Lebanese government, stop its 
attacks, which reveals two hidden truths which the United Nations took into 
consideration: firstly, it implies that the group which triggered the conflict from the 
Lebanese side was Hezbollah and not the Lebanese government. Secondly, it shows that 
the Lebanese government was not the party that demanded the end of military 
operations, but Hezbollah through the Lebanese government. Moreover, the above 
quotation from the resolution shows that Hezbollah suffered a new crisis of legitimacy. 
In contrast, it emphasized the State's right to establish its legitimacy, with the help of the 
United Nations, on the entire national territory, including those under the influence of 
Hezbollah. Furthermore, the resolution, as the above quotation demonstrates, stresses 
the assertion of the movement’s authority, and thus emphasizes the need to restore the 
rule of law in south Lebanon, by the expulsion of Hezbollah militants from the area of 
operations of the Lebanese army and international forces, and the importance of 
stopping weapons smuggling from Syria into the Lebanese territory in order to ensure 
stability in the region. Through these assertions, the international community delivered 
a message to Iran and Syria that they should stop using Hezbollah as their proxy in 
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Lebanon. Also, these assertions demonstrated that the resolution aimed to provide 
protection to the people of Lebanon, particularly to those in the south and to Lebanon 
itself as well, the country which suffered from the existence of illegal weapons since the 
signing of the previously discussed Cairo Agreement of 1969, an agreement which led 
to the abandonment of the Lebanese authorities and thus its sovereignty in parts of the 
country’s territories. The most important part of the resolution was its emphasis on the 
previously discussed Taif agreement as a base for extending the state’s authority and 
sovereignty all over the Lebanese territory, including the southern part, where there 
should be no illegitimate weapons, but only those of the legitimate state.   
This resolution, which was approved by Hezbollah, marked a step forward toward the 
consolidation of the state’s authority. Moreover, the Lebanese government of 2006, 
headed by the March 14
th
 coalition, achieved a victory which enabled the state to work 
logically. However, Hezbollah, after the implementation of the resolution, decided to 
respond in retaliation. Nasrallah, the Secretary General of the armed organization, while 
seeing, “the southern villagers fleeing in packed cars with their possessions strapped on 
top flutter” (Koteich 2010), returning back to their villages, insisted on projecting his 
armed organization as the victor of its confrontation with Israel. On the 14
th
 of August 
2006, Nasrallah, after thanking “God for what he called ‘a divine, historic and strategic 
victory’” 93  over Israel, told the crowds that “his guerrillas will not surrender their 
weapons until a stronger Lebanese government is in place — including 20,000 rockets 
his group claims to still have after its 34-day war with Israel.”94 In the same speech, and 
also in later speeches, he announced that the Government of the March 14
th
 coalition, 
which is western-backed, must leave. David Hirst portrays it as follows: 
 
 “The western-backed, ‘14 March majority’ government, he now proclaimed, had to 
go. It was unfit to rule. A ‘national unity government’ should take its place, a 
government that would rebuild Lebanon as ‘just, strong, capable, honorable and 
                                                          
93 Hezbollah chief Nasrallah refuses to disarm - In first appearance since war, leader hails ‘divine victory’ over Israel- 
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resisting state’ which could ‘truly protect’ its citizens with arms, power, reason, unity, 
organization, planning and national will’; a ‘proud and noble’ state which rejected 
‘foreign tutelage or hegemony’, and a ‘clean’ state that banished ‘theft and 
waste’…[Nasrallah believed that] under this state, this authority, this regime … any 
talk of surrendering the resistance weapons means keeping Lebanon exposed to an 
Israel that can bomb, kill and kidnap as it wants, and plunder our land and waters ” 
(Hirst 2011:383-384). 
 
Nasrallah, fulfilling his promise to topple the ‘western-backed’ government, appeared a 
few months later on Hezbollah’s Al-Manar television, and ordered a peaceful sit-in 
protest in Beirut to topple the Lebanese government. According to the New York Times, 
“Hezbollah and its political allies planned [on the 1st of December 2006] to occupy the 
center of this city … with a massive sit-in that would last as long as it took to force the 
government to resign” (Slackman 2006). Nasrallah, who ceased to appear in person after 
the war of 2006, continued saying in his address that Lebanon, because of its structure, 
diversity, nature and confidentiality, “cannot be ruled by one single party and cannot be 
ruled by a specific coalition to solve its problems, especially in light of the internal 
difficult conditions, which are regionally more difficult and internationally very 
dangerous" (Slackman 2006). Nasrallah’s speech demonstrates that, at that period of 
time, he did not recognize the results of the 2005 parliamentary elections, which 
produced a parliamentary majority and minority. As discussed in an earlier chapter, 
democracy, on a wider scale, means something deeper and broader than sheer elections, 
however, elections constitute an essential and important part of democracy. 
Consequently, it can be argued that Nasrallah since he rejected the outcome of the 2005 
elections is thus conspiring against an essential part of democracy and hence 
encouraging a breakup in the country.  
The next day Hezbollah, as its leader promised, staged a mass protest and sit-in in the 
center of Beirut, meters away from the complex which houses the government's offices. 
Hezbollah partisans, setting up water tanks, portable latrines and distributing 
sandwiches
95
 to those camped out, hoped to oust the elected March 14
th
 government and 
                                                          
95Hezbollah supporters pitch tents in Beirut- 12/2/2006 4:19:14 – MSNBC 
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get a “clean government”.96 Seemingly, the “victorious” Hezbollah, by such a move, 
wanted to draw the attention elsewhere. Hezbollah wanted to ease the burden of the 
disaster that befell in Lebanon after Hezbollah’s war with Israel. Moreover, Hezbollah 
wanted to delude the Lebanese society and government, Israel, and the international 
community, by demonstrating that a victory over Israel, requires another kind of victory; 
an internal victory whereby they would attain the reins of power in Lebanon. 
The March 14
th
 coalition, which held the parliamentary majority at that time, was ready 
to defend its elected government. Fouad Siniora, the Prime Minister during that course 
of incidents, argued that “this government will continue as long as it enjoys the support 
and backing of the constitutional institutions in the country, most importantly 
Parliament.” 97  The March 14th coalition represented by Siniora, relying on the 
parliamentary majority it had been granted in 2005, “called on Hezbollah to resume 
negotiations over its demand for a bigger role in the government.”98 Siniora stressed 
that “Taking to the streets will not lead us anywhere [and] there is just one way to solve 
our problems and that is to sit behind a table to discuss all our differences …Other than 
that it is a waste of time, waste of resources and waste of opportunities.”99  
 
 The March 14
th
 coalition, defending its political agenda, remained steadfast to its 
position regarding the popular mobility that Hezbollah was leading which had no 
parliamentary basis to supports it. However, at the same time, the cabinet lead by the 
March 14
th
 coalition, was committing serious mistakes, which led to events which 
appeared be happening for the sake of satisfying Hezbollah. Firstly, the government, 
submitting to several threats and Fatwas that were originated by several clerics related 
to Hezbollah, did not make any move towards appointing alternative ministers instead 
of those who had dropped-out. Secondly, the government failed to establish a link with 
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the southern citizens after the war of 2006. It acted in a manner which indicated that 
these citizens are attached to Hezbollah, and thus, the latter alone has got the right to 
regulate their affairs. The financial compensation that the government was supposed to 
pay to those affected by the 2006 war was not going through proper official channels, 
but through channels managed and directed entirely by party officials belonging to the 
Amal movement and Hezbollah, which gave the impression that Hezbollah was paying.  
From December 2006, the date that marked the beginning of the sit-ins, until May 2008, 
the date which marked a forced resolution, the political situation in Lebanon remained 
rigid. On the one hand, the Lebanese government stood firm and stuck to its position, 
judging Hezbollah’s action as a tantamount to an attempt coup d’état (Hirst 2011), 
while on the other hand Hezbollah continued its sit-in in downtown Beirut, which 
forced many businesses to close down. This situation deteriorated into clashes between 
both supporters; the worst of these clashes was in 2007 which left 7 dead and 250 
injured (Hirst 2011). Moreover, Hezbollah’s campaign coincided with new 
assassinations including those of ministers and MPs. It was believed at that time that 
these assassinations were happening in order to decrease the majority’s number of MP’s, 
which consequently enabled the minority to weaken people’s confidence in the 
government, and hence bring them down. 
On the 6
th
 of May 2008, the Lebanese government decided, after the discovery of a 
private telecommunication network owned and run by Hezbollah in most parts of the 
country, to outlaw and dismantle it. The Lebanese government, after an overnight 
meeting, considered the telecommunication network of Hezbollah to be an illegal one 
and one which constitutes an assault on the sovereignty of the state as well as public 
money. The government called for the launch of criminal prosecutions against anyone 
found involved in the process, whether individuals, parties, organizations or companies. 
Moreover, the government rejected the argument which states that the protection of 
Hezbollah requires the establishment of such a network. The government also decided 
to follow-up the issue of the CCTV cameras that were found directed to the main 
runway of the airport, and which the government believed to have been installed by 
Hezbollah. The government, considering these cameras as a threat and as a violation to 
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Lebanon’s sovereignty, decided to reassign the pro-Hezbollah Beirut airport’s security 
chief because of his failure to meet his responsibilities.
100
   
After announcing these resolutions, an alleged civil disobedience movement, organized 
by Hezbollah and its allies, took place which led to the shutting Beirut’s airport and 
major roadways.
101
 Subsequently, Hezbollah’s Secretary General, Sayyed Hassan 
Nasrallah, held a press conference and said that “the Lebanese government's decision to 
close down its private telecommunications network was a "declaration of war"”.102 
Publicizing that a totally new era is being embarked, Nasrallah “warned that the move 
was "for the benefit of America and Israel" and vowed to "cut off the hand" that tries to 
dismantle it.”103 Accusing the government of being a “gang”, Nasrallah argued that 
"Whoever declares war against us and who launches a war against us even if he's our 
father or brother, or just a political opponent, we have the right to confront him to 
defend ourselves, to defend our weapons, to defend our resistance and to defend our 
existence."
104
 After Nasrallah’s press conference, “the protest movement turned into a 
deliberate and well-planned operation to take over West Beirut.”105 According to the 
International Crisis Group, Hezbollah soldiers in addition to those of the Amal 
movement, the militia headed by the Speaker of the Parliament, with far greater 
equipment, training and self-restraint, took control in few hours of west Beirut, the 
section of the capital that includes government Head Quarters. In addition to attacking 
Beirut, Hezbollah managed to strike an assault on Mount Lebanon in which the Druze 
Leader’s Walid Junblatt’s Supporters are based. Moreover, the assault reached south 
Lebanon, wherein “Sayyed Ali al-Amin, the grand old man of Lebanese Shi’ism” 
(Taheri 2006) was attacked and his offices and residence were seized. Hezbollah’s 
assault cannot be described as a sectarian assault, but as a political one since it involved 
leaders from different sects. In other words, Hezbollah was targeting its opponents for 
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just being opponents, whether Sunni, Shia, Druze, etc. Furthermore, the armed clashes 
in Beirut in which Hezbollah was involved did not take place because the second part 
was Sunni, but rather, because it was an armed defender of the government. The 
aforementioned events flout several allegations which state that Hezbollah’s assaults 
were confined to a certain sect .i.e. a sectarian one.     
During the violence in May, Hezbollah’s opposing Media institutions were attacked; 
“the Future News station was shut down, the station's former headquarters, which were 
serving as an archive, were torched to the ground, and the offices of Al-Mustaqbal 
newspaper were attacked, burned and shut down”(Koteich 2008). It may be argued that 
the attacks on media institutions indicates that the May assaults led by Hezbollah were 
not only intending to force the government to back off, but rather it was a knockout 
blow to all those who oppose Hezbollah’s agenda in Lebanon, whether they were 
individuals, groups, political parties or institutions.  
Being unable to have the army nor any of the security forces involved in enforcing the 
rule of law or defending the government against such assaults, and being unable to offer 
any kind of organized “armed resistance” on the ground, the government, and 
consequently the March 14
th
 leaders, managed only to issue strong spoken responses 
which had no effect in reality. It was clear, as Nasrallah said that a new era was being 
imposed. On one side, there was an exhausted, disjointed and scattered government, and 
on the other side, there was an armed, organized, trained and coherent organization 
aware of exactly what it was planning for.  
With west Beirut being under siege, and the government being confronted, an internal 
solution to the crisis seemed impossible. However, there were attempts to initiate a 
compromise between both Hezbollah and the government with the help of foreign go-
betweens. A day following an Arab League delegation’s visit, on the 15th of May, an 
agreement was reached, in which the biggest defeat of the government and the March 
14
th
 was chronicled , since 2005. According to that agreement, which happened under 
the conditions announced in Nasrallah’s press conference, the government had to annul 
its decisions, in exchange for “paving the way for a possible return to normalcy in the 
capital and elsewhere.”106 With the soldiers of Hezbollah and its allies still in the streets, 
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the March 14
th
 coalition leaders as well as Hezbollah’s representatives, were invited to 
Qatar to reach a solid Agreement. Nathan J. Brown, a professor of Political Science and 
International Affairs at George Washington University, puts it as follows:  
 
 “The Qatar-negotiated May 21, 2008 Doha accord amicably ended the opposition’s 
military takeover of Beirut and organized a political settlement of the political crisis.  
The sit-in in Beirut’s central district was ended the same day the Accord was signed. 
The Doha accord opened the way for the election of the consensus presidential 
candidate, army Commander General Michael Suleiman on My 25
th
 , 2008 and the 
formation on July 11, 2008 of a national unity government, one in which the 
opposition possessed veto power” (Brown, N. J., & Shahin, E. E. 2010: 145-
146 ).  
 
It can be argued that the Doha agreement did not end the opposition’s military takeover 
of Beirut “amicably”, as argued by Brown, since the political settlement that was 
reached to end the political crisis happened according to Hezbollah’s conditions. In 
other words, the political settlement that was reached happened according to the 
conditions of the winner on the ground, which “amounted to a significant shift of power 
in favor of the militant Shiite group Hezbollah and its allies” (Worth & Bakri 2008). 
The Doha agreement, sided with the point view of the militias, rather than the point 
view of the state. Consequently, the Doha agreement led to a situation where the March 
14
th
 coalition waivered its parliamentary majority, through accepting, by force, that 
Hezbollah, be not just a decision maker in future governments, but also a side that has 
the ability and the right to interrupt any decision that does not fit with its political 
agenda. It can be argued that what happened after the Doha Agreement is a complete 
submission to the de facto authority logic, and thus an obvious failure of all the slogans 
that were raised to support the logic of the state. Thus, the agreement can be described 
as a rock on which all the dreams, hopes and political slogans of the March 14
th
 
coalition were shattered.  
In 2009, another parliamentary election took place. The people who supported the 
March 14
th
 coalition in earlier years decided to grant them a parliamentary majority 
once more. But again, the agenda which the March 14
th
 coalition raised in 2005, and 
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once more in 2009, went down the drain. The blocking third veto in the cabinet which 
was granted to Hezbollah and its allies for the first time in Doha agreement was given 
again to them. The failures of the parliamentary majority in implementing its political 
slogans made them incapable of doing anything to curb Hezbollah. In other words, 
Hezbollah's tutelage on the State, which was imposed through the May 2008 attacks and 
then legitimized through Doha agreement, and the subordination of the majority to these 
pressures, made the March 14
th
 coalition a parliamentary majority that cannot meet the 
promises it made to the people, and thus gave Hezbollah an extra chance to control the 
Lebanese public sphere and national political ground. 
The March 14
th
 coalition leaders claim that they faced some obstacles which made them 
unable to meet their promises. One of which is demonstrated by Saad Hariri, the former 
prime minster and head of the 2005 and 2009 parliamentary majority, who argues that 
when on the 14
th
 of March 2005 people went down to the streets and started 
demonstrating and calling for a democratic Lebanon some politicians did not understand 
what the people were calling for, while others understood but didn’t know how to 
achieve it. Hariri says that there was a part of Lebanon which did not witness the cedar 
revolution of 2005, and since they (the March 14
th
 coalition) believed in democracy and 
dialogue, they decided to extend their hands to those who were elsewhere. However, the 
others, referring to Hezbollah and its allies, did not extend their hands back to share 
their vision in establishing a democratic country. Hariri concludes by stating that the 
weapons of Hezbollah not only are a Lebanese problem but also a regional one, arguing 
that no one in Lebanon is able to negotiate that issue (Hariri 2008).   
While Marwan Hamadeh MP, the former Lebanese Minister of Telecommunications, 
who was injured in a car bomb explosion on October 1st 2004, which it marked the 
beginning of a series of assassinations of Lebanese politicians and journalists, argues 
that the battle in Lebanon is simply a battle between the idea of a Lebanese state, one 
army, one president, one foreign policy, and the parallel state of Hezbollah. Hamadeh 
believes that that some form of partition has been made and implemented since there are 
areas that are not subject to the rules of the Lebanese state, the security and the military 
of Hezbollah are in this category. In addition, he argues that Hezbollah’s foreign policy 
is outside the laws of the state and is a totally independent concept.  Moreover, on one 
side, Hamadeh argues that it is true that Hezbollah is a part of the state , part of the 
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government , part of the parliament and the Lebanese institutions , but on the other side, 
it runs its own state , it has its own government , its own leader , and above their leader 
a supreme guide that God inspired, with whom it is almost impossible to fight with 
since, according to their beliefs, he is not a leader that was assigned through a law voted 
by human-beings but one assigned through his ‘divine right’ from God. Hezbollah, 
according to Hamadeh, has penetrated everything and managed to cover all the country 
with a parallel telecom system, parallel security system, parallel finance system and a 
parallel cultural system, i.e. their own schools. Hamadeh concludes by demonstrating 
that “Hezbollah is trying to copy the Iranian system even in the ways and means, even 
in the Sit-ins, even in the way they attack others, .i.e. uses motorcycles. It is the Tehran 
phenomena of the 1978 and 1979, and I think we are seeing the blue print of the Iranian 
system” (Hamadeh 2009). 
Walid Junblatt MP, the current leader of the Progressive Socialist Party and the leader 
of Lebanon's Druze community, believes that Lebanon, in comparison with the Arab 
world, is a democratic country. However, compared to the western democratic countries, 
Lebanon is not. Believing that the mood of the March 14
th
 coalition does not tend to 
make any change in the current Lebanese regime, Junblatt argues that, on the one side, 
Hezbollah is an obstacle to democracy, but on the other side, he doesn’t see the March 
14
th
 coalition accepting a modern democratic system, .i.e. one man one vote. Regarding 
the weapons of Hezbollah, Jumblatt feels that whilst they are not an obstacle to vote, 
they are obstacle for democracy to prosper. He concludes by arguing that “we have to 
wait until regional circumstances are better so then, by dialogue, Hezbollah will 
surrender” (Junblatt 2009).  
Professor Tarek Mitri, the former minister of information, who believes that Lebanon 
has the democratic structure of a democracy, argues that the process of democratization, 
both social and economic democratization has been affected and delayed by the wars 
Lebanon has had in the last thirty years. He states that in the last thirty years, the 
Lebanese were busy making and negotiating compromise solutions for their crises, and 
these solutions were reached through means which are outside the political democratic 
process. Mitri demonstrates that the Doha agreement of 2008 was one of those solutions 
that had little to do with the norms of democracy. Concerning Hezbollah, Mitri argues 
that the armed organization which is loyal to Iran looks at the democratic process as a 
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mean to achieve a higher goal, i.e. the ‘sacralization’ of its weapons and arms. Mitri 
who believes that democratic competition is about who serves better for the good of the 
public, says that if the only solution for Hezbollah is that they keep their arms, then this 
reveals a setback in their understanding of democracy and for the process of democracy 
itself. Furthermore, he expresses his worries regarding the weapons by saying: 
“I am worried about the sacralization of weapons. I mean, weapons are weapons, 
they are means to a noble cause, but they are not a noble cause in themselves. If you 
use the arms to defend yourself against your enemy, then this is fair, but to reach a 
point where you use the arms to defend the arms, this is too much. It is an ethical 
question, and I oppose any sacralization of the arms. Arms are what they are, they 
are an evil, and we worship God, not arms” (Metri 2009). 
  
Some of the March 14
th
 leaders can easily diagnose the problem in Lebanon, indeed 
some of them are fully aware of its complexity and roots. Additionally, they realize that 
a sovereign, independent and democratic Lebanese state cannot be built with the 
presence of Hezbollah’s state-within-the-state. In some parts of the interviews 
mentioned above, it was clear that the March 14
th
 coalition leaders were courageous 
enough to undertake self-criticism, and disapprove of some of their policies since 2005, 
for example Hariri. While Walid Junblatt, who later resigned from the political coalition, 
was very clear in his criticism to the latter. In the interview that was conducted with him 
before leaving the coalition, Junblatt did not see that his colleagues were serious enough 
to implement their political slogans regarding democracy. He came to this conviction 
after witnessing, at that period of time; some of the March 14
th
  leaders accepting 
certain adjustments on the electoral law, which came to reflect their own interests, but 
not democratic values. Junblatt argued that Lebanon, compared to the Arab World, is a 
democratic country, while if compared to the Western one, then it is not. Perhaps, 
Junblatt, in this case, indicates that Lebanon, in comparison with its neighbours, has a 
sort of respect for some of democracy’s rituals, like elections, although not considering 
whether they are conducted properly or not, freedom, although not considering whether 
it is fully respected or not, in addition to the institutions that constitute the Lebanese 
political system. But when it comes to comparing Lebanon with the Western world, 
Junblatt’s argument indicates that Lebanon is far from meeting any of democracy’s 
requirements. Marwan Hamadeh emphasised, in the interview conducted with him, 
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Syrian hegemony as well as Hezbollah’s expansion inside Lebanon. Hamadeh was clear 
in showing that Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed armed organisation, is sabotaging and 
impeding any possible progress and development of the Lebanese political system. 
Moreover, Hamadeh who believes that Hezbollah is trying to imitate the Iranian system 
in Lebanon hinted that Hezbollah is an obstacle to the political coalition he belongs to, 
and restricts their ability to apply their political slogans and agenda. Tarik Metri, who is 
not a March 14
th
 coalition member, but an ally who believes in democratic values, 
agrees with the research’s point of view, which states that Lebanon has elements of the 
democratic structure of a democracy. Furthermore, Lebanon has some very basic 
features of democracy, such as elections etc., but it has not attained the level whereby it 
can be described as a democratic country, given the internal and external factors that 
hinder it. Metri indicates that the illegal weapons are one of the main obstacles in 
Lebanon, which prevent the country from developing institutions and its political 
system in a form that corresponds with democratic values.  
 
6.5 Two Scenarios of Governance   
 
(a). Hezbollah into Power  
 
In 2007, the Secretary General of Hezbollah addressed the Lebanese state and the ruling 
party at that time with the statement: “When you become a state, come and ask us not to 
be a state within a state”.107  Nasrallah, who is known in Lebanon as a seasoned political 
and martial leader, did not publicize such a talk in vain. Nasrallah evidently recognizes 
that his party is stronger than the state, and that it does not need more than a Lebanese 
state that gives his armed organisation some kind of legitimacy, either by turning a blind 
eye to its activities, or at maximum, supporting its political spectrum. In other words, on 
one side, Hezbollah, who is strong enough to be able to impose appointing ministers 
that failed in parliamentary elections, does not need to govern Lebanon directly, as in 
the case when its opponents govern. Hezbollah knows that the state cannot marginalize 
                                                          
107 http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&article=414249&issueno=10359 
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its role or disarm it by force, and thus, will turn a blind eye on its activities. On the other 
side, Hezbollah knows that if its allies rule, then it will be able to pass its policies 
without any obstacle at all, and therefore, it would be a legitimate party running the 
country from behind the scenes. 
In short, Hezbollah is acquainted with the fact that governing the country directly, in the 
light of the diversity that Lebanese society enjoys, is not a possible mission, or a task 
that requires abandoning a lot of its political and religious beliefs. However, this does 
not mean that Hezbollah is frugal in achieving such a goal. But, as long as the state’s 
authority stops at the border drawn by the Hezbollah, and as long as the authority of the 
whole state remains a hostage which is not allowed to exceed the margin laid down by 
the armed organisation, the safest option for Hezbollah remains to upholding and to 
stick to the current gains and powers that it is enjoying.  
  (b). The March 14 into power  
 
On the 7
th
 of May 2008, Lebanon witnessed an armed assault on the State, the 
parliamentary majority and the citizens. Such an assault, was able to impose de facto by 
force, and resulted in the March 14
th
 coalition losing its political battle, as well as 
retreating in its political agenda announced in both 2005 and 2009. However, the blame 
does not only fall on Hezbollah’s strength and determination alone, but it also falls on 
the March 14
th
 coalition, which was too weak to achieve what it called for, and therefore 
too weak to put an end to Hezbollah’s ambitions. It can be argued that the decline 
started in 2005, the year which marked the establishment of the independence 
movement. Instead of imposing the rule of Law, the governing majority decided to 
negotiate on how to apply and enforce the rule of law, which, consequently, exposed to 
Hezbollah not the principles that the March 14
th
 coalition held, but the fragility of the 
mechanism being used to apply them. The initiative for dialogue which the March 14
th
 
coalition accepted and approved, between those who call for the application of law, the 
restoration of state sovereignty and the establishment of a democratic political system 
based on freedom, justice and equality, and against those who speak of breaking the rule 
of law and insist on violating the state’s sovereignty, marked a clear breakup for its true 
independence and its democratic dynamic project. The dialogue which the 
parliamentary majority chose marked a decline in the momentum of the change it called 
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for. It was an incongruous gamble to think of accommodating Hezbollah in the state 
system, especially in light of the clear political slogans that the latter rises. Moreover, 
the March 14
th
 coalition’s parliamentary majority made a mistake when it considered 
Hezbollah as an exceptional case that represents that entire Shiite community, without 
taking into consideration that this party did not get the popular majority in this 
community in any of the recent parliamentary elections. In addition, the biggest mistake 
that the March 14
th
 coalition committed, which overthrew everything it stood for over 
the years, was diminishing the government decisions and going after the May 7
th
 attacks, 
to Doha, to draft an agreement based on concession to those who oppose the rule of law. 
The March 14
th
 coalition, as a governing political coalition, did not waiver some of its 
rights by doing so, but waivered the rights of the state which it was governing.   
In short, after the events that took place on March 14
th
 2005, the democratic process in 
Lebanon was moving ahead, but in a step which contrasted to the will of the people, the 
March 14
th
 political coalition decided to regress. The March 14
th
 coalition could not, 
despite its full familiarity with the fact that excessive settlements and waivers affect the 
prestige of the state and, therefore, strengthen the logic of the illegality, achieve any of 
what they had called for and promised. However, the weakness that prevailed in the 
performance of the March 14
th
 coalition was, in addition to the aforementioned, a result 
of the absence of the balance of power in Lebanon. Hezbollah, because of its both its 
determination and strength, was able to demonstrate the inability of the March 14
th
 
coalition in governing Lebanon. However, if the balance of power in Lebanon could be 
restored, starting with the disarming of Hezbollah, then the March 14
th
 coalition may 
have the opportunity to apply its political agenda and slogans which call for the building 
of a just, sovereign, democratic and modern Lebanese state.  
 
 
7. Chapter Seven: Conclusion  
 
Sadly, the vague and ambiguous Lebanese model of “democracy” resembles that of 
world politics; it is basically complex and to a certain extent, chaotic.  Most of the 
political parties, including the so-called secular parties which, to a certain extent, have 
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tried to overcome confessional obstacles, fail to demonstrate a national agenda.  In 
many cases they also remain subjected to various foreign political and ideological 
influences coming from both regional and non-regional countries. Such Political parties 
in Lebanon face a deep problem which stems from them opposing the concept of 
democracy when dealing with Lebanon’s internal issues. In other words, the prevailing 
model that these political parties are part of fundamentally opposes democracy, and the 
structure of these parties defies the actual mechanisms of representative democracy as 
well as the Lebanese liberal democratic aspirations.  
Initially, when dealing with the case of Lebanon, I was hesitant to apply any of the 
described theories relating to democracy. This hesitancy emanated from the lack of 
democracy theories that deal with non-sovereign states. Sovereignty is well-connected 
to democracy as it includes the state’s capability, and willingness, to maintain the rule 
of law and uphold political rights throughout its territory. In other words, a sovereign 
state is required for a democracy, and the challenges of providing a democracy cannot 
be overcome “unless the territorial entity is recognised as a sovereign state” (Linz & 
Stepan 1996:18).  
Being a type of political governance, democracy needs the characteristics of a modern 
sovereign state to be applied. These characteristics include an administration capable of 
raising taxes, providing public services according to the needs of the electorate, and 
monopolising the legitimate use of force. With regard to Lebanon, it currently lacks 
state-like characteristics in some of its territories, and its government, regardless of 
whether it is elected democratically or not, is still not able to enforce a monopoly on the 
legitimate use of force in these territories.  Nor is it able to collect, for example, taxes or 
properly run its judicial system. Thus, it can be argued that applying democracy would 
be very difficult, if not possible, given the absence of the features of most modern 
sovereign states.  
This thesis examined the various obstacles to democracy in Lebanon as well as the 
country’s political synthesis and the imbalance of power amongst the various political 
parties involved.  Divided into seven main chapters, the thesis provided an overview 
and analysis of the Lebanese case, with some chapters based on secondary sources, 
while others were based on both secondary sources and primary sources collected 
during a research trip to Lebanon between 2008 and 2009.  
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Chapter one detailed the research aims, objectives and the methodology of the thesis, as 
well as a literature review. The first part of this review focused on existing works on 
democracy and political culture. A number of major studies on political culture and 
democracy were surveyed, in an attempt to find out how, after the Second World War, 
some nations came to support democratic systems while other nations turned to 
authoritarian regimes, and also the interaction of the citizens with the political process. 
In this chapter, a relevant literature on the culture of the Arab world and Islam was 
reviewed. Moreover, a literature review was conducted on the political history of 
Lebanon, from independence, through the war of Lebanon, leading to the post-Taif 
Accord, and ending with the major transitions that took place after the assassination of 
Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri. A literature review of democracy in Lebanon then 
followed, as I aimed to study the history of democracy in the country, and in particular 
where it succeeded and where it stalled. 
Chapter Two provided a historical background wherein the main concepts and 
definitions of democracy were discussed. Subsequently, it provided an overview of the 
various approaches regarding the study of democracy and democratization. Also, this 
chapter analysed and investigated the notion of democracy and the main phases it has 
gone through since records began. Moreover, the chapter outlined some of the 
theoretical aspects of democracy, along with its practical tools and procedures.   
Chapter three discussed the development of Lebanon as a nation-state since 1943 when 
it first gained independence from the French mandate. Moreover, it discussed the 
French mandate of Lebanon, the 1926 constitution, and some of its articles that 
respected, recognized and documented democratic principles of governance and the 
gradual transition from the Mandate Era to the independent state. Additionally, the 
chapter assessed the way the Lebanese political system functioned before and after the 
civil war. Furthermore, it tried to draw a link between the operation of the Lebanese 
institutions and upholding democracy through examining whether the functioning of 
those institutions supported the democratic functioning of the state or failed to do so. It 
also discussed the institutional synthesis of the Lebanese political system and how the 
translation of the constitutional structure reflected the stability of the current model of 
“democracy”. In this chapter, it became clear that the Lebanese state was able to regain 
some sense of stability as a result of the Taif agreement, but this was not harnessed to 
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help stabilise Lebanon’s sovereignty or to properly rebuild its democratic institutions. 
Political leaders did not act in unison after the agreement and did not follow the 
conditions it laid out for re-establishing the institutions of state on a firm foundation. In 
fact, what did emerge in Lebanon was a series of dysfunctional institutions that do not 
act in the public interest, but are rather rife with corruption and unnecessary 
extravagance. They do not favour competence and integrity, but rather reward 
favouritism and blind subordination to political leaders and not to the interests of the 
state. 
In Chapter Four I reviewed some of the internal barriers and hindrances that have 
impeded the development of an effective democratic system in Lebanon. The chapter 
examined how these hindrances shook and disturbed the approach for democracy in 
Lebanon. Furthermore, the chapter discussed the absence of the features of a modern 
sovereign state in Lebanon and how this has affected “democracy”, arguing that 
achieving democracy and the presence of a sovereign state are interlinked. Also, it was 
noted in this chapter that sectarianism in Lebanon remains an obvious source of 
disruption for the stability of the Lebanese political system, and thus for democracy. 
Moreover, sectarianism as it currently exists, and without taking into consideration 
implementing the reforms concerning the abolition of sectarianism and political 
sectarianism outlined in the Taif agreement, proves itself a hindrance for the spreading 
of a democratic culture. Additionally, sectarian power sharing stands in contradiction 
with the principle of political equality of all Lebanese. It was also noted in this chapter 
that elections, as a key precondition for accessing democracy, sometimes become a key 
regime survival strategy and, therefore, are no longer in themselves sufficient evidence 
of a true and efficient democracy. In Lebanon, elections certainly do not seem to be a 
source of promoting democratic life and fostering the so-called democratic system. 
Moreover, for democracy to be functioning properly, competitive elections should take 
place. In addition, if democracy “means only that the people have the opportunity of 
accepting or refusing the men who are to rule them,” (Davenport & Armstrong 
2004:538-554)  Lebanon’s democracy is some distance from this definition, as most 
people do not play a key role in accepting or refusing candidates, due to the influences 
they are exposed to. In other words, if a parliamentary election takes place, and for 
example is overwhelmed by fraud and bribery, the results will not lead to the 
strengthening of democracy; on the contrary, they will lead to the death of democracy. 
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Finally, the chapter discussed Lebanon’s on-going violations of human rights, 
especially of the refugees – many of whom are subject to racial discrimination. Since it 
is commonly agreed that a democracy is expected to lessen its willingness and 
capability to violate human rights, Lebanon’s violation of refugees’ human rights can be 
seen as another internal hindrance to democracy.                                                                
Chapter five focused on external hindrances to Lebanon’s democracy. It examined how 
these external factors manipulated the Lebanese institutions, internal policies and 
foreign affairs. Moreover, it provided an analysis of how each one of these factors 
disturbed the application of democracy in Lebanon. As observed from this chapter, 
external interventions resulted in huge violations of Lebanese sovereignty. Moreover, 
external influences and interventions were, and still are, authoritative enough to 
influence domestic politics and to control the state’s institutions. Moreover, external 
powers, when they become influential enough to determine domestic policies, often 
impede the right of citizens to decide about the system of government they prefer, or 
decide about the policies of their government.  The chapter found that such 
interventions often result in a lack of the structures of a modern sovereign state in 
Lebanon. In addition, it was concluded in the chapter that if democracy means “rule of 
the people”, then, does external intervention allow any role for the people to play? The 
“rule of the people” cannot go in parallel with foreign interference and occupation, and 
thus is no longer valid under these two conditions.  
Chapter six tried to find the connection between Hezbollah and Iran, and shed light on 
the organic relationship between them. Moreover, it provided, in addition to what was 
discussed in Chapter four, a thorough account of Hezbollah –and its armed militia. 
Moreover, this chapter investigated the way this armed organisation managed to reach 
the stage where it became more powerful than the Lebanese state and its legitimate 
armed forces. The chapter discussed Hezbollah’s opponents in Lebanon, mainly the 
political parties which gathered under the umbrella of a political coalition called the 
March 14 coalition. It also examined how Lebanon has now become clearly divided into 
two rival factions, each with its own political agenda. Finally, this chapter analysed two 
possible scenarios of state governance in Lebanon. 
It can be stated that the political system of governance in Lebanon, remains anything 
but a democracy; if a country is in the grip of an illegally armed organisation, even with 
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the existence of some signs of democracy, it is not possible to maintain a democratic 
system operating under the rule of law that governs the interaction and co-existence of 
all citizens and creates the basic conditions through which they can pursue and 
guarantee their civil rights. Thus, with the existence of an abusive use of power by a 
certain group, and with the lack of a state’s monopoly of power, it remains impossible 
to apply the rule of law that guards and observes the maintenance of democracy. 
Consequently, in such a chaotic kind of system, applying democracy remains a mere 
dream.  
Though being a cornerstone of democracy, the rule of law is still absent in Lebanon.  
The rule of law as it is commonly understood, enables democracy to ensure the 
maintenance of human rights, to create a lively civil and political society, to restore 
public confidence in the state’s institutions, judicial system, and above all in an 
accountable government. However, in Lebanon, the situation does not conform to these 
rules. For it can be clearly seen that some citizens fear for their safety and do not have 
an equal say in matters concerning their lives. Unelected “political leaders” can wilfully 
apply their policies by force, thus rendering parts of the country off-limits to state 
control. In addition, illegal, arbitrary weapons exist everywhere as part of an illegitimate 
governing body, and the results of elections when even conducted, are not respected. 
Indeed, those in power have usually been supported or installed by foreign powers, and 
political assassinations remain a means of removing political opponents, resulting in a 
state where sovereignty is violated, and where freedom is not fully protected. 
Furthermore, fringe institutions similar to those run by the state continue to exist and 
often do so in order to compete with the state. Moreover, the situation continues to 
allow proxy wars to be launched in Lebanon without the parties involved having 
permission from the Lebanese Government or without conducting any referendum 
among the Lebanese people. Thus, as it stands, in a state such as this, there is currently 
not much left for the legitimate state to rule, govern or decide on policy. 
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